INDIA

LORD PRIVY SEAL'S MISSION

AND

OTHER REPORTS

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

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1 India (Lord Privy Seal's Mission)

2 Report of the Bannu Enquiry Committee

3 Some facts about the disturbances in India 1942-43

4 Congress responsibility for the disturbances 1942-43

INDIA
(Lord Privy Seal's Mission)

Statement and Draft Declaration by His Majesty's Government with correspondence and Resolutions connected therewith

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Presented by the Secretary of State for India to Parliament
by Command of His Majesty
April, 1942

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STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 11TH MARCH, 1942.

The crisis in the affairs of India arising out of the Japanese advance has made us wish to rally all the forces of Indian life, to guard their land from the menace of the invader. In August, 1940, a full statement was made about the aims and policy we are pursuing in India. This amounted, in short, to a promise that, as soon as possible after the war, India should attain Dominion status, in full freedom and equality with this country and the other Dominions, under a Constitution to be framed by Indians, by agreement among themselves and acceptable to the main elements in Indian national life. This was, of course, subject to the fulfilment of our obligations for the protection of minorities, including the depressed classes, and of our treaty obligations to the Indian States, and to the settlement of certain lesser matters arising out of our long association with the fortunes of the Indian sub-continent.

However, Sir, in order to clothe these general declarations with precision and to convince all classes, races and creeds in India of our sincere resolve, the War Cabinet have agreed unitedly upon conclusions for present and future action which, if accepted by India as a whole, would avoid the alternative dangers either that the resistance of a powerful minority might impose an indefinite veto upon the wishes of the majority or that a majority decision might be taken which would be resisted to a point destructive of internal harmony and fatal to the setting-up of a new Constitution. We had thought of setting forth immediately the terms of this attempt, by a constructive British contribution, to aid India in the realisation of full self-government; we are, however, apprehensive that to make a public announcement at such a moment as this might do more harm than good. We must first assure ourselves that our scheme would win a reasonable and practical measure of acceptance, and thus promote the concentration of all Indian thought and energies upon the defence of the native soil. We should ill serve the common cause if we made a declaration which would be rejected by essential elements in the Indian world, and which provoked fierce constitutional and communal disputes at a moment when the enemy is at the gates of India.

Accordingly, we propose to send a member of the War Cabinet to India, to satisfy himself upon the spot, by personal consultation, that the conclusions upon which we are agreed, and which we believe represent a just and final solution, will achieve their purpose. My right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House has volunteered to undertake this task. He carries with him the full confidence of His Majesty's Government, and he will strive in their name to procure the necessary measure of assent, not only from the Hindu majority, but also from those great minorities, amongst which the Moslems are the most numerous and on many grounds pre-eminent.

The Lord Privy Seal will, at the same time, consult with the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief upon the military situation, bearing always in mind the paramount responsibility of His Majesty's Government by every means in their power to shield the peoples of India from the perils which now beset them. We must remember that India has a great part to play in the world's struggle for freedom and that her helping hand must be extended in loyal comradeship to the valiant Chinese people, who have fought alone so long. We must remember also that India is one of the bases from which the strongest counter-blows must be struck at the advance of tyranny and aggression.

My right hon. Friend will set out as soon as convenient and suitable arrangements can be made. I am sure he will command in his task the heartfelt good wishes of all parts of the House and that, meanwhile, no word will be spoken or Debates be held, here or in India, which would add to the burden

he has assumed in his mission, or lessen the prospects of a good result. During my right hon. and learned Friend's absence from this House, his duties as Leader will be discharged by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary.

DRAFT DECLARATION FOR DISCUSSION WITH INDIAN LEADERS PUBLISHED 30TH MARCH, 1942.

The conclusions of the British War Cabinet as set out below are those which Sir Stafford Cripps has taken with him for discussion with the Indian Leaders and the question as to whether they will be implemented will depend upon the outcome of these discussions which are now taking place.

His Majesty's Government, having considered the anxieties expressed in this country and in India as to the fulfilment of the promises made in regard to the future of India, have decided to lay down in precise and clear terms the steps which they propose shall be taken for the earliest possible realisation of self-government in India. The object is the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs.

His Majesty's Government therefore make the following declaration:—

(*a*) Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps shall be taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an elected body charged with the task of framing a new Constitution for India.

(*b*) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for the participation of the Indian States in the constitution-making body.

(*c*) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the Constitution so framed subject only to:—

(i) the right of any Province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new Constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so decides.

With such non-acceding Provinces, should they so desire, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new Constitution, giving them the same full status as Indian Union, and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down.

(ii) the signing of a Treaty which shall be negotiated between His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making body. This Treaty will cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands; it will make provision, in accordance with the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government, for the protection of racial and religious minorities; but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian Union to decide in the future its relationship to the other Member States of the British Commonwealth.

Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the Constitution, it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its Treaty arrangements, so far as this may be required in the new situation.

(*d*) the constitution-making body shall be composed as follows, unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities agree upon some other form before the end of hostilities:—

Immediately upon the result being known of the provincial elections which will be necessary at the end of hostilities, the entire

membership of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures shall, as a single electoral college, proceed to the election of the constitution-making body by the system of proportional representation. This new body shall be in number about one-tenth of the number of the electoral college.

Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion to their total population as in the case of the representatives of British India as a whole, and with the same powers as the British Indian members.

(*e*) During the critical period which now faces India and until the new Constitution can be framed His Majesty's Government must inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain control and direction of the defence of India as part of their world war effort, but the task of organising to the full the military, moral and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India with the co-operation of the peoples of India. His Majesty's Government desire and invite the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to give their active and constructive help in the discharge of a task which is vital and essential for the future freedom of India.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS AND MAULANA ABUL KALAM AZAD AND MR. M. A. JINNAH.

(1)

Letter from Sir S. CRIPPS *to* MAULANA AZAD *dated 30th March,* 1942.

I had the opportunity of a short talk with His Excellency the Viceroy last night, during which he discussed with me his views as to the implementation of Clause (e) of the draft Declaration. It must be clearly understood that the final definition of the division of responsibilities between His Majesty's Government and the Government of India is as stated in paragraph (*e*) of the Document. I propose to make the position as to this as clear as I can in my broadcast to-night. The Viceroy would be prepared to consult with Indian leaders on this basis to see whether it were possible to designate an Indian to some office connected with the Government of India's defence responsibilities, without in any way impinging upon the functions and duties of the Commander-in-Chief, either in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in India or as the Member of the Executive Council in charge of defence. I give you this information as you put the question to me when last I had the pleasure of seeing you.

(A similar letter was sent to Mr. M. A. Jinnah.)

(2)

Letter from Sir S. CRIPPS *to* MAULANA AZAD *dated 1st April,* 1942.

I understand from the Press that difficulties are still in the mind of Congress as to the question of the responsibility for the defence of India. I have done what I could to clarify this point but as I think it would be a tragedy if negotiations were to break down upon any misunderstanding of the position I should like to suggest that I should ask the Commander-in-Chief to meet yourself and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru with myself in order that he may explain fully to you the technical difficulties of the situation and in order that you may make to him any suggestions you wish as to the division of

responsibilities in this sphere of Government. Unfortunately he is at the moment away in Calcutta but he is expected back on Saturday next at the latest (and possibly earlier). If you consider this a helpful suggestion—as I hope you will—I will ask him the moment he returns whether he will be prepared to attend such a meeting and I do not anticipate that there will be any difficulty about it. I am sure you will realise that I do not want to be met with an impasse if there is any reasonable way out.

(3)

Letter from MAULANA AZAD *to* Sir S. CRIPPS *dated 1st April,* 1942.

I have your letter of to-day's date for which I thank you. If you so desire it I shall gladly meet the Commander-in-Chief and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru will I hope be able to accompany me. My Committee have already arrived at a decision in regard to the proposals communicated by you to us. It was my intention to send this to you this evening or possibly to take it over in person in case you wished to discuss any point contained in it. This decision naturally covers other points also apart from defence. I hope to send it to you some time to-day. If you wish to meet me again in regard to this I shall gladly meet you.

(4)

Letter from Sir S. CRIPPS *to* MAULANA AZAD *dated 2nd April,* 1942.

Mr. Jinnah has asked me to give him a clear picture of the method by which I have proposed that a Province should decide whether it will or will not join an Indian Union set up in accordance with the procedure laid down in His Majesty's Government's draft declaration. I have told him in reply that the proposition which I have put orally to him and to the other leaders is that a Province should reach its decision by a vote in the Legislative Assembly on a resolution that the Province should join the Indian Union and that, if the majority for accession is less than 60%, the minority would have the right to demand a plebiscite of the adult male population. I explained this to you at our first meeting but as I have written to Mr. Jinnah in this sense I thought it desirable to give you a similar letter.

(5)

Letter from SIR S. CRIPPS *to* MAULANA AZAD *dated April 3rd,* 1942.

I have now been able to see His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and he will be very glad to meet you and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to discuss the position regarding defence. Subject to your convenience 6 o'clock to-morrow evening would suit General Wavell, and if you can manage this I suggest that you should come here at 10 minutes to 6 p.m. and I will go up with you to the Commander-in-Chief's office. If there are any specific points of detail about organisation which you wish to raise I should be very much obliged if you could let me have a note of them to-night or first thing to-morrow morning, so that the Commander-in-Chief can consider them before the meeting.

(6)

Letter from MAULANA AZAD *to* SIR S. CRIPPS dated 4th April, 1942.

Thanks for your letter of to-day's date. From our talk yesterday I had gathered the impression that we were likely to meet the Commander-in-Chief some time to-day and we had arranged our programme accordingly, but as this is not convenient to him we shall meet him to-morrow at 6 p.m. as suggested and reach your house at 5.50 p.m. I do not think it is necessary

for me to send a note about organisational details. We are interested as you know in the political aspect of the problem, the full popular control of defence as well as all other departments of administration. We consider such control essential before responsibility can be undertaken. Our views on this subject and others are embodied in the resolution I gave you yesterday and it is with that background that we should like to consider the subject of defence. Problems of higher strategy may well be controlled by inter-Allied Cabinets or Councils, but the effectual control of the defence of India should rest with the Indian National Government.

(7)

Letter from SIR S. CRIPPS *to* MAULANA AZAD *dated 7th April*, 1942.

I have as I promised when I last saw you consulted His Majesty's Government as to what further step could be taken in order to meet the criticism of your Working Committee, that under clause (*e*) of the draft declaration the defence of India would not fall to be administered by a representative Indian. Although, as the Working Committee have fully understood, it is impossible to make any change in the existing constitution during the period of hostilities, His Majesty's Government are anxious to give representative Indians the maximum possible participation in the Government during that period. In accordance with the principle laid down in clause (*e*) of the draft declaration I have explained to you the technical difficulties with regard to the position of the Commander-in-Chief and will not here reiterate them. I have also pointed out that all those main aspects of the defence of India which at present fall under the care of other members of the Executive (*e.g.*, civil defence, supply, home affairs, communications, etc., etc.) will, if the scheme is accepted, be administered by representative members in the new National Government. His Majesty's Government are however anxious to do their utmost to meet the wishes of the Indian people and to demonstrate their complete trust in the co-operative effort of the two peoples, British and Indian, which they hope may reinforce the defence of India. They also appreciate the force of the arguments that have been put forward as to the necessities of an effective appeal to the Indian peoples for their own defence.

I am therefore authorised to propose to you as a way out of the present difficulties that (*a*) the Commander-in-Chief should retain a seat on the Viceroy's Executive Council as War Member and should retain his full control over all the war activities of the armed forces in India subject to the control of His Majesty's Government and the War Cabinet, upon which body a representative Indian should sit with equal powers in all matters relating to the defence of India. Membership of the Pacific Council would likewise be offered to a representative Indian. (*b*) An Indian representative member would be added to the Viceroy's Executive who would take over those sections of the Department of Defence which can organisationally be separated immediately from the Commander-in-Chief's War Department and which are specified under head (I) of the annexure. In addition this member would take over the Defence Co-ordination Department which is at present directly under the Viceroy and certain other important functions of the Government of India which are directly related to defence and which do not fall under any of the other existing departments, and which are specified under head (II) of the annexure.

His Majesty's Government very much hope, as I personally hope, that this arrangement will enable the Congress to come into the scheme, so that if other important bodies of Indian opinion are also willing it will be possible for His Excellency the Viceroy to embark forthwith upon the task of forming the new National Government in consultation with the leaders of Indian opinion.

(A similar letter was sent to Mr. Jinnah).

Annex (I).—Matters now dealt with in the Defence Department which would be transferred to a Defence Co-ordination Department:—

(*a*) Public relations.

(*b*) Demobilisation and post war reconstruction.

(*c*) Petroleum officer whose functions are to calculate the requirements of and make provision for all petroleum products required for the Army, Navy and Air Force, and for the civil departments, including storage and distribution.

(*d*) Indian representation on the Eastern Group Supply Council.

(*e*) Amenities for and welfare of troops and their dependants including Indian soldiers' boards.

(*f*) All canteen organisations.

(*g*) Certain non-technical educational institutions, *e.g.*, Lawrence schools, K.G.R.I.M. schools, and the Prince of Wales's Royal Indian Military College.

(*h*) Stationery, printing, and forms for the Army.

(*i*) Reception, accommodation, and social arrangements for all foreign missions, representatives, and offices.

Annex (II).—In addition the Defence Co-ordination Department would take over many major questions bearing directly on defence but difficult to locate in any particular existing departments; examples are denial policy, evacuation from threatened areas, signals co-ordination, economic warfare.

(8)

After further consideration of the formula contained in the second paragraph of letter No. (7), a new formula was evolved and submitted to the Congress leaders.

Draft Alternative Formula on Defence.

(*a*) The Defence Department shall be placed in the charge of a representative Indian Member, but certain functions relating to the conduct of the war will be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief, who will control the armed forces in India, and who will be a Member of the Executive Council in charge of the War Department.

(*b*) This Department will take over such functions as are to be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief as War Member. A list of such functions has been prepared and is attached.

(*c*) The Defence Member shall be in charge of all other matters relating to Defence in the Defence Department and those now dealt with by the Defence Co-ordination Department, in addition to other important matters closely related to Defence.

(*d*) In the event of any new functions falling to be discharged in relation to Defence or any dispute arising as to the allocation of any old functions it shall be decided by His Majesty's Government.

The following is the list referred to in (*b*) above:

The War Department will be responsible for the governmental relations of General Headquarters, Naval Headquarters and Air Headquarters, which include:

(1) examining and sanctioning all proposals emanating from General Headquarters, Naval Headquarters and Air Headquarters;

(2) representing the policy of Government on all questions connected with the war which originate in or concern General Headquarters, Naval Headquarters, or Air Headquarters;

(3) acting as the channel of communication between the Government of India and His Majesty's Government on all such questions;

(4) acting as liaison between these Headquarters and other Departments of the Government, and Provincial Governments.

(9)

Letter from MAULANA AZAD *to* SIR S. CRIPPS *dated 10th April, 1942.*

On April 2nd I sent you the resolution of the Working Committee* of the Congress containing their views of the tentative proposals put forward by you on behalf of the British Government. In this resolution we expressed our dissent from several important and far-reaching proposals for the future. Further consideration of these proposals has only strengthened us in our conviction in regard to them and we should like to repeat that we cannot accept them as suggested. The Working Committee's resolution gives expression to our conclusions relating to them, which we reached after the most earnest consideration.

That resolution however emphasized the gravity of the present situation and stated that the ultimate decision that we might take would be governed by the changes made in the present. The over-riding problem before all of us, and more especially before all Indians, is the defence of the country from aggression and invasion. The future, important as it is, will depend on what happens in the next few months and years. We were therefore prepared to do without any assurances for this uncertain future, hoping that through our sacrifices in the defence of our country we would lay the solid and enduring foundations for a free and independent India. We concentrated therefore on the present.

Your original proposals in regard to the present, as contained in Clause (*e*) of the proposed Declaration, were vague and incomplete, except insofar as it was made clear that His Majesty's Government must inevitably bear the full responsibility for the defence of India. These proposals in effect asked for participation in the tasks of to-day with a view to ensure the future freedom of India. Freedom was for an uncertain future, not for the present; and no indication was given in Clause (*e*) of what arrangements or governmental and other changes would be made in the present. When this vagueness was pointed out, you said that this was deliberate so as to give you freedom to determine these changes in consultation with others. In our talks you gave us to understand that you envisaged a National Government which would deal with all matters except Defence.

Defence at any time, and more particularly in war time, is of essential importance; and without it a National Government functions in a very limited field. Apart from this consideration, it was obvious that the whole purpose of your proposals and our talks centred round the urgency of the problems created by the threat of the invasion of India. The chief functions of a National Government must necessarily be to organize defence, both intensively and on the widest popular basis, and to create mass psychology

* Reproduced on pages 16-18 *infra*.

of resistance to an invader. Only a National Government could do that, and only a Government on whom this responsibility was laid. Popular resistance must have a national background and both the soldier and the civilian must feel that they are fighting for their country's freedom under National leadership.

We pointed this out to you. The question became one not of just satisfying our national aspirations, but of effective prosecution of the war and fighting to the last any invader who set foot on the soil of India. On general principles a National Government would control defence through a Defence Minister, and the Commander-in-Chief would control the armed forces and would have full latitude in the carrying out of operations connected with the war. An Indian National Government should have normally functioned in this way. We made it clear that the Commander-in-Chief in India would have control of the armed forces and the conduct of operations and other matters connected therewith. With a view to arriving at a settlement, we were prepared to accept certain limitations on the normal powers of the Defence Minister. We had no desire to upset in the middle of the war the present military organization or arrangements. We accepted also that the higher strategy of the war should be controlled by the War Cabinet in London, which would have an Indian Member. The immediate object before us was to make the defence of India more effective, to strengthen it, to broadbase it on the popular will and to reduce all red tape delay and inefficiency from it. There was no question of our interfering with the technical and operational sides. One thing of course was of paramount importance to us, India's safety and defence. Subject to this primary consideration there was no reason why there should be any difficulty in finding a way out of the present impasse in accordance with the unanimous desire of the Indian people, for in this matter there are no differences amongst us.

The emphasis on defence led you to reconsider the matter and you wrote to me on April 7th suggesting a formula for defence.

In this letter you said " as the Working Committee have fully understood, it is impossible to make any change in the existing constitution during the period of hostilities." The Working Committee's attitude in the matter has been completely misunderstood and I should like to clear this up. Although we are not immediately concerned with it; the Committee do not think that there is any inherent difficulty in the way of constitutional changes during the war. Everything that helps in the war not only can be but must be done with speed. That is the only way to carry on and win a war. No complicated enactments are necessary. A recognition of India's freedom and right to self-determination could easily be made if it was so wished together with certain other consequential but important changes. The rest can be left to future arrangements and adjustments. I might remind you that the British Prime Minister actually proposed a Union of France and England on the eve of the fall of France. No greater or more fundamental change could be imagined and this was suggested at a period of grave crisis and peril. War accelerates change. It does not fit in with static conceptions.

The formula for Defence that you sent us was considered by us together with its annexure which gave a list of subjects or departments which were to be transferred to the Defence Department. This list was a revealing one as it proved that the Defence Minister would deal with relatively unimportant matters. We were unable to accept this and we informed you accordingly.

Subsequently a new formula for Defence was suggested to us but without any list of subjects. This formula seemed to us to be based on a more healthy approach and we suggested certain changes pointing out that our ultimate decision would necessarily depend on the allocation of subjects. A revised

formula was then sent back to us together with an indication of the functions of the War Department. This was so widely and comprehensively framed that it was difficult for us to know what the actual allocation of subjects and departments as between the Defence Department and the War Department would be. A request was made on our behalf that illustrative lists of these subjects might be supplied to enable us to consider the matter. No such lists were supplied to us.

In the interview we had with you yesterday we discussed the new formula and expressed our viewpoint in regard to it. I need not repeat what I said then. The wording of the formula is after all a minor matter and we would not allow that to come in our way unless some important principle is at stake. But behind that wording lay certain ideas and we were surprised to find that during the past few days we had been proceeding on wrong assumptions.

When we asked you for illustrative lists of subjects for the two Departments you referred us to the old list for the Defence Department which you had previously sent us and which we had been unable to accept. You added that certain residuary subjects might be added to this but in effect there was not likely to be any such subject as the allocation was complete. Thus you said that substantially there was no change between the old list and any new one that might be prepared. If this was so and we were to go back ultimately to the place we started from then what was the purpose of our searching for new formulae, a new set of words meaning the same thing made no difference.

In the course of our talks many other matters were also cleared up. Unfortunately to our disadvantage you had referred both privately and in the course of public statements to a National Government and a Cabinet consisting of Ministers. These words have a certain significance and we had imagined that the new government would function with full powers as a Cabinet with the Viceroy acting as a constitutional head; but the new picture that you placed before us was really not very different from the old, the difference being one of degree and not of kind. The new government could neither be called, except vaguely and inaccurately, nor could it function as a National Government. It would just be the Viceroy and his Executive Council with the Viceroy having all his old powers. We did not ask for any legal changes but we did ask for definite assurances and conventions which would indicate that the new government would function as a free government, the members of which act as members of a Cabinet in a constitutional government. In regard to the conduct of the war and connected activities the Commander-in-Chief would have freedom and he would also act as War Minister. We were informed that nothing could be said at this stage even vaguely and generally about the conventions that should govern the new government and the Viceroy. This was a matter in the Viceroy's sole discretion and at a later stage it could be discussed directly with the Viceroy. Ultimately there was always the possibility of the Members of the Executive Council resigning or threatening to resign if they disagreed with the Viceroy. That sanction or remedy is of course always open but it is curious that we should base our approach to a new government on the probability of conflict and resignation at the very outset.

The picture therefore placed before us is not essentially different from the old one. The whole object which we and I believe you have in view, that is to create a new psychological approach to the people to make them feel that their own National Government had come, that they were defending their newly won freedom, would be completely frustrated when they saw this old picture again with even the old label on. The continuation of the India Office which has been a symbol of evil to us would confirm this picture. It has almost been taken for granted for some time past that the India Office

would soon disappear, as it was an anachronism, but now we are told that even this undesirable relic of a past age is going to continue.

The picture of the Government which was so like the old in all essential features is such that we cannot fit into it. Normally we would have had little difficulty in disposing of this matter for it is so far removed from all that we have striven for, but in the circumstances of to-day we were prepared to give full consideration to every proposal which might lead to an effective organization of the defence of India. The peril that faces India affects us more than it can possibly affect any foreigner and we are anxious and eager to do our utmost to face it and overcome it. But we cannot undertake responsibilities when we are not given the freedom and power to shoulder them effectively and when an old environment continues which hampers the national effort.

While we cannot accept the proposals you have made, we want to inform you that we are yet prepared to assume responsibility provided a truly National Government is formed. We are prepared to put aside for the present all questions about the future, though as we have indicated we hold definite views about it. But in the present the National Government must be a Cabinet Government with full power, and must not merely be a continuation of the Viceroy's Executive Council. In regard to Defence we have already stated what in our opinion the position should be. At present we feel that such an arrangement is the very minimum that is essential for the functioning of a National Government and for making the popular appeal which is urgently needed.

We would point out to you that the suggestions we have put forward are not ours only but may be considered to be the unanimous demand of the Indian people. On these matters there is no difference of opinion among various groups and parties and the difference is as between the Indian people as a whole and the British Government. Such differences as exist in India relate to constitutional changes in the future. We are agreeable to the postponement of this issue so that the largest possible measure of unity might be achieved in the present crisis for the defence of India. It would be a tragedy that even when there is this unanimity of opinion in India the British Government should prevent a free National Government from functioning, and from serving the cause of India as well as the larger causes for which millions are suffering and dying to-day.

(10)

Letter from SIR S. CRIPPS *to* MAULANA AZAD *dated 10th April, 1942.*

I was extremely sorry to receive from you your letter of April 10 expressing the rejection by the Congress Working Committee of His Majesty's Government's draft declaration.

I will not deal with those points which are covered by the original resolution of your committee which you sent me, as they were clearly not the reason for your decision.

Nor need I go into the question of the division of duties between the Defence Minister and the Commander-in-Chief as War Member with which you deal at length. This division allotted to the Defence Minister all functions outside those actually connected with the General Headquarters, Navy Headquarters and Air Headquarters which are under the Commander-in-Chief as head of the fighting forces in India.

In addition to these functions in the narrow field of "defence" it was suggested that all other portfolios relating to that subject such as:

Home department: internal order, police, refugees, etc.,
Communications department: railways, roads, transport, etc.,
Finance department: all war finance in India,
Supply department: supplies for all forces and munitions,
Information and broadcasting department: propaganda, publicity, etc.,
Civil defence department: air raid precautions, and all forms of civilian defence,
Legislative department: regulations and orders,
Labour department: man power,
Defence department: administration of Indian personnel, etc.,

should be put in the hands of representative Indians as members of the Executive Council.

Nothing further could have been done by way of giving responsibility for defence services to representative Indian members without jeopardising the immediate defence of India under the Commander-in-Chief. This defence is as you know a paramount duty and responsibility of His Majesty's Government, while unity of command is essential in the interest of the allied help to India.

The real substance of your refusal to take part in a National Government is that the form of Government suggested is not such as would enable you to rally the Indian people as you desire.

You make two suggestions. First that the constitution might now be changed. In this respect I would point out that you made this suggestion for the first time last night, nearly three weeks after you had received the proposals, and I would further remark that every other representative with whom I have discussed this view has accepted the practical impossibility of any such legislative change in the middle of a war and at such a moment as the present.

Second, you suggest " a truly National Government " be formed which must be " Cabinet Government with full power ".

Without constitutional changes of a most complicated character and on a very large scale this would not be possible as you realise.

Were such a system to be introduced by convention under the existing circumstances the nominated cabinet (nominated presumably by the major political organisations), responsible to no one but itself, could not be removed and would in fact constitute an absolute dictatorship of the majority.

This suggestion would be rejected by all minorities in India, since it would subject all of them to a permanent and autocratic majority in the cabinet. Nor would it be consistent with the pledges already given by His Majesty's Government to protect the rights of those minorities.

In a country such as India where communal divisions are still so deep an irresponsible majority Government of this kind is not possible.

Apart from this, however, until such time as the Indian peoples frame their new Constitution His Majesty's Government must continue to carry out its duties to those large sections of the Indian people to whom it has given its pledges.

The proposals of His Majesty's Government went as far as possible, short of a complete change in the Constitution which is generally acknowledged as impracticable in the circumstances of to-day.

While therefore both I and His Majesty's Government recognise the keen desire of your Working Committee to carry on the war against the enemy

by every means in their power, they regret that your Working Committee has not seen its way to join in the war effort upon the conditions sincerely offered, the only conditions which could have brought together all the different communities and sections of the Indian people.

(11)

Letter from MAULANA AZAD *to* SIR S. CRIPPS *dated 11th April, 1942.*

I have just received your letter of April 10th and I must confess that my colleagues and I were considerably surprised to read it. I am sending you this reply immediately and can only deal briefly here with some of the points you have raised.

The points covered by our original resolution are important and represent my Committee's well-considered views on the British proposals as a whole; but we pointed out to you that so far as the proposals relate to the future they might be set aside, as we were anxious to assume responsibility for India's Government and defence in this hour of danger. This responsibility could only be undertaken, however, if it was real responsibility and power.

As regards the division of functions between the Defence Minister and the War Minister, you did not give an illustrative list as requested by us, and referred us to the previous list of the Defence Minister's functions which as you know we had been wholly unable to accept. In your letter under reply you mention certain subjects directly or indirectly related to the war which will be administered by other departments. So far as the Defence Minister is concerned it is clear that his functions will be limited by the first list that you sent.

No one has suggested any restrictions on the normal powers of the Commander-in-Chief. Indeed we went beyond this and were prepared to agree to further powers being given to him as War Minister. But it is clear that the British Government's conception and ours in regard to Defence differs greatly. For us it means giving it a National character and calling upon every man and woman in India to participate in it. It means trusting our own people and seeking their full co-operation in this great effort. The British Government's view seems to be based on an utter lack of confidence in the Indian people and in withholding real power from them.

You refer to the paramount duty and responsibility of His Majesty's Government in regard to defence. That duty and responsibility cannot be discharged effectively unless the Indian people are made to have and feel their responsibility, and the recent past stands witness to this. The Government of India do not seem to realise that the war can only be fought on a popular basis.

Your statement that we have for the first time after three weeks suggested a change in the constitution is hardly correct. In the course of our talks reference was made to it, but it is true that we did not lay stress on it as we did not want to introduce new issues; but when you stated explicitly in your letter that we had agreed that no constitutional changes could be made during the war we had to deny this and correct your impression.

It is the last part of your letter that has especially surprised and pained us. It seems that there has been a progressive deterioration in the British Government's attitude as our negotiations proceeded. What we were told in our very first talk with you is now denied or explained away. You told me then that there would be a National Government which would function as a Cabinet and that the position of the Viceroy would be analogous to that of The King in England vis-à-vis his Cabinet. In regard to the India Office you

told me that you were surprised that no one had so far mentioned this important matter, and that the practical course was to have this attached or incorporated with the Dominions Office.

The whole of this picture which you sketched before us has now been completely shattered by what you told us during our last interview.

You have put forward an argument in your letter which at no time during our talks was mentioned by you. You refer to the " absolute dictatorship of the majority ". It is astonishing that such a statement should be made in this connection and at this stage. This difficulty is inherent in any scheme of a mixed Cabinet formed to meet an emergency, but there are many ways in which it can be provided for. Had you raised this question we would have discussed it and found a satisfactory solution.

The whole approach to this question has been that a mixed Cabinet should be formed and should co-operate together. We accepted this. We are not interested in the Congress as such gaining power, but we are interested in the Indian people as a whole having freedom and power. How the Cabinet should be formed and should function was a question which might have been considered after the main question was decided: that is the extent of power which the British Government would give to the Indian people. Because of this we never discussed it with you or even referred to it.

Nevertheless you have raised this matter for the first time in what is presumably your last letter to us and tried most unjustifiably to side-track the real issue between us.

You will remember that in my very first talk with you I pointed out that the communal or like questions did not arise at this stage. As soon as the British Government made up its mind to transfer real power and responsibility, the other questions could be tackled successfully by those concerned. You gave me the impression that you agreed with this approach.

We are convinced that if the British Government did not pursue a policy of encouraging disruption, all of us to whatever party or group we belonged would be able to come together and find a common line of action; but unhappily even in this grave hour of peril the British Government is unable to give up its wrecking policy. We are driven to the conclusion that it attaches more importance to holding on to its rule in India as long as it can and promoting discord and disruption here with that end in view, than to an effective defence of India against the aggression and invasion that overhang it. To us and to all Indians the dominant consideration is the defence and safety of India and it is by that test that we judge.

You mention that you propose to publish your letter to me. I presume that you have no objection now to our publishing our original resolution, your letters to us, and our letters to you.

RESOLUTION OF THE INDIAN STATES DELEGATION, contained in letter to SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS from His Highness the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, dated 10th April, 1942.

MY DEAR SIR STAFFORD,

The Indian States delegation unanimously adopted the following resolution in respect of the proposals of His Majesty's Government which you discussed with them:—

" The attitude of the Indian States in general on the Mission of the Lord Privy Seal is summed up in the Resolution on the subject which was adopted unanimously at the recent Session of the Chamber of Princes. The Indian States will be glad as always, in the interest of the Motherland, to make their contribution, in every reasonable manner compatible with the sovereignty and integrity of the States, towards the framing of a new Constitution for India.

The States should be assured, however, that in the event of a number of States not finding it feasible to adhere, the non-adhering States or group of States so desiring should have the right to form a union of their own, with full sovereign status in accordance with a suitable and agreed procedure devised for the purpose."

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) DIGVIJAYSINHJI MAHARAJA JAM SAHEB OF NAWANAGAR.

The following is the text of the Resolution referred to:—

(*a*) That this Chamber welcomes the announcement made in the House of Commons on March 11th, 1942, by the Prime Minister and the forthcoming visit to India of the Lord Privy Seal and leader of the House of Commons, and expresses the hope that it may help to unite India to intensify further her war effort and to strengthen the measures for defence of the Motherland.

(*b*) That this Chamber has repeatedly made it clear that any scheme to be acceptable to the States must effectively protect their rights arising from Treaties, engagements and Sanads or otherwise and ensure the future existence of Sovereignty and autonomy of the States thereunder guaranteed, and leave them complete freedom duly to discharge their obligation to the Crown and to their subjects; it therefore notes with particular satisfaction the reference in the announcement of the Prime Minister to the fulfilment of the Treaty obligations to the Indian States.

(*c*) That this Chamber authorises its representatives to carry on the discussions and negotiations for Constitutional advance of India with due regard to successful prosecution of war and interests of the States, and subject to the final confirmation by the Chamber and without prejudice to the right of the individual States to be consulted in respect of any proposals affecting their Treaty or other inherent rights.

RESOLUTION OF THE CONGRESS WORKING COMMITTEE: issued on 11th April, 1942.

The Working Committee have given full and earnest consideration to the proposals made by the British War Cabinet with regard to India and the elucidation of them by Sir Stafford Cripps.

These proposals, which have been made at the very last hour because of the compulsion of events, have to be considered not only in relation to India's demand for independence but more especially, in the present grave war crisis, with a view to meeting effectively the perils and dangers that confront India and envelop the world.

Congress has repeatedly stated, ever since the commencement of the war in September 1939, that the people of India would line themselves with the progressive forces of the world and assume full responsibility to face the new problems and shoulder the new burdens that had arisen, and it asked for the necessary conditions to enable them to do so to be created. The essential condition was the freedom of India, for only the realisation of present freedom could light the flame which would illuminate millions of hearts and move them to action.

At the last meeting of the All-India Congress Committee, after the commencement of the war in the Pacific, it was stated that:—"Only a free and independent India can be in a position to undertake the defence of the country on a national basis and be able to help in the furtherance of the larger causes that are emerging from the form of war."

The British War Cabinet's new proposals relate principally to the future, upon the cessation of hostilities. The Committee, while recognising that self-determination for the people of India is accepted in principle in that uncertain future, regret that this is fettered and circumscribed and that certain provisions have been introduced which gravely imperil the development of a free and united national government and the establishment of a democratic state. Even the constitution-making body is so constituted that the people's right of self-determination is vitiated by the introduction of non-representative elements.

The people of India have, as a whole, clearly demanded full independence, and Congress has repeatedly declared that no other status except that of independence for the whole of India could be agreed to or could meet the essential requirements of the present situation.

The Committee recognise that future independence may be implicit in the proposals, but the accompanying provisions and restrictions are such that real freedom may well become an illusion.

The complete ignoring of ninety millions of people in the Indian States, and their treatment as commodities at the disposal of their Rulers, is a negation both of democracy and self-determination. While the representation of an Indian State in the constitution-making body is fixed on a population basis, the people of the State have no voice in choosing those representatives, nor are they to be consulted at any stage while decisions vitally affecting them are being taken. Such States may in many ways become barriers to the growth of Indian freedom, enclaves where foreign authority still prevails, and where the possibility of maintaining foreign-armed forces has been stated to be a likely contingency and a perpetual menace to the freedom of the people of the States as well as of the rest of India.

The acceptance beforehand of the novel principle of non-accession for a Province is also a severe blow to the conception of Indian unity and an apple of discord likely to generate growing trouble in the Provinces, and which may well lead to further difficulties in the way of the Indian States merging themselves into an Indian Union. Congress has been wedded to Indian freedom and unity and any break of that unity especially in the modern world when peoples' minds inevitably think in terms of ever larger federations would be injurious to all concerned and exceedingly painful to contemplate. Nevertheless the Committee cannot think in terms of compelling the people of any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will. While recognising this principle, the Committee feel that every effort should be made to create conditions which would help the different units in developing a common and co-operative national life. Acceptance of this principle inevitably involves that no changes should be made which would result in fresh problems being created and compulsion being exercised on other substantial groups within that area. Each territorial unit should have the fullest possible automony within the Union consistently with a strong National State.

The proposal now made on the part of the British War Cabinet encourages and will lead to attempts at separation at the very inception of the Union and thus create great friction just when the utmost co-operation and goodwill are most needed. This proposal has been presumably made to meet the communal demand, but it will have other consequences also and lead politically

reactionary and obscurantist groups among the different communities to create trouble and divert public attention from the vital issues before the country.

Any proposal concerning the future of India must demand attention and scrutiny, but in to-day's grave crisis it is the present that counts and even the proposals for the future in so far as they affect the present. The Committee necessarily attached the greatest importance to this aspect of the question and on this ultimately depends what advice they should give to those who look to them for guidance. For this the present British War Cabinet's proposals are vague and altogether incomplete, and there would appear to be no vital changes in the present structure contemplated. It has been made clear that the defence of India will in any event remain under British control. At any time Defence is a vital subject; during war-time it is all-important and covers almost every sphere of life and administration. To take away Defence from the sphere of responsibility at this stage is to reduce that responsibility to a farce and nullity, and to make it perfectly clear that India is not going to be free in any way and her Government is not going to function as a free and independent Government during the pendency of the war.

The Committee would repeat that the essential fundamental prerequisite for the assumption of responsibility by the Indian people in the present is their realisation as a fact that they are free and are in charge of maintaining and defending their freedom. What is most wanted is the enthusiastic response of the people, which cannot be evoked without the fullest trust in them and the devolution of responsibility on them in the matter of Defence. It is only thus that even in this grave eleventh hour it may be possible to galvanise the people of India to rise to the height of the occasion. It is manifest that the present Government of India, as well as its Provincial agencies, are lacking in competence and are incapable of shouldering the burden of India's defence. It is only the people of India, through their popular representatives, who may shoulder this burden worthily. But that can only be done by present freedom and full responsibility being cast upon them. The Committee are, therefore, unable to accept the proposals put forward on behalf of the British War Cabinet.

RESOLUTION OF THE ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE WORKING COMMITTEE ISSUED ON 11TH APRIL, 1942.

The Working Committee of the All India Muslim League have given their most earnest and careful consideration to the announcement made by Mr. Churchill, the British Prime Minister, in the House of Commons on March 11th 1942 and the Draft Declaration of the War Cabinet of His Majesty's Government regarding the future of India, and also the interim proposals during the critical period which now faces India for the immediate participation of the Leaders of the principal sections of the Indian People in the counsels of their country.

The Committee appreciate that the British Prime Minister in his pronouncement made it clear that the draft Declaration embodied only the proposals of His Majesty's Government and not their decision, and that they are subject to agreement between the main elements in India; thus maintaining the validity of the Declaration of August 8th 1940, which had promised to the Moslems that neither the machinery for the framing of the Constitution should be set up, nor the Constitution itself should be enforced, without the approval and consent of Moslem India.

The Committee, while expressing their gratification that the possibility of Pakistan is recognised by implication by providing for the establishment of

two or more independent Unions in India, regret that the proposals of His Majesty's Government embodying the fundamentals are not open to any modification and therefore no alternative proposals are invited. In view of the rigidity of the attitude of His Majesty's Government with regard to the fundamentals not being open to any modification, the Committee have no alternative but to say that the proposals in their present form are unacceptable to them for the following reasons:—

(1) The Mussalmans, after 25 years of genuine efforts for the reconciliation of the two major communities and the bitter experience of the failure of such efforts, are convinced that it is neither just nor possible, in the interests of peace and the happiness of the two peoples, to compel to constitute one Indian Union composed of the two principal nations—Hindus and Moslems: but this appears to be the main object of His Majesty's Government as adumbrated in the preamble of the draft Declaration, the creation of more than one Union being relegated only to the realm of remote possibility, and is purely illusory.

(2) In the draft Declaration a constitution-making body has been proposed with the primary object of creating one Indian Union. So far as the Muslim League is concerned, it has finally decided that the only solution of India's constitutional problem is the partition of India into independent zones: and it will therefore be unfair to the Moslems to compel them to enter such a constitution-making body whose main object is the creation of a new Indian Union. With conditions as they are it will be not only futile but on the contrary may exacerbate bitterness and animosity amongst the various elements in the country.

The machinery which has been proposed for the creation of the constitution-making body, namely that it will consist of members elected by the newly elected Lower Houses of the eleven Provinces upon the cessation of hostilities as a single electoral College by the system of proportional representation, is a fundamental departure from the right of the Mussalmans hitherto enjoyed by them to elect their representatives by means of separate electorates, which is the only sure way in which true representatives of the Mussalmans can be chosen.

The constitution-making body will take decisions by a bare majority on all questions of the most vital and paramount character involved in the framing of the Constitution, which is a departure from the fundamental principles of justice and contrary to constitutional practice so far followed in the various countries and Dominions; and the Mussalmans by agreeing to this will, instead of exercising their right and judgment as a constituent factor, be at the entire mercy of the constitution-making body in which they will be a minority of about 25 per cent.

(3) The right of non-accession to the Union as contemplated in the draft Declaration has been conceded presumably in response to the insistent demands by the Mussalmans for the partition of India: but the method and procedure laid down are such as to negative the professed object; for in the draft proposals the right of non-accession has been given to the existing Provinces which have been formed from time to time for administrative convenience and on no logical basis.

The Mussalmans cannot be satisfied by such a Declaration on a vital question affecting their future destiny, and demand a clear and precise pronouncement on the subject. Any attempt to solve the future problem of India by the process of evading the real issue is to court disaster.

In the draft proposals no procedure has been laid down as to how the verdict of the Province is to be obtained in favour of or against accession to the one Union, but in the letter dated April 2nd from the Secretary of Sir Stafford Cripps addressed to the President of the All-India Muslim

League it is stated that " a Province should reach the decision whether or not to stand out of the Union by a vote in the Legislative Assembly on a resolution to stand in ".

If the majority for accession to the Union is less than 60 per cent. the minority will have the right to demand a plebiscite of the adult male population. In this connection it must be emphasised that in the Provinces where the Mussalmans are in a majority, as in the case of the major Provinces of Bengal and the Punjab, they are in a minority in the Legislative Assemblies, and in the Assemblies of Sind and the North-West Frontier Province the total number (namely 60 and 50 respectively) is so small and the weightage given to the non-Moslems so heavy that it can be easily manipulated, and a decision under such conditions cannot be the true criterion of ascertaining the real opinion of the Mussalmans of those Provinces.

As regards the suggested plebiscite in the Provinces in which the Mussalmans are in a majority, in the event of the requisite majority not being available in the Legislative Assemblies, the procedure laid down is that reference shall be made to the whole adult population of the Provinces and not to the Mussalmans alone; which is to deny them the inherent right to self-determination.

(4) With regard to the Indian States, it is the considered opinion of the Committee that it is a matter for them to decide whether to join or not to join or form a Union.

(5) With regard to the Treaties to be negotiated between the Crown and the Indian Union or Unions, the proposals do not indicate as to what would happen in case of disagreement on the terms between the contracting parties; nor is there any provision made as to what would be the procedure when there is a difference of opinion in negotiating a revision of treaty arrangements with the Indian States in the new situation.

(6) With regard to the interim arrangement there is no definite proposal except the bare statement that His Majesty's Government desire and invite the effective and immediate participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth, and of the United Nations. The Committee are therefore unable to express their opinion until a complete picture is available. Another reason why the Committee are unable to express their opinion on the interim arrangements for participation in the counsels of the country is that Sir Stafford Cripps has made it clear that the scheme goes through as a whole or is rejected as a whole, and that it would not be possible to retain only the part relating to the immediate arrangements at the centre and discard the rest of the draft scheme; and as the Committee has come to the conclusion that the proposals for the future are unacceptable, it will serve no useful purpose to deal further with the question of the immediate arrangements.

RESOLUTION OF THE HINDU MAHASABHA, ratified by the Working Committee of the Mahasabha on 3rd April, 1942.

There are several points in the Declaration which are more or less satisfactory but according to the statement unfortunately made by Sir Stafford Cripps, the scheme of His Majesty's Government is to be accepted or rejected *in toto*. As some essential features of the scheme are wholly or partially unacceptable to us, the Hindu Mahasabha has no other alternative but to reject the scheme.

1. One of the cardinal points in the scheme which Sir Stafford Cripps has put forward on behalf of the War Cabinet is the right which has been conferred on the provinces of British India to keep out of the Indian Union or Federation. The basic principle of the Hindu Mahasabha is that India is one

and indivisible. In the religious and cultural aspect there has been recognised the fundamental unity of India by the Hindus throughout the ages, and even unity in the political sphere was an accomplished fact in many periods of this country's history. Even during some two centuries of British rule, the political unity of India has been recognised and fostered and this has always been claimed by Britain herself as her finest achievement. Besides, India has been treated as one political and constitutional unit under the Constitution Act of 1935. The right to step out of the Indian Federation will stimulate communal and sectional animosities. The other option given to the non-acceding provinces to set up a rival Pakistan Federation constitutes, in view of such Moslem movements as Pakistan and Pathanisthan involving threats of joining hands with Afghanistan and other Moslem nations, serious menace to India's security and unity, and this may lead to civil war in the country. The Mahasabha cannot be true to itself and to the best interests of Hindusthan (India) if it is a party to any proposal which involves the political partition of India in any shape or form. The Hindu Mahasabha therefore has fundamental objections to the proposal.

The right of non-accession of any province to the " Indian Union " cannot be justified on the principle of self-determination and no such right can be imposed by any outside authority. India has already been one unitary State, and the existing provinces are constituted as administrative units. The analogy of sovereign States entering into a Federation and surrendering a portion of their sovereignty for certain common purposes cannot apply to Indian Provinces.

2. According to the scheme of Sir Stafford Cripps, a treaty will be signed between His Majesty's Government and the Constituent Assembly, and such a treaty will implement the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government for the protection of racial and religious minorities. In the framing of this treaty all parties and sections will have an effective say. Such a treaty ought to completely satisfy the minorities.

If, however, any minority is not satisfied with the safeguards in the proposed constitution, then the question of such safeguards can be referred to a tribunal or arbitration to be appointed by the Constituent Assembly in consultation with disputing parties. We want to take our stand on justice and fair play, and we do not ask for any rights or privileges which we are not prepared to extend to any community.

3. The Hindu Mahasabha is not so much concerned with a declaration as to the future, but the real question is whether England is willing to transfer immediately real political power to India and, if so, to what extent. It notes with regret that the scheme which Sir Stafford Cripps has announced is nebulous, vague and unsatisfactory with regard to the interim arrangements. The Government of India Act of 1935 still maintains the bureaucracy in power with the Governor-General and the Governors as their powerful protagonists. But for successful prosecution of the war it is essential to transfer real power to Indian hands and to set up conventions whereby Indian ministers can formulate and execute a policy of national defence, including the formation of national militia and the arming of the Indian people for the defence of the country.

4. It has been the demand of the Hindu Mahasabha that India should be immediately declared an independent nation with free and equal status in the Indo-British Commonwealth. The Declaration promises full national sovereignty in the future, but the constitutional position and status of India during the interim period have not been made at all clear.

5. Particularly in regard to defence, the scheme of His Majesty's Government is unacceptable to us.

It is urgent and imperative that if India is to be an effective partner in the struggle for freedom, her defence policy must be determined and her defence arrangements must be made on the responsibility of her own Defence Minister enjoying the confidence of all sections of the people. The tragic experiences of Malaya and Burma have demonstrated that, apart from the deplorable failure of military strategy, the apathy and hostility of the people who were deliberately kept unarmed, contributed to the British reverses. The psychology necessary for full and willing co-operation in the present war amongst the Indian people cannot be created unless, and until, the defence of India is put in Indian hands.

6. We note with satisfaction that this scheme provides for a constitution-making body for framing the future constitution of India, and that the Constituent Assembly may begin its work with the declaration of India's independence. But the principle on which it will be constituted is vicious. The constitution-making body will be elected on the basis of the communal award which is not only anti-national but runs counter to the essential principles of democracy.

7. Unless, and until, the scheme of His Majesty's Government is radically altered and readjusted on the vital issues mentioned above, the Hindu Mahasabha cannot be a party to the acceptance in as much as the scheme is to be accepted or rejected *in toto*.

THE DEPRESSED CLASSES: *Letter to* SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS *from* DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR *and* MR. M. C. RAJAH, *dated* 1st *April*, 1942.

We told you when we met you on the 30th March that the proposals of His Majesty's Government relating to Constitutional development of India will not be acceptable to the Depressed Classes for the reasons which we placed before you at the interview. Since then we have had consultations with many of the Depressed Classes' representatives in the various Provincial and Central Legislatures and all of them have unanimously endorsed the view we placed before you regarding the proposals.

We are all of us absolutely convinced that the proposals are calculated to do the greatest harm to the Depressed Classes and are sure to place them under an unmitigated system of Hindu rule. Any such result which takes us back to the black days of the ancient past will never be tolerated by us, and we are all determined to resist any such catastrophe befalling our people with all the means at our command.

We request you to convey to His Majesty's Government our deepest anxiety regarding the future of the Depressed Classes and to impress upon them that we must look upon it as breach of faith if His Majesty's Government should decide to force upon the Depressed Classes a Constitution to which they have not given their free and voluntary consent and which does not contain within itself all the provisions that are necessary for safeguarding their interests.

In the end we want to thank you for assuring us that you called us in our representative capacity and that His Majesty's Government did not regard the Depressed Classes as a minor party—points upon which some doubt had arisen in our mind and about which we asked you for a correct definition of our position.

THE SIKH ALL-PARTIES COMMITTEE: *Letter to* SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS *dated 31st March, 1942, with note appended.*

DEAR SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS,

May we begin by stating that after giving careful consideration to the proposals which have now been published from the point of view of (1) India's integrity and (2) the Sikh position, we find them unacceptable because; (1) instead of maintaining and strengthening the integrity of India specific provision has been made for separation of Provinces and constitution of Pakistan and (2) the cause of the Sikh community has been lamentably betrayed.

Ever since the British advent our community has fought for England in every battlefield of the Empire and this is our reward, that our position in the Punjab, which England promised to hold in trust and in which we occupied a predominant position, has been finally liquidated.

Why should a Province that fails to secure a three-fifth's majority of its Legislature, in which a religious community enjoys statutory majority, be allowed to hold a plebiscite and be given the benefit of a bare majority? In fairness this right should have been conceded to communities who are in permanent minority in the Legislature.

Further, why should not the population of any area opposed to separation be given the right to record its verdict and to form an autonomous unit?

We are sure you know that Punjab proper extended up to the banks of the Jhelum excluding Jhang and Multan Districts, and that the Trans-Jhelum area was added by the conquest of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and retained by the British for administrative convenience. It would be altogether unjust to allow the extraneous Trans-Jhelum population, which only accidentally came into the Province, to dominate the future of the Punjab proper.

We give below the figures which abundantly prove our contention. From the boundary of Delhi to the banks of the Ravi river the population is divided as follows: Muslims forty-five lakhs five thousand, Sikhs and other non-Muslims seventy-six lakhs forty-six thousand.

From the Delhi boundary to the banks of the Jhelum river excluding Multan and Jhang districts: Muslims eighty-two lakhs eighty-eight thousand, Sikhs and other non-Muslims ninety-three lakhs forty-eight thousand.

To this may be added the population of the Sikh States of Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Kapurthala and Faridkot, which is about twenty-six lakhs. Of this the Muslims constitute barely twenty per cent. and this reduces the ratio of Muslim population still further.

We do not wish to labour the point any more. We have lost all hope of receiving any consideration. We shall resist however by all possible means separation of the Punjab from All-India Union. We shall never permit our Motherland to be at the mercy of those who disown it.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) BALDEV SINGH, President, Sikh All Parties Committee.
TARA SINGH.
JOGENDRA SINGH.
UJJAL SINGH.
MOHAN SINGH (ex-Adviser to the Secretary of State for India).

We append herewith a note which gives some particulars of the position of our Community in the Punjab.

NOTE.

On behalf of the Sikhs we wish to place the claims of the Sikh community in the proposed scheme of His Majesty's Government for the governance of India. We begin by giving a historical background of our case.

The Sikhs are an important and distinct community mainly concentrated in the Punjab of which they were the Rulers until 1849. Sikhism recognises no caste and strictly enjoins upon those who profess it to treat all human beings as equal.

Sikhs play an important role in the economic and civic life of the country and a leading part in its defence. In the British Punjab with their 3¾ million population (13.5 per cent. of the whole) the Sikhs pay 25 per cent. of the land revenue and 40 per cent. of the land revenue and water rates combined, the main source of the Provincial Exchequer. They maintain at their own expense over 400 schools and 4 colleges open to all communities and classes without distinction. The percentage of literacy among the Sikhs is higher than in any other community in the Punjab. They have got a large number of Sikh shrines with big landed estates attached to them which are the centres of Sikh culture and tradition.

The authors of the Montford Report recognised the importance of the Sikhs and " the difficulty of denying to the Sikhs in the Punjab a concession which is granted to Mohammedans ".

The Simon Commission states: " Sikhism remained a pacific cult until the political tyranny of the Mussalmans and the social tyranny of the Hindus converted it into a military creed. It is a striking circumstance that this small community contributed no less than 80,000 men " (actually 89,000 combatant recruits in addition to 32,500 already serving when the war broke out) " to serve in the Great War, a larger portion than any other community in India ".

With a population of over 6,000,000 in India the share of Sikhs in the defence forces of the country has always been out of all proportion to their population. The Sikhs are perhaps the only community which is making an organised war effort by the establishment of the " Khalsa Defence of India League " to maintain its glorious traditions in the Army. We do realise that with our past traditions and the excellent fighting material that can be found in the Sikh districts, we should have done still better in mobilising our man-power, but we are constrained to remark that nothing has been done by Government to rouse the enthusiasm of the Sikh community in the way of recognition of its status in the sphere of the Central Government or of providing effective safeguards for it in the Punjab, to which it was entitled on account of its unrivalled position, historical, political and economic.

The Sikhs were deeply disappointed at the differential treatment meted out to them under the so-called " communal award " of 1932. In spite of their unique position in the Punjab they were not given the same weightage in the Legislature as the Moslem minorities were given in other Provinces. By way of illustration it may be stated that Muslims with 14·8 per cent. population in the United Provinces were given 30 per cent. seats in the Provincial Assembly as against 18·8 per cent. seats to the Sikhs in the Punjab with their 13·5 per cent. population. Their influence in the administration and political life of the Punjab was further weakened in the formation of the Provincial Cabinet. Whereas in the days of dyarchy out of three Punjabees appointed as Ministers and Members of the Governor's Council there was one Sikh from 1921 to 1926 and one Sikh out of four Punjabees from 1926 to 1937, since the advent of the Provincial autonomy there has been only one Sikh out of a total of

six Ministers. It will thus be observed that in the sphere of the supreme Executive of the Province, the representation of the Sikhs was reduced from 33 per cent. in 1921 to 25 per cent. in 1926 and to 16 per cent. in 1937.

This progressive deterioration of the share of Sikhs in the Punjab Cabinet is strongly resented by the community as it has led to encroachment of their religious and cultural rights and the waning of their influence on the political and economic life of the country.

We submit that under the existing constitution the strength of the Sikhs in the Punjab Cabinet should be maintained normally at 33 per cent. and in no case below 25 per cent. so that there may always be at least two Sikh Ministers in the Cabinet. We also feel that so long as communal electorates continue to be the method of representation in the Legislature, Cabinet should be formed on a coalition basis in the true sense of the word. We may here point out that when ministries were functioning in all Provinces, in the United Provinces where the percentage of the Muslim population is nearly the same as that of Sikhs in the Punjab, there were two Moslem Ministers in a Cabinet of six.

In the sphere of the Central Government, the Sikh Community in spite of its important stake in the country, its sacred shrines scattered all over India and the valuable services that the Sikh soldiers and technicians are rendering, has been unjustly treated. The Sikhs have suffered a great disillusionment by the deliberate neglect of their claims and omission of any reference to the Sikh minority by British statesmen and the Viceroy of India in their statements made from time to time during the last ten years on the Indian question. It seems as if in their opinion, Muslims alone or the depressed classes sometimes, constitute the important minorities of India.

Although for seventeen years a Punjabee has been appointed on the Viceroy's Council, no Sikh has ever been considered for such an appointment. Even at the time of the last expansion of the Executive Council, the claims of the Sikhs were entirely ignored.

In this connection we should like to invite attention to the decisions of the Allahabad Unity Conference which were arrived at between Hindus Muslims and Sikhs in November, 1932. Resolution number 4 regarding Cabinets read as follows:—1. " In the formation of the cabinet of the Central Government, so far as possible, members belonging to the Muslim, *Sikh* and other minority communities of considerable numbers forming the Indian Nation shall be included by convention." 2. " Further during the first ten years in the formation of the Central Government, *a seat shall be offered to a member of the Sikh community.*"

Resolution No. 7 reads as under: II. " It is agreed that in the Central Legislature out of the total elected seats allotted to British India 33 per cent. shall be reserved for Muslims, 4⅔ per cent. or 14 seats out of 300, for Sikhs."

It will thus be observed that leading Indians of different communities recognised the importance of the Sikh minority and agreed to accommodate it in the Central Cabinet, and also to give it nearly 5 per cent. representation in the Central Legislature.

We favour immediate transfer of power to Indian hands, entrusting all portfolios including defence to Indians with experience of public life.

We feel that in this way alone, the moral and material resources of India can be tapped to the fullest extent and Indians can participate in the war with full vigour and enthusiasm.

The Sikhs stand for national unity and the integrity of India. They would like the provinces to enjoy as wide a measure of autonomy as may be compatible with good government in the country as a whole but they also feel that any weakness at the centre will expose India to internal and external dangers.

They are strongly opposed to the vivisection of India into two or three rival dominions or soverign states as is contemplated in the British proposals. They feel that such a step would lead to a state of perpetual strife and civil war in the country.

If the object is to give self-determination to the provinces in the matter of accession to the " Union of India," the right to stand out and break the unity of India should not be exercised by a bare majority but by at least 65 per cent. of Indian members present at the meeting of the provincial assembly when the resolution is considered. A plebiscite on the issue of secession is certain to lead to intercommunal riots of a most serious character and magnitude and should in no case be resorted to.

We are constrained to remark that the proposed scheme does not make any provisions for safeguarding the interests of the Sikh minority. The decisions of the constitution-making body are to be by a bare majority and no provision is made for recourse to arbitration by the aggrieved party as was even assured by Mahatma Gandhi in his statement on the Congress scheme of Constituent Assembly.

The Treaty which is proposed to be negotiated between the constitution-making body and His Majesty's Government for protecting the religious and racial minorities in accordance with undertakings given by the British Government, will have no sanction behind it. Besides, we are not sure how political rights which relate mainly to a share in the Legislature and the administration of the country will be incorporated in the Treaty. The Treaty might cover the cultural religious and linguistic rights of minorities as such Treaties in European countries after the last Great War did. But the undertakings given to the Sikhs by His Majesty's Government from time to time relate to the position and status of the Sikhs in the governance of the country and not merely regarding the exercise of their religious or cultural rights.

The Sikhs therefore feel that they cannot attain their rightful position or effectively protect their interests unless the Punjab is re-distributed into two Provinces with the river Ravi roughly forming the boundary between them

We might invite attention to the All-India Moslem League Resolution of the Lahore session held in March, 1940, which is popularly known as the Pakistan Resolution, " that no Constitution would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted *with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority,* as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."

A careful reading of the Resolution discloses the fact that the Muslim League itself visualised the re-adjustments of areas and the inclusion in their separate state of only those areas in which the Muslims were in a majority.

The population of the Punjab is so distributed that the two western divisions of Rawalpindi and Multan are predominantly Muslims and the two eastern divisions of Ambala and Jullundur area predominantly non-Muslims. The three central districts of Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Lahore have a balanced population. The separate figures of population for each district of the Punjab are attached* as appendix to this statement. If a new Province of a contiguous area of the two divisions of Ambala and Jullundur *plus* the three districts of Lahore, Gurdaspur and Amritsar is carved out, it will have a total population of 12,151,000 (according to 1931 census) with non-Muslims forming 63 per cent. and Muslims 37 of the population. The other Province to the

* Not printed.

west of the river Ravi comprising the Multan and Rawalpindi divisions *plus* the three districts Sheikhupura, Sialkot and Gujranwala will have a total population of 11,429,000, with Muslims forming 77.3 per cent. and non-Muslims 22.7 per cent. of the population.

The Sikhs do not want to dominate but they would certainly not submit to the domination of a community which is bent upon breaking the unity of India and imposing their personal laws and culture on the other sections of the population.

We submit that in any interim arrangement or in the permanent scheme the following safeguards should be provided either in the Treaty which might be enforceable or in the Constitution itself:—

No. 1. By delimiting the present Provincial boundaries of the Punjab, a new Province comprising of Ambala and Jullundur divisions with the three districts of Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Lahore be constituted.

No. 2. The Sikh minority in the Provinces be given the same weightage and measure of protection as the Muslim minority.

No. 3. So long as communal electorates exist, Provincial Cabinets should be formed on a coalition basis.

No. 4. The Sikhs should be given 5 per cent. representation in the Central Legislature.

No. 5. A Sikh should always be given a seat in the Cabinet of the Central Government.

No. 6. A Defence Advisory Committee should be set up for advising the Indian Defence Minister and a Sikh should be given a seat on that Committee.

No. 7. The position of the Sikhs in the Defence Forces of India should be maintained in keeping with their past traditions and strength in those forces.

No. 8. The share of the Sikhs should be fixed in Provincial and All-India Services on the lines it has already been provided or may be provided for the Muslims.

No. 9. Religious laws of Sikhs enacted may only be amended by the votes of majority of the Sikh members in the Legislature.

No. 10. No restrictions should be imposed by the State in the exercise of the religious rights of the Sikhs in the matter of eatables and religious performances.

No. 11. The State should provide for the teaching of Punjabi in Gurmukhi script where a certain fixed number of scholars is forthcoming.

(Signed) BALDEV SINGH, President.

MEMORANDUM BY SIR T. B. SAPRU AND MR. M. R. JAYAKAR: published on 5th April, 1942.

We observe from the Draft Declaration that excepting clause (*e*) there is very little in the Declaration about the changes to be introduced in the constitution of the Government of India during the period of the war. It may be that instructions have been or may be issued to His Excellency the Viceroy to bring about the necessary changes in the composition and the constitution of the executive government.

If any such instructions have been issued we are not aware of them but we must point out that Indian opinion attaches the greatest importance to the transfer of real power in the Central Government at the present moment and it is for this reason that we emphasize the necessity of the complete non-officialization of Government without the reservation of any portfolio during the interim period.

We have considered the terms of clause (*e*) as originally given to us and as subsequently amended by Sir Stafford Cripps. In the amended clause, we find it stated that while His Majesty's Government must inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain the control and direction of the defence of India as a part of their world war effort the task of organising to the full the military, moral and material resources must be the responsibility of the Government of India with the co-operation of the peoples of India. We have carefully considered the terms of this amended clause particularly in the light of the speech of Sir Stafford Cripps at the press conference, a summary of which appeared in the press on March 30th, 1942. It is stated therein that Sir Stafford Cripps was emphatic that handing over political control and direction of defence in the midst of the war to the Indian Government would be fatal, and, further, that if Indian leaders insisted on absolute control over defence before accepting the scheme then the scheme would fall through.

We realize that the transfer of absolute control over defence at the present juncture, when it is necessary that there should be unity of direction and control of military policy, would not be in the best interests of England and India. But we fail to see how this end will fail to be achieved by the appointment of an Indian Defence Member who, we presume, will be a man possessed of a due sense of responsibility and would be only too willing to accept expert advice and to work in the closest co-operation with the War Cabinet.

While we appreciate the necessity of unity of policy and control in matters of Defence we think, in common with most of our countrymen, that the appointment of an Indian member in charge of Defence working in close association and co-operation with the War Cabinet and willing to accept expert advice will be taken at this stage as an unmistakable token of the reality of the transfer of such power and as a symbol of the confidence of His Majesty's Government in the people of this country. We have no doubt that the object of His Majesty's Government is that the people of this country should feel that this is their own war, but we feel that the requisite sense of responsibility for the defence of the country can best be stimulated by an appeal to their sense of pride and self-esteem, and by the two countries, England and India, completely identifying themselves with each other in the common cause of defending this country. We strongly hold that it would be a mistake to ignore the strength of the sentiment of the people on this subject.

We desire to state unequivocally that we are strongly in favour of the Indian people rendering every possible help in the successful prosecution of the war. At the same time we feel equally clearly that, in order to achieve that end, it is necessary that during the period of the war there should be an Indian Defence Member of the Council of the Governor-General. We are fully aware of the arguments to the contrary, and we do not wish to overlook or minimise them, but we feel that the arguments in favour of the adoption of this step are overwhelming.

The adoption of an Indian Defence Member will have a great effect on Indian psychology. It will inspire the people with confidence and materially help in altering the present mentality of the people, which in our opinion is not adequately zealous in the successful prosecution of the war. We do not in the slightest degree desire that there should be any conflict between his powers and those of the Commander-in-Chief in technical matters or in decisions about the movements or disposition of the troops or similar other matters. We think that the presence of such a Member will, far from weakening the military position in India, strengthen it, and the political effects of this step will be very wholesome.

Besides, there are in our opinion large and inexhaustible resources of man-power remaining untapped in the youth of the country, which can be mobilized by methods which a Defence Member drawn from the people can alone effectively employ.

His approach to this storehouse of strength will be by methods vitally different from those which the British official mind has hitherto employed with such little effect. The successful way in which the people of China, Russia, and even the small Philippine Islands, have resisted the overwhelming forces of Japanese aggression contrasted with the debacle in Malaya, Singapore and Rangoon, graphically illustrates the difference between a struggle carried on by the people of a country under the direction of their own leaders and another pursued with the aid of a professional army guided and directed by officers who are drawn from a different race. We venture to suggest that at this critical time, when the danger is daily approaching, the old world ideas of keeping Indians in the perpetual position of unarmed helplessness, and also the feelings of distrust and suspicion which have led to this policy, should be forthwith abandoned and a new era of hope and confidence inaugurated, leading to a joint effort by England and India on terms of mutual reliance, association and truthfulness. It is only such an association that would be productive of the maximum effort of this country, resulting eventually in a victory based on the self-esteem, honour and willing sacrifice of a proud people.

On all these grounds we desire strongly to press the inclusion of an Indian Defence Member in the Executive Council, as otherwise the Declaration, whatever its other merits may be, will fail to achieve the object it is intended to serve. It should not in our opinion be difficult to define the spheres of activity of the Defence Member and of the Commander-in-Chief so as to avoid conflict, nor should it be difficult to secure close co-operation and co-ordination between the two.

The second point to which we desire to advert relates to clause (*c*) of the proposed Declaration. While we recognise the justice of allowing any Province of British India the liberty of remaining out of the new constitution and of retaining its present constitutional position, we are not free from considerable doubt and anxiety about the wisdom of the further provision which makes it possible for another Federal Union being established. Such a Federal Union may in certain conceivable circumstances be a rival or hostile union. But apart from this we cannot favour any step which may have the effect of breaking up the integrity of the country fostered by a long succession of Hindu and Muslim Emperors and a galaxy of British administrators. We are convinced that the creation of more than one union, howsoever consistent in theory with the principle of self-determination, will be disastrous to the lasting interests of the country and to its integrity and security.

In the Draft Declaration which has been handed over to us we do not find any indication of the precise majority of votes which will be required in a Provincial Legislature to carry a resolution as to whether the Province will or will not adhere to the Union. We are however of the opinion that in a matter of this momentous character the method of bare majority cannot be adopted, and that the majority required for any decision on this question should not be less than 65 per cent. of the Indian Members of the Lower House at which the resolution is passed. We do not think that a decision in which the Indian population is primarily interested should be allowed to be influenced by the votes of European Members, to whom the question of remaining in one Federation or another cannot be of the same importance as it is to the Indian Members.

We are also strongly of the opinion that once this principle of a prescribed majority of votes in a Legislature is accepted, it would not only be superfluous but might easily lead to grave social disorder if resort were to be had to the further device of a plebiscite of the adult population of the Province. We feel that in the existing circumstances of the country such a plebiscite, howsoever democratic in theory, is bound to lead to serious consequences gravely disturbing peace and tranquillity, not only in the Province concerned but in other areas to which the contagion may easily spread, leading to violent communal or religious conflicts. For these reasons we cannot conceal our grave concern as to the wisdom and expediency of provisions making it possible for some Provinces to combine into a separate Union.

We attach importance to the possibility of the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities coming to some mutual agreement before the cessation of hostilities, an agreement which may secure and safeguard the interests of all minorities by providing for (*a*) their representation in the Legislature, (*b*) in the Government to be established, and (*c*) reservation to them of the fullest liberty in matters of conscience, religion and culture. If the contending parties begin to work together in a common cause during the interim period they will, we hope, learn to appreciate one another's point of view, and a spirit of tolerance and confidence may be generated conducive to a final settlement which will secure the position of the minorities in the fullest measure without causing a disruption of the well-established integrity of the country.

If however all attempts during the intervening period to secure one Federal Union unhappily fail and the overwhelming wishes of the Provinces to have a separate Union are indicated through their Legislatures and the evils pointed out above of having a separate Union are prevented or mitigated, we have no objection to the experiment suggested in the Draft Declaration being made, subject of course to what we have stated above.

Lastly we desire to call attention to the necessity of the restoration in the Provinces of a popular form of Government. There is no reference to this question in the Draft Declaration probably because it is intended to leave it for decision by the new Government which is to be established at the Centre. We consider however that the rule which at present prevails in so many Provinces under Section 93 of the Government of India Act should be brought to an immediate end and their administration restored once more to popular control. If for the successful working of the Provincial Governments it should be necessary to establish coalition Governments we would indeed welcome such an arrangement.

On all other points arising out of the Draft Declaration of Sir Stafford Cripps we do not wish to say anything more than that we are in general agreement with the line adopted by His Majesty's Government.

(19061) Wt. — 5000 & 50 4/42 D.L. G. 373

GOVERNMENT
OF THE
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

REPORT

OF THE

BANNU ENQUIRY COMMITTEE

Price Re. 0-8-0.

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GOVERNMENT
OF THE
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

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OF THE

BANNU ENQUIRY COMMITTEE

FOREWORD.

The Provincial Government propose in due course to obtain Major Laughton's account of the events dealt with in the report. Major Laughton is now on leave, and was not examined by the Committee of Enquiry.

REPORT
OF THE
BANNU ENQUIRY COMMITTEE

PART—I

To

HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR,
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE,
PESHAWAR.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY

SECTION I—INTRODUCTORY

1. This Committee was appointed with the following terms of reference.—

(a) To enquire into the state of affairs in the Bannu District and neighbourhood with special reference to the raid on Bannu City on the 23rd of July 1938, and the adequacy of measures taken to meet it.

(b) To recommend to the Provincial Government any measures the Committee consider necessary for the prevention of such raids, or for the improvement of conditions in Bannu District generally.

2. The Committee consisted of the following two members:—

(i) Mr. O.K. Caroe, C.I.E., I.C.S.,—*President.*

(ii) Mr. J. L. Kapur, Barrister-at-Law.

After his appointment Mr. Kapur fell ill and we could not start work till the 5th of November 1938. Our sittings commenced on the 5th of November and continued till the 18th November 1938, when we had to break up till the 27th November because Mr. Caroe had been summoned on official duty to Delhi. We restarted our sittings on

the 27th of November and continued the examination of witnesses upto the 20th December, 1938, except for three days when work was again interrupted by a necessary tour by Mr. Caroe in Waziristan. Thereafter both of us had to find time which could be spared from other duties, and were unable to complete out report until the end of February. We regret the long delay, which has been due to circumstances beyond our control.

3. In all we examined twenty-seven official witnesses who included the present Deputy Commissioner of Bannu, Major de la Fargue, Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khalil Khan, who was the Assistant Commissioner at the time of the raid, the Public Prosecutor and seven other officials and seventeen Police witnesses who included the Superintendent of Police, Mr. A. C. Fryer, the Assistant Superintendent of Police, Mr. R. Bowen, and several other subordinate Police officials and members of the Police force. We also examined twenty-six non-official witnesses amongst whom were included members of the Bar, merchants, office-holders of political Bodies and other citizens, and ten tribal maliks and district notables all of whom assisted us with their knowledge of the problems into which we were to enquire. We further had the advantage of having placed before us the official documents consisting of Police Reports, Political Diaries and reports which were made by district officials to the Government and by Military authorities.

The local officials throughout showed unvarying courtesy and consideration and gave us every kind of assistance which we asked for or which was possible for them to give.

4. We regret that we had not the advantage of hearing the evidence of Major Laughton, who was Deputy Commissioner of Bannu at the time of the raid. He had left this country on furlough before we could commence our sittings. We were in this way precluded from hearing the version or the explanation of the then Deputy Commissioner. Another handicap under which we laboured was the absence of military evidence. We have had to rely on the reports and explanations which had been sent to the Provincial Government or were on the official files in the district. This is far from satisfactory but in the circumstances it was the only material available to us. We have given it our utmost consideration and in coming to findings

on the various points that arise, we have throughout kept this fact in view. We must, however, add that any conclusion bearing on facts, actions or omissions, in respect of which we have been unable to hear the evidence of those responsible for them, must at the best be accepted subject to the definite qualification that it represents a view of the case open to rebuttal on the part of the persons concerned.

Section II—The Raid

5. On the 23rd of July 1938 there was a raid in Bannu City, as a result of which property moveable and immoveable claimed to be of the value of Rs.3,08,330-4-0 was destroyed, shops were burnt and some citizens killed. The claim by sufferers is attached to this report as Appendix I. This raid was organised by one Mehr Dil, a Khattak who had previously served in the Tochi Scouts. It is also said that he had with him, as members of the raiding party, a large number of outlaws and proclaimed offenders, the most important of whom were Khale, Abdul and Shakhar, and his lashkar is variously described to have consisted of from 150 to 500 people. From the information which has been placed before us it appears that Mehr Dil had come to the Ahmadzai Salient somewhere in the month of June and gradually collected a lashkar which, on the evening of the 22nd of July 1938, moved into Gumbatti Tangi and on the evening following descended upon Bannu and committed the raid. From the evidence it appears that the lashkar entered the district near Gumbatti old post on the evening of the 23rd and came to the Kurram bed where they were seen at about 7-30 p.m. After crossing the Kurram River below the bridge they took a route which passed through the fields and then near the villge of Bazar Ahmad Khan, from where they came near the Railway Station and from there to a *masjid* opposite to the Saddar Police Station, and thence, taking a circuitous route through the fields, came to a field opposite to the Railway Gate on the east wall of Bannu City, which they are reported to have reached at about 9 p.m. The gate known as the Railway Gate was forced open by bending the rod and then by forcing it by sheer

weight of numbers. The raiders then went westwards along the Railway Gate road and, turning to the north, went straight to the main road-centre of the City known as the "Chauk Kalan". They had flags flying and were shouting slogans, and on their way to the Chauk they fired at the electric bulbs and thus put out the lights. The raiders remained at the Chauk till about 10-45 p.m. and while they were there they looted the cloth shops, tried to break open iron safes, and then set fire to them. As a result of firing directed at the Chauk by some persons who were residents of Bannu, the raiders seem to have sustained some casualties, the exact number of which, including those killed and wounded by the Police, was

5.....killed
9.....wounded.

The casualties sustained by the Police was one Constable wounded; by the Constabulary one sepoy wounded, and by the public 9 wounded and 6 killed. The main body of the raiders returned by the route they came by, went out of the City through the Railway Gate and managed to escape from there. It is not clear whether they were able to carry off their booty, or not. It might also be mentioned that the raiders left a picket on the other side of the Kurram Bridge and also opposite to Cavalry Lines and a picket in the *Masjid* opposite to the Saddar Police Station, and it is claimed that two pickets were left outside the Railway Gate. The Police under Mr. Bowen, the Assistant Superintendent of Police, are reported to have entered the City at or about the time when flames became visible from outside the City and reached the Chauk some time later, which is variously described as 10 p. m. and 10-45 p.m. and helped in the putting out of the fire. The Deputy Commissioner with some Frontier Constabulary arrived at the Chauk a little later and he was followed by a Military detachment who all assisted in the suppression of the fire. The raiders or their helpers also cut down some trees and laid them across the road on the other side of the Kurram Bridge, evidently, with the object of preventing their pursuit by the regular or irregular forces of the Crown.

6. Two scale plans of Bannu with its bazaars and lanes have been attached to this report as an Appendix. One represents the whole city, and the other the eastern portion into which the raiders entered.

The number of raiders.

7. According to the report from Gumbatti Post, the number of raiders as seen by the men at Gumbatti was between 250 and 300. The estimate of Behari Lal, who saw these raiders in the Kurram bed, was about a 100. The report of the Waziristan District Headquarters, which was based on an estimate given by the lorry drivers, puts it to 200/250. The Railway Gate guard estimated the lashkar to have consisted of 300/400 men. Sub-Inspector Dost Muhammad Khan put the number at anything between 400/500. According to the evidence of the last two this crowd of 400 was made up of armed as well as of unarmed men. Inspector Sarwar Shah who saw the raiders from a little distance thought that the number was 50, but this estimate does not seem to be correct as he could only be referring to raiders who were visible from Pareti Gate after the fire was lit. Khan Sahib Malik Ghazi Marjan Khan put the strength of the lashkar at 300, out of whom the Wazirs were , according to him, only about 50/60. The lashkar had further divided itself into several parties. We consider that the estimate given by Khan Sahib Ghazi Marjan Khan is probably more correct. The other people who saw them could not have got a very correct idea of numbers because of the excitement of the moment. We conclude therefore that the number of people who actually entered the City after leaving pickets was probably not more than 200 and not all of them could have been armed.

8. The route taken by the lashkar is described in the Police Special report No. 15 dated the 26th of July 1938 (Appendix B) but the details of this are not very important and an outline of the route has already been given in a previous part of the report. The lashkar do not seem to have come to the City in a quiet manner; they had flags flying and according to the evidence of Sub-Inspector Dost Muhammad Khan, when they were passing below the *balakhana* of Kewal Ram, in the Railway Gate bazaar, they had flags flying and were shouting slogans.

9. Some witnesses have mentioned that the object of the lashkar was not to commit a raid or cause damage in the City but it was merely a reply to the taunt of the Ahmadzai jirga who went to visit Mehr Dil and asked him

to go away from the Ahmadzai Salient. One witness before us, who was counsel for the accused in the raid case, has stated that a witness had on oath deposed before the Sessions Court that a taunt of this nature was given by the maliks constituting the jirga. Khan Sahib Ghazi Marjan Khan who was the leader of the jirga denies that any such taunt was given. A decision on this point however, does not seem to be very important. In the first place we would prefer to believe the evidence of Khan Sahib Ghazi Marjan Khan on this point rather than that of a witness who was being cross-examined in the Court of the Sessions Judge and even if this taunt is established it cannot be a justification for the tribal people to come and raid a peaceful town. The contention that the object of the lashkar was not plunder, is contradicted by their own acts. It has been maintained by some witnesses that the lashkar got out of control because of the firing at them by some citizens and therefore the raiding and arson started. We repel this suggestion because before any firing took place and while the lashkar was still in the bazar of *Nanbaiyan* and *Nilgran Mandi*, a flour shop was set on fire and the owner of the shop killed. There is no suggestion that he had in any way attempted to fire at the raiders. The extent of the damage and the time spent by the raiders in the City clearly contradicts the theory of the lashkar's coming to Bannu City merely to hoist a flag in its centre.

SECTION III—MEASURES TAKEN TO MEET THE RAID.

Previous Information.

10. In order to decide the question of the adequacy or otherwise of the measures adopted by the authorities to meet the raid one has to decide the time at which they came to know about the imminence of this raid. A perusal of the diaries recorded in the Deputy Commissioner's file and a document signed by the Stenographer to the Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, dated the 25th July 1938, and marked as M.K.1, and the evidence of witnesses, including the Political Tehsildar shows that Mehr Dil was reported on the 24th June 1938 to have come towards the hills of the Ahmadzai Salient in the tribal territory north of Bannu. This Mehr Dil according to the evidence before us, was an

emissary of the Faqir of Ipi and had become one of his lieutenants after having remained with him for about a year and after having proved his loyalty to the Faqir. The evidence of the Tahsildar also proves that Mehr Dil had been deputed to the Ahmadzai Salient to start propaganda in favour of the Faqir and to organise raids in British Territory. He remained in the Ahmadzai Salient for about a week during which some effort was made by the maliks of the Ahmadzai Tribe to turn him out, but the effort had no measure of success. The report on the 1st of July 1938 was that one Maulvi Qari was taking active part in preaching in favour of the Faqir of Ipi and that the lashkar which had gathered round Mehr Dil intended to demolish a bridge over " Kashu Nullah " near Bahadur Khel on the Bannu-Kohat road, and also that they were making preparations to attack either the Cantonment or the City of Bannu. The Political Tehsildar in his statement before us was asked about the correctness of this report, and admitted that he had sent it to the Deputy Commissioner. It follows that the note in the Stenographer's Summary of the Diaries is correct. During the course of their evidence practically all the official witnesses have tried to impress on the Committee that a raid on Bannu City was absolutely unexpected and was not within the range of possibility or reasonable expectation. The report of the 1st July, however, shows that such a possibility had been previously envisaged. We have had before us some non-official witnesses and Arbab Muhammad Abbas Khan, Treasury Officer, Bannu, whose evidence shows that strong rumours of the possibility of a raid on the Bannu City were afloat in the town for sometime before the raid. Arbab Muhammad Abbas Khan says " A raid was always expected to take place in the City. I say this because early in 1937 when I was going on four months' leave, my neighbour, a Hindu gentleman, taunted me that I was going on leave and was taking my family out of Bannu because I was afraid of a raid : since then there had been always a fear of the City or Cantonment being raided ". It is true that he adds that as this story had become old the fear of the raid had worn off and people did not expect it at the time when it took place. In face of this evidence it is impossible to hold that the contingency of a raid on the City was absolutely excluded, however remote the possibility might have seemed. On

the other hand it had been well established to our satisfaction that the general outline of the Faqir's plans and what was known of the intentions of his lieutenants led to the conclusion that their objective was an attack on Government posts or property and not on towns or villages. Bannu City moreover had in the past escaped the attention of raiders, was protected by a picketed wall, and to some extent has always been the Metropolis of the neighbouring tribesmen, who have many interests in the town. We can only conclude that, while the possibility of a raid on the City could not be excluded the fact that it eventualized was contrary to official expectation.

11. From the 2nd to the 21st July various reports were received of the continued presence of the lashkar and its intention to raid Government property.

12. On the 22nd of July the Political Tahsildar, Bannu, reported that the lashkar was about 120 and it moved towards Tangi in Umarzai territory. A report (marked G.M. 1) came from Gumbatti Old Post (garrisoned by the Umarzai Section of the Ahmadzai Khassadars) written by Ghaus Muhammad Constable that the lashkar had gone towards Shakha Tabai and that it was very large, and that information had been sent to Zarha Garhi and Khalboi posts. The exact time of arrival of this information does not seem to be clear but it seems to have reached the Bannu authorities on the same day at about 5 p. m. It should be mentioned here that Ghaus Muhammad was a Police Muharrir who had been stationed as a wise precaution at the old Gumbatti Khassadar post.

13. Coming now to the 23rd July, a first report came in in the morning at about 10 a.m. from the same Ghaus Muhammad Constable at the Old Gumbatti Post that the lashkar was going to Khuzi Khel Takka in the jurisdiction of the Mohammad Khel section of the Ahmadzai Wazirs. This Khuzi Khel Takka is to the north-west of the Gumbatti post and is at about a distance of a mile. The report was passed on to the Deputy Commissioner and is mentioned in his report as well as in the Summary of events given by Head Quarters, Bannu Brigade, dated the 27th July, 1938. The Deputy Commissioner says in his report " At about 10-30 a.m. I received the information that a lashkar of some 200 was seen in the neighbourhood

of Old Gumbatti Post". The Military report shows that the Khassadars' Post at Old Gumbatti had been fired at and this is confirmed by the report of Ghaus Muhammad marked G.M.2, which says that Mehr Dil with a lashkar is present in the Khuzi Khel Takka in the hills in front of the Old Gumbatti Post and that firing is going on. It also says " The lashkar is in the hills in front of old Gumbatti post and it depends on you whether you help us or not." A second report, again from Ghaus Muhammad at Old Gumbatti Post and marked G.M.3, was received at 5 p.m. on the 23rd July and passed on to the Deputy Commissioner to the effect that the lashkar was still in the same hills and it was feared that it intended to attack some place and arrangements should be made for the protection of the cantonment. The report re-emphasizes that the lashkar was sure to attack some place. The leaders of the lashkar were described as Khale, Abdul (who was sick), Ghazi Bizan Khel, Talib, Gangi Khel and the son of a Gangi Khel *lambardar*, and the number of the lashkar was put between 200/300. The Deputy Commissioner in his report admits that the Political Tahsildar had reported this to him at 6-30 p.m. but he says that the objective according to the report made to him was the Muhammad Khel Khassadar Post or the Bizan Khel post, a contingency which did not appear to him to be likely. A third report, again from Ghaus Mohammad Constable at Old Gumbatti and marked G.M.4 was received by the Political Tahsildar when it was getting dark. The report said that the lashkar had gone towards the Algad (presumably meaning the bed of the Kurram River) via Khuzi Khel Takka, that the lashkar was about 250 in number and was making its way towards Bannu and necessary arrangements should be made. This report was also passed on to the Deputy Commissioner on the telephone by the Political Tahsildar as deposed to by the latter before us. From the above it will be seen that throughout the day on the 23rd July reports of a lashkar threatening the District from a point less than five miles from Bannu City and Cantonment were coming in from Old Gumbatti Post.

14. Some Constabulary lorry-drivers who had gone out for a walk on the Kurram Bridge reported to the Constabulary Lines at about 7-30 p.m. that they had seen the lashkar in the Kurram bed. This presence of

the lashkar in the Kurram bed at 7-30 p.m. or thereabouts receives confirmation from a report made by one Behari Lall to the Kohat Road Police Post at 7-45 p.m. which has been placed before us. It may therefore be taken as established on this record that the lashkar was near about the Constabulary Lines at about 7-30 p.m.

15. The Special Report of the Superintendent of Police No. 5707, dated the 26th July 1938 shows that on the morning of the 23rd July 1938 at 6 a.m. information had been received from the Khassadars of Gumbatti Post that Mehr Dil's lashkar had fired a few shots at the Khassadar Post. This information although mentioned in the report does not seem to be borne out by the evidence of the Political Tahsildar or by the Special Political Diaries that have been placed before the Committee. It appears therefore that this information was the one which had been received the previous day but was probably passed on to the Superintendent's office at a later time. At any rate it is quite clear from the evidence summarised above that the authorities at Bannu had warning of the imminence of the trouble whether in the form of damage to Government buildings in sufficient time before the raid actually took place. The information of the arrival of a hostile lashkar in Gumbatti had been received on the day previous to the raid and of its arrival in the Kurram bed not later than 7-45 p.m. on the day of the raid.

The time of the arrival of the lashkar at the Railway Gate.

16. The Special Report of the Superintendent of Police above-mentioned and the evidence of Mr. McCrea, District Officer Frontier Constabulary, show that the lashkar split into two parties, one of which took position on the eastern side of the Kurram bridge and the other went on across the Kurram River behind the Constabulary Lines to Bazar Ahmad Khan *en route* to Bannu City. It is also proved that the raiders took up position on the road near the Frontier Constabulary Lines and fired shots on the Lines from the fields surrounding them and one sepoy of platoon No. 14, who was holding the southern corner of the Lines, was wounded. The special Report of the District Officer Frontier Constabualry No. 21 dated the 24th of July 1938 shows that in order to locate the enemy platoon No. 20 with the District Officer Frontier Constabulary proceeded to the western bridge-head but when

an attempt was made to cross the bridge, the patrol was heavily fired at and two men were hit by ricochets, and had therefore to retire to the Bannu end of the bridge. The body of the lashkar eventually got into the city and it was reported to a witness residing in Bazar Ahmad Khan to have passed near that village at about 8-30 p.m. The evidence of Sub-Inspector Nizam Khan shows that the Saddar Police Station was fired at, at some time before 9 p.m., and he heard firing in the city at what he estimated to be between 8-45 and 8-50 p.m. Before going to the city the firing was directed, as shown by the report of the Headquarters, Bannu Brigade, on the east face of the perimeter in the direction of the Railway Station which gave the impression that the attack was developing on this locality. From the Saddar Police Station the raiders are proved to have gone to the Railway Gate which they seem to have reached at a little before 9 p.m.

17. The witnesses who have appeared before us have given different times for the arrival of the lashkar at the Railway Gate. The difference does not seem to be very large, and considering that the lashkar was at the Kurram bed at 7-30 p.m. and was in the vicinity of Bazar Ahmad Khan at about 8-30 p.m., it would be quite safe to conclude that they were at the Railway Gate somewhere near 9 p.m. The evidence given by three witnesses namely Sub-Inspector Dost Muhammad Khan, Lance-Head-Constable Shiv Dayal and Foot-Constable Jesa Ram No. 423 shows that the time that was taken by the raiders to break open the Railway Gate was about 15 minutes. Sub-Inspector Dost Muhammad Khan put the time at 10 minutes, Jesa Ram put it at 15 minutes and Shiv Dayal again put it at 10 minutes. After having seen the Gate itself and also having seen the marks of the instrument used to bend the rod, we think we can accept this time as between 10 and 15 minutes, the exact time being immaterial. It would therefore mean that by about 9-15 p.m. the raiders had entered the city.

Reaction of authorities to information.

18. The discussion of the evidence given above shows that the authorities had warning and, even if they had made no dispositions on receiving the reports from Gumbatti had at their disposal about one hour and a half in order to locate and oppose the raiders. We have not had the ad-

vantage of hearing the explanation of Major Laughton who was the Deputy Commissioner at the time, nor were we able to examine any Military witnesses. We feel, therefore, very reluctant to adjudicate on what was and was not done by Major Laughton, but from the report of the attack on Bannu City which was made by him and which had been placed before us and from the perusal of other evidence both oral and documentary, we must hold that Major Laughton was lacking in initiative and did not take proper and strong measures to protect the life and property of the citizens committed to his charge, and living in the city which was a garrison town and should not have been allowed to be raided by a lashkar consisting at most of 300/400 men, even though armed with fire-arms.

19. It has even been suggested by certain witnesses that the raid was connived at by Major Laughton, and in support of this allegation a large number of circumstances have been placed before us. The circumstances will be dealt with at a later stage, but having carefully considered them we hold that all these circumstances even cumulatively do not lead to the conclusion which we have been asked to draw that the Deputy Commissioner organised or connived at the raid. No servant of the Crown can be so diseased in mind as to permit a city which owes fealty to the Crown to be pillaged and plundered and burnt in the manner that Bannu suffered, howsoever grave may be the provocation alleged to have been given to such servant of the Crown, and howsoever dilatory his counter-measures may be held to have been. But when one has said this, it does not follow that there was no negligence or misunderstanding of his position to be attributed to Major Laughton.

20. The evidence of Major de la Fargue, the present Deputy Commissioner and the statements made before the Committee both by Mr. Fryer, Superintendent of Police and Mr. McCrea, District Officer Frontier Constabulary indicate that the Deputy Commissioner was under the impression that in the maintenance of internal order he was subordinate to the Military authorities. Both the report of Bannu Brigade Headquarters as well as the report of Major Laughton seem to confirm that this was the prevailing idea. We must affirm that this was a wholly erroneous idea and is neither supported by au-

thority nor by precedent nor by practice. The Code of Criminal Procedure makes it quite clear that the initiative in calling for military aid to the civil power must proceed from the Magistrate, and it is only the method of application of the necessary force that remains with the Military Commander. We have come to the conclusion that this idea of subordination of the Civil to the Military authorities was in no small measure responsible for lack of adequate measures taken to meet the raid. This verdict will become clearer when we come to discuss the action taken after the raiders had entered the City. Before their entry the tactics of the raiders were clever enough to divert attention from their objective, but even so it will be seen that a whole day was allowed to go by without an attempt, other than the organization of a *chigha* party, to reconnoitre or gain touch with the lashkar.

Action taken by the Political authorities.

21. The measures taken by the authorities may be divided into various heads, the first one of which is the heading "Political Measures." For this we have to turn to the evidence of the Political Tahsildar and to the Political Diaries which have been placed before us. It appears that before the date of raid, five jirgas of the Ahmadzai Wazirs had been held. The first jirga was held in the end of June and the tribesmen were asked to drive out Mehr Dil and the Deputy Commissioner reminded them of their responsibilities. The second Ahmadzai jirga was sent on the 5th of July 1938, this was accompanied by the Political Tahsildar as far as new Gumbatti, but this also proved a failure in effecting the expulsion of Mehr Dil. As a matter of fact this jirga could not reach Mehr Dil as he had moved from Ghar Khulla to Daryoba. According to the evidence of the Tahsildar the jirga was unsuccessful because Mehr Dil wanted to avoid meeting it and had changed his headquarters. The third jirga was called by the Deputy Commissioner on the 11th July 1938, in which he again reminded the maliks of their responsibilities and the maliks are said to have promised that they were going to organise a lashkar of their own to drive Mehr Dil out. The Deputy Commissioner, who evidently was not satisfied from his past

experience as to the conduct of the maliks, told them that their movement towards Ghar Khulla will be watched from an aeroplane. The fourth jirga was held on the 15th of July 1938; this is described by the Tahsildar as a representative jirga of the Ahmadzais who were seen by the Deputy Commissioner. The jirga undertook that no raiding parties will be allowed through their territory, no rations or subscriptions will be allowed to pass through their territory and none of their tribesmen, with the exception of outlaws, will join the lashkar and they will impose a tribal agreement that if any outlaws joined the lashkar they will point out their relatives to the Government and would even be prepared to give evidence against them. As security the Deputy Commissioner took 200 rifles and 200 men in *barampta*. It will be admitted that all this amounted to as strong a form of political pressure short of the use of armed force that could have been applied to any tribe. We think that up to this stage the Deputy Commissioner acted with sufficient vigour, and was justified in expecting that the political pressure applied would maintain the necessary equilibrium. As Mehr Dil still continued to carry on his nefarious activities, on the 20th July 1938, another jirga of the Ahmadzais was told by the Deputy Commissioner to go and turn him out. This jirga did go, according to the statement of the Tahsildar, and is supposed to have told Mehr Dil that he had given enough trouble and that he was giving a bad name to Islam, which did not allow raiding and kidnapping of children and asked him to leave their territory. Mehr Dil's reply was that he would not go and if they had any force they should turn him out. This jirga also returned unsuccessful. When the Deputy Commissioner heard that the Hathi Khels had not accompanied the jirga to Mehr Dil, he, on the 22nd of July, arrested 100 persons belonging to the tribe. Before this arrest about 100 men of Umarzai tribe had been taken in *barampta* because there were many Umarzais with Mehr Dil, the chief amongst whom were Khale, Abdul and Shakhar. These men were kept in *barampta* as a kind of security that the Ahmadzai Wazirs would not allow Mehr Dil and his lashkar to come through their passes to British Territory. According to the evidence of Khan Sahib Ghazi Marjan Khan who is the chief malik of the Bannu Ahmadzai Wazirs and belongs to the Sperkai branch, out of the first

four jirgas the first three had been wholly useless and it was only the fouth jirga that interviewed Mehr Dil.

22. On the day of the raid after the news was received at about 10 a.m. no action was taken by any armed forces, but the Deputy Commissioner decided to organise a *chigha* party of the Muhammad Khel Ahmadzais for the purpose of driving out Mehr Dil who had come to Gumbatti Tangi. After the five unsuccessful attempts made by the Ahmadzai maliks and the failure of the heavy political pressure already applied, we think that the Deputy Commissioner should have resorted to more vigorous steps to gain touch with the lashkar and to place vulnerable points, which might become the objective of its attack, in a state of preparation. He did, it is true, ask for air reconnaissance, but when owing to bad visibility this proved impossible there were other means of aid on which he could have called. The Bannu Brigade report shews that units were not ordered to stand to until 8-30 p.m., and the Police evidence that the City Police were so unprepared that the officers were attending a dinner party at the quarters of the City Inspector when the raid developed. As subsequent events have proved and previous results from jirgas had shown political action alone was unsuited to the occasion. Khan Sahib Ghazi Marjan Khan who went to Daryoba says that Mehr Dil had hoisted his flags there and had posted pickets on all the hills around just like an ' army ' and would not allow any one to go armed. His attitude towards the jirga which saw him first was anything but encouraging and Mehr Dil tried to tamper with the loyalty of the maliks who went to visit him. He made absolutely clear his view that the maliks who had gone to see him were servants of *kafirs*, and that the Faqir of Ipi's orders to him were that all the country between Dre Ghundari and the River Indus was regarded as his lieutenancy. He also taunted the maliks as being the servants of the *Firangis* and he told them that he would hoist his flag in Gumbatti Tangi on Friday. A man with such mentality and in this frame of mind was not going to be moved from his intentions by the requests of unarmed maliks who in this case signally failed to honour their pledges and to discharge their responsibilites. To rely on political action alone was to say the least an error of judgment.

Stronger measures were needed when it was reported that the lashkar was descending on the District, and we think the Deputy Commissioner should have called for Military aid to oppose it.

SECTION IV— MEASURES TAKEN TO MEET THE RAID—Continued

Action taken by the Police.—

23. Inspite of the fact that in the month of July the District of Bannu owing to the presence of Mehr Dil in the Ahmadzai Salient was considerably disturbed the Superintendent of Police, an officer of about fourteen years experience, was allowed to leave the District on casual leave on about the 7th of July 1938 and the Police were placed in charge of Mr. Bowen, Assistant Superintendent of Police, who was a very junior officer and had at that time a total service of about 19 months, out of which he had spent some time in Phillaur Training Centre and a few months only in Peshawar. We are told that he had, to advise him, a senior Indian gazetted officer, a Deputy Superintendent of Police, Rana Farzand Ali Khan. We had this officer before us and we have no hesitation in saying that the presence of Rana Farzand Ali Khan could not fill the gap, which had been caused by the absence of Mr. Fryer. Moreover it has been proved on this record that Rana Farzand Ali Khan was not throughout in Bannu City, and even when he was he does not seem to have been consulted in any matter of importance nor does he seem to have had any special administrative qualifications to enable him to stand behind and guide police effort in a District like Bannu at a critical time.

24. As has been mentioned above the raiders were noticed in the Kurram bed at about 7-30 p.m. The information of the presence of this lashkar was received by Mr. Bowen at 7-40 p.m. In his evidence he also says that the information of the morning, meaning the information from Gumbatti Old Post that was received at 10. a.m. on the 23rd July was passed on by Major Laughton to him, but it does not appear that action was proposed or taken on the report. Nothing in the way

of special Police precautions seems to have been done during the day. A few minutes after 7-40 p.m. when the news of the arrival of the lashkar in the Kurram bed was confirmed by an orderly of the District Officer Frontier Constabulary, a hurried consultation was held in the Deputy Commissioner's office between the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Superintendent of Police and the District Officer Frontier Constabulary, who with the Assistant Superintendent of Police was staying with the Deputy Commissioner in his house. The result of this consultation was that, believing the objective of the lashkar to be Bazar Ahmad Khan, a plan was drawn up to meet the lashkar and protect this village, and it was decided that the Assistant Superintendent of Police with about fifty armed men should go on lorries to Bazar Ahmad Khan in order to meet the lashkar and stop its advance and the Constabulary was to follow the lashkar and thus the lashkar was to be caught between the Constabulary and the Police—an excellent plan no doubt. The Assistant Superintendent of Police got to the Lines according to his own evidence after 8-20 p.m. thus it took him 40 minutes to hold the consultation and to reach the Police Lines. As the Assistant Superintendent of Police thought privately, as he puts it, that an attack on the cantonment was likely, he sent the City Inspector to the Cantonment Police Station. Just when Mr. Bowen with the Police Force was ready to go to Bazar Ahmad Khan, he was informed by the Deputy Commissioner that the lashkar was not making for Bazar Ahmad Khan and soon after he received the information that the lashkar was attacking the Railway Station which was followed shortly after by the information of an attack on the Saddar Police Station. He was still uncertain as to what he should do when at about 9 p.m. he was told that the City had been entered into and looting was going on in the bazar. Mr. Bowen then had all the horses and families in the Police Lines, brought into the quadrangle and leaving a guard of 20 under Mr. Daniels, Deputy Superintendent of Police, got ready to go to the City.

Action at Bannu Brigade Headquarters.—

25. On this point the Bannu Brigade summary says that the Brigade-Major was with the Deputy Commissioner at about 8 o'clock when a message from the District

Officer Frontier Constabulary that a lashkar reported to be 200/250 had been seen in the Kurram bed was received. At 8-20 p.m. the Deputy Commissioner informed the Brigade Commander at the Flagstaff House that the probable objective of the lashkar was Bazar Ahmad Khan. At 8-40 p.m. the Deputy Commissioner himself arrived at the Brigade Headquarters in the Flagstaff House, and as the District Officer Frontier Constabulary had reported that the lashkar had split into two parties and as a part of the lashkar was cutting trees on the east bank of the Kurram Bridge, the Deputy Commissioner asked for armoured cars to be sent out to reinforce the Frontier Constabulary, and for troops to cut off the lashkar from Bazar Ahmad Khan. The armoured cars were sent but the troops held in reserve. The report goes on to show that between 9-30 and 10-15 p. m. conflicting reports were received including one that the City had been broken into. The Deputy Commissioner asked for Military assistance, but it was decided that 56 Police reserves should move from the Cantonment into the City under Mr. Bowen. The timings given in the report are approximate and were set down on the morning of the 24th of July 1938. The Bannu Brigade report and the evidence of Mr. Bowen and other competent witnesses show that the information had been received that the City was entered into and that Mr. Bowen made up his mind, as instructed, to go into the City, after the lashkar had reached its objective and had begun to damage the property of Bannu citizens. Thus it is clear that with the exception of a small gate-guard consisting of four constables under the command of a guard-commander, a Lance Head-Constable, there was nobody else who was at the Railway Gate or anywhere on the route from Gumbatti to the City, to stop the entrance of the lashkar into the City. The lashkar took about fifteen minutes as has already been found to break open the gate. Making all allowance for the confusion, and darkness, and the lashkar's clever tactics in diverting attention by posting pickets, we think that greater initiative would have resulted in making Government forces available to oppose the raiders before they had entered the city or at any rate very shortly afterwards. We think that the Deputy Commissioner himself, possibly accompanied by a military officer, should have gone to the City to ascertain the situation. As it was, he remained

at Brigade Headquarters for two hours (from 8-40 to 10-30 p.m.) and asked for military aid apparently at about 10 p.m. This aid was not given at once, the situation not being held to be sufficiently clear, and it was not till about half past ten that troops moved down with the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner himself in his report anticipates this criticism, by commending the Military Commander's restraint in holding back his reserves. But more vigour earlier in the day, and then again later between 7-30 and 10-30 p.m., might well have rendered such restraint unnecessary.

Police action in the City.

26. It cannot be said that there was at this late stage no apprehension of an attack on the City, for, if that had been so, Sub-Inspector Dost Muhammad Khan would not have sent a man on a bicycle to inform all the guards on the City gates to take their positions in the pickets, as he puts it. He himself got on to a bicycle and went to the City Police Station from the Chappar Police Post and he reached there at 8-45 p.m. About a minute or two after his arrival, he says, he heard shots coming from the south-east. Some people told him that they were coming from the Railway Gate side and so he started from the Police Station with two armed Foot Constables, two unarmed Foot-Constables and one Head Constable. He was going towards the Railway Gate when he was informed by some four or five people that the gate was about to be opened by the lashkar. He proceeded towards the Railway Gate with the hope of reaching the *morcha* on the gate but he had not gone very far when he could see that the lashkar had opened the gate and were entering the City. He therefore got on to the top of the *balakhana* of one Kewal Ram in the Railway Gate bazar. The lashkar passed under the *balakhana* but was not fired at by the Sub-Inspector as he had only one musket at the time. The lashkar according to him proceeded towards the *Nilgaran Mandi* and went on to the Chauk where they must have reached very soon after 9 o'clock.

27. Similarly Assistant Sub-Inspector Haqdad Khan who was incharge of the Chappar Police Post heard shots in the eastern direction, but the exact place where they were coming from, he could not locate. After sending a Head Constable and four armed constables towards the

Haved Gate, he left to warn the gate-guards of the eastern side of the City and when he reached Chauk Dass Shah he saw people running from Chauk Kalan towards Chauk Dass Shah. They told him that the lashkar had reached the Chauk. This confirms our estimate of the time when the lashkar reached the main Chauk, to be 9-15 p.m.

28. To return to Mr. Bowen, he says that he did not leave the Lines till the fire had actually broken out and flames had become visible from the Police Lines. According to the *Roznamcha* kept in the City Police Station, cries of the fire having broken out on the side of the *Nilgaran* Bazar were heard at 10 p.m. Mr. Bowen puts his departure at the latest to be 9-30 p.m. Master Kewal Ram, who may have had a fair estimate of time because he was less alive to the danger of the situation at least at the time when this raid was going on and therefore less excited, puts the time at approximately 10 p.m. The other evidence also puts the starting of the fire at about 10 p.m. This is supported by the report of Bannu Brigade Headquarters. Inspector Sarwar Shah says that the Police party arrived at the Pareti Gate at 10 p.m. So it must be held that the Assistant Superintendent of Police could not have left the Police Lines or entered the City much before 10 p.m.

29. When the Police Party under the Assistant Superintendent of Police and the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Rana Farzand Ali Khan, entered the Pareti Gate, we are told by Mr. Bowen that they were fired at though it was desultory fire and presumably the firing was directed at them from the lashkar some of whom had taken up position in the *balakhana* of Damsaz Khan contractor, which is on the eastern side about 4 shops removed from the Chauk. The Assistant Superintendent of Police and his party instead of going straight to the place where the fire was burning and where the raiders were and which could easily have been ascertained from the gate-guards at the Pareti Gate, turned to the right and went along the City wall to the Chappar Police Post. It may be mentioned that S. Sarwar Shah, Prosecuting Inspector was present at the Pareti Gate *morcha* at the time. He had been told at Chauk Dass Shah by two Hindus that the raiders had reached the main Chauk and were busy in looting the shops. As he had been told —

the Pareti Gate that going out would be dangerous he stayed on at the *morcha*. He as mentioned above puts the time of the arrival of the Assistant Superintendent of Police and Rana Farzand Ali Khan at 10 p.m.

30. These two Police Officers have given two versions of the reason for going to the Chappar Police Post. Mr. Bowen says that when he started from the Police Lines he had no particular intention of going to the Chappar Police Post, but as he went along in that direction, he saw crowds of citizens running towards the west and therefore he thought it worth while going to the Chappar Police Post and taking a force from there and then advancing up into the front of the lashkar. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Rana Farzand Ali Khan, says that they started with the intention of going to Chappar Police Post as it was inhabited by a majority of the Hindus and implication of this statement was that the Police force turned to the right to go to the Chappar Police Post in order to give protection to the Hindus. This reason given by Rana Farzand Ali Khan, we are constrained to say, is incorrect. We have had Hindu citizens as witnesses and their evidence establishes that majority of the Hindus do not live on the Chappar Police Post side. As a matter of fact a large portion of the City on that side is a new extension and the majority of Hindus and particularly the richer class of Hindus live on the eastern and southern sides of the City and round about the Chauk Kalan.

31. From the Chappar Police Post from where the Assistant Superintendent of Police expected to get some reinforcement but did not get any, he and the force under him came to Chauk Dass Shah and from there turned to the City Police Station which is on the southern side of this Chauk and close to it. At this time Mr. Bowen says there were only some desultory shots, but the fire was blazing, and we think rightly he decided the first thing was to turn out the fire-engine. We have not sufficient evidence to show whether these shots were fired by the lashkar or by house-holders, and shooting by house-holders from roofs is a most confusing feature of city rioting. It is possible that the lashkar had left or was leaving when Mr. Bowen arrived. It may be that when the fire-engine began working, its sound which is like

that of a machine-gun frightened the lashkar who left but at any rate this much is clear that the main body of the Police under the Assistant Superintendent of Police never attained contact with the lashkar at all.

32. Another point to be noticed is that according to the evidence of Rana Farzand Ali Khan the Police party went at the double from the Pareti Gate to the scene of occurrence and must have taken about ten minutes. Mr. Bowen puts it about 20 minutes but the summary of the Police Station diaries of the Chappar Police Station a translation of which has been placed on the file, shows that the Assistant Superintendent of Police, the Deputy Superintendent of Police (2), and the District Armed Reserve Party arrived at the Chappar Police Post and left for the City Police Station at 10-45 p.m. The Deputy Superintendent of Police said that these timings were wrong. The Committee upon this got the Police Station Muharrirs and examined them with regard to the Police *roznamchas*. The statements of the Muharrirs are definite, that they were taking down the timings simultaneously with the events as they happened and that the times of the clocks in the Police Station were reasonably correct although they cannot say that they were standard time. It is true that the night was full of excitement and there was likelihood of the Muharrirs losing their heads in the face of danger, but there is nothing to suggest that Muharrirs in the Police Station realised the danger to the City or were in any way so terror-stricken that they were incapable of doing this simple duty of keeping a correct record of the timings of the events of the night. Moreover these timings fit in with the other evidence.

33. According to the estimate given by non-official witnesses which does not seem to be wrong, the raiders were in the City for about two hours, which will take us to 11 p.m. Thus we find that the lashkar in the City met with no organised opposition from the Civil forces. The official witnesses have maintained that it was not possible for the Police party under Mr. Bowen to go straight from the Pareti Gate to the Chauk Kalan as it would have resulted in unnecessarily large casualties. This fact was particularly emphasised by the Police witnesses, and Major Lang-Anderson and it was also said, as is indeed true, more particularly at night, that combing out of armed

bands in a city like Bannu is a very difficult operation. We have not had any evidence to the contrary and we cannot pronounce on tactics in cold blood and at this distance of time. It may well have been too risky a manoeuvre to undertake. But what we do feel is that there was undue delay in getting to grips with the situation in the City. Some evidence referred to house-holders having taken up positions on the roofs of houses and fired at the lashkar, so circumscribing its activities. The experience of the Official Member of our Committee leads him however to question the utility of such manoeuvres which add to the confusion and are under no form of direction. Nevertheless in the present case the failure of Government forces to appear on the scene and oppose the raiders left the citizens of Bannu with no alternative but to protect themselves.

34. Mr. Bowen and other official witnesses have suggested that the prompt despatch of armoured cars would have brought the situation quickly under control and he himself telephoned to the Deputy Commissioner for such a reinforcement. In this matter we are precluded from any definite finding in view of the fact that the Criminal Procedure Code leaves it entirely to the Military Commander to decide the manner and the means by which a Magistrate's requisition for military aid shall be met.

35. The Superintendent of Police has taken up the position that it was not the duty of the Police to meet such a big organised attack by large armed bands; he says that "they (the Police) cannot be counted as part of a set plan for the defence of an area like Bannu City against an organised attack by armed forces but only as effective against depredations of normal criminals for which they are organised." But this position of the Superintendent of Police is not consistent with his own statement in the course of which he said "The District Armed Reserves are platoons of Police organised for the application of force and not for the investigation of crime, they are used for holding routes, to intercept raiders, catching absconders and proclaimed offenders.....We have in this District at the moment three platoons of the District Armed Reserves and had two at the time of the raid, one platoon is used in the defence of the City." At page 10 he says "I have only three sections with excessive

crime work and anti-raiding measures, the District Armed Reserves are more useful than the Frontier Constabulary within the District as they are under Police control." This answers the position taken up by the Superintendent of Police, but a perusal of the Police Act section 23 and Chapters IX and XIII of the Criminal Procedure Code show clearly that prevention of crime and dispersal of unlawful assemblies is a normal function of the Police. In a book by S. Roy on Police Officers published by the Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1938 Edition, in Chapter XXI at page 460, dealing with the " Uses of Special Armed Forces," the learned author says that the armed Police is a kind of emergency force and is known as such. Rules with regard to its mobilization are also given. Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure is specially meant for the guidance of Police and other forces to maintain peace. Special procedure has also been laid down by various Police rules and in Police Manuals for the dispersal of unlawful assemblies both in cases where the danger to life or property is not apprehended as also in cases where the danger is great. In Sohoni's Code of Criminal Procedure at page 205 is given an extract from the Police Manual laying down the procedure to be adopted for the dispersal of unlawful assemblies.

36. It may on the other hand with good reason be contended that the dispersal of a lashkar of the magnitude which came to raid Bannu City was beyond the powers of Police force which was at the disposal of officers at the time. This is a different position and, as far as we can reconstruct the events of this night, we think the real failure lay in not preparing the City Police in good time for a possible attack, and having no plan ready for immediate military reinforcement when the attack materialized. From a perusal of the evidence and explanations given by the Police Officers and particularly by Mr. Bowen who gave his statement in a most straightforward manner we must conclude that he was set a task which should not have been laid on so young and inexperienced officer, that determination to get to grips with the raiders was halting throughout, and that the time-lag which took place between the information received and the arrival of Government forces, Civil and Military, was due partly to a failure of initiative already commented on and partly

to lack of any organised and pre-arranged plan for the defence of Bannu City against tribal irruption.

Action by isolated Police parties in the City.

37. In dealing with the Police, the next point to be considered is the conduct of the Railway Gate guard. As has been said above the Railway Gate guard consisted of four Police Constables under the command of a Lance Head-Constable. According to the evidence of Foot Constable Jesa Ram No. 423 and Lance Head-Constable Shiv Dayal, Foot Constable Bhagwan Dass came on a bicycle and asked them to put on their uniform. This was about 8-45 p.m. He said that there was danger but he did not tell them what the danger was. Jesa Ram says in reply to a question that Foot Constable Bhagwan Dass never told them that there was a danger of the lashkar. This may be true considering the slip-shod manner in which the whole thing was being treated but it appears to be unlikely that source of danger was not communicated or at any rate enquired by the gate-guard from Bhagwan Dass. According to Shiv Dayal it was about five minutes before the change of sentries at 9 p.m. that Foot Constable Ahmad Khan who was on duty at the morcha blew a whistle and then all members of the guard took their muskets and went into the morcha from where they fired at the raiders, but the latter managed to reach the gate. Shiv Dayal further says that the raiders replied to the fire and that none of them was hurt or wounded as a result of firing by the guard. There were however many bullet marks on the roof of the morcha showing that heavy covering fire had been maintained on it by a picket from outside to enable the lashkar to reach the gate.

38. From the conduct of the guard it appears unlikely that they fired any shots from the morcha. The lashkar managed to reach the Railway Gate unscathed. At least it has not been shown that as a result of the firing by the guard any one of the raiders was wounded. They (the raiders) remained at the gate for about fifteen minutes as has already been found and during this time they fired in all directions including the morcha, but due to defect in the loop-holes from which fire could only be directed in a straight direction and not downwards, the guard in the morcha could not reply to the fire. We have also

been told that the morcha was otherwise badly constructed and was not a sufficent protection to the men in it. Taking everything into consideration, while we feel that four brave and determined men in this post might have rendered it impossible for the lashkar to break open the gate, we must note that there were marks of heavy covering fire having hit the post and that the faulty construction of the loop-holes made it a difficult post to defend. We think therefore it would not be fair to blame four ordinary policemen for failing to prevent an armed lashkar from entering the City. Had the post been properly constructed as it has now been, the position might have been different, but even so a true measure of the task set may be gauged from the statement that successful resistance at this point would certainly have been applauded as an heroic act.

39. We now come to the part played by Sub-Inspector Dost Muhammad Khan. He in his evidence says that at 8-30 p.m. he was in the Chappar Police Post when Inspector Qaim Shah was called away and he was left incharge of the City Police. He sent a verbal warning through a foot constable to the gate-guards. He came to the City Police Station at 8-45 p.m. and then proceeded towards the Railway Gate and when he reached the *Nilgaran Mandi* he was told by 4/5 persons whose names he does not remember that the lashkar was about to open the gate. He proceeded to the Railway Gate in the hope of reaching the morcha on the gate but he had not gone very far and was yet 150 paces from the Railway Gate when he saw the gate opening and the lashkar entering the City. He got on to the *balakhana* of one Kewal Ram and from there he saw the lashkar, which he estimated to be 400/500 men, armed and unarmed, pass under him. As he had only two constables and one Head Constable with him, he did not open fire on the crowd passing below. After the lashkar had passed and gone into the *Mandi Nilgaran*, he went on to the Railway Gate and th ere collected the Railway Gate guard who were standing behind the mosque and he asked them why they had left the morcha and their reply was that the morcha was being fired at and the bullets were coming in and it was difficult to hold the morcha or to stop such a large lashkar and therefore they had left the morcha. He took them with him into the morcha, and he saw the enemy picket on the eastern side of the gate about 100 paces away in the grassy

plot opposite to the gate. He says that he fired at them and as a result of the fire they dispersed and hid themselves in a field of maize. It may or may not be so. It is not possible to come to a definite finding on this point. The night was dark at the time and no lights were burning. Another picket was seen on the northern side of the gate. They also were fired at and they also retired and hid themselves in a field of maize. The Sub-Inspector also says that he closed the Railway Gate in the sense that he put the bent bolt back into the socket. The Sub-Inspector and the Party then left the morcha as it was not considered to be safe from the inside and went along the Railway Gate Road to the house of one Khem Chand. The Sub-Inspector asked for the door of the house to be opened but according to his statement the door was not opened and therefore they (the Sub-Inspector and Police Party) went a little further on and got on to the roof of a *kacha* house opposite to Khem Chand's house and from there they again shouted to Khem Chand to open the door and this time he did and according to the statement a good half an hour was wasted in this manoeuvre and by the time the Sub-Inspector and his Party had entered the house and were yet in the courtyard the lashkar was heard returning. They (the lashkar) were firing at that time and were very jubilant. The Sub-Inspector further says that he and his party were led by Khem Chand to a morcha on the second storey and they were yet on the first floor when the lashkar reopened the Railway Gate and began going out of the City. From the second storey where there are three morchas, which we have seen, the Sub-Inspector claims to have fired at the lashkar but did not know with what result.

40. The Sub-Inspector was in the region of the Railway Gate all the time while the lashkar was in the City for at least one and a half hours. The Sub-Inspector's evidence shows that he must have taken about half an hour in the morcha in trying to disperse two pickets and then another half an hour in getting into Khem Chand's house. We have considered the evidence and do not think that the Sub-Inspector could justly have been expected with the small number of men at his disposal to put up an effective resistance either to the approach or to the retreat of the lashkar. But there remains the fact that he did not send any clear information to the Police

Headquarters or to the Deputy Commissioner with regard to the breaking in by the lashkar or their going towards *Nilgaran Mandi*.

Action taken by the Police subsequent to the raid.—

41. After the main body of raiders had left, the Police made a number of arrests in the *balakhana* of Damsaz Khan and Master Kewal Ram, Pleader, and also in a mosque in the *Sabzi Mandi*. As to the guilt or otherwise of the persons arrested, we refrain from comment as that matter is *sub-judice*, but we think that Police action in this matter was prompt and deserving of commendation. The Police witnesses have also deposed to their firing at and killing certain persons who were, after or during the raid, lurking about under suspicious circumstances. They were suspected of being accomplices and some of them were found to be armed with fire-arms, bandolier, haversacks or water-bottles. Persons so equipped could not have been there near the gates or the City walls for an innocent object but as their case may also be *sub-judice* we prefer to express no opinion.

Military aid.—

42. As has been remarked above, the Deputy Commissioner allowed himself to surrender initiative to the Military authorities and the report of Headquarters Bannu Brigade suggests that he was acting under their control. According to this report between 10 and 10-15 p.m. the Deputy Commissioner asked for troops but they were not sent. His earlier request for sending out armoured cars was acceded to. According to the same report orders for dispatch of troops to the City were issued between 10-15 and 10-30 p.m. Inspector Sarwar Shah in his evidence at page 150 puts the arrival of the Military at about 11 p.m. Mr. Bowen in answer to a question said that the military gave no help in the dispersal or pursuit of the raiders. In his evidence at page 121 he says " So far as I am aware the military gave no assistance in the dispersal of the lashkar or in their pursuit." Major Laughton himself wrote " The military and the civil forces are under military control and I feel that I am treading on ground which concerns the military. It may however be remembered that reductions have been made to the District garrison of last year despite protests. The fact must be admitted that the garrison was too small

to deal with what developed into a large scale attack against both the Cantonment and the City". At another place he praises the Commander on the ground that but for the restraint shown by him in maintaining his reserves intact the damage to the City might well have been incalculable. How that would have been so, it is not possible for us to say in the absence of fuller explanations from the Deputy Commissioner, but we cannot help saying that the report shows that the Deputy Commissioner was lacking in knowledge of the respective duties of the civil and military forces in time of disturbances of the type that faced Bannu authorities on the 23rd of July 1938. We are aware that the Criminal Procedure Code leaves it entirely to the Military Commander to decide the manner in which he will obey a requisition of a Magistrate for military assistance. Moreover in the absence of any evidence from the Military or explanation from the Deputy Commissioner, excepting the two reports mentioned above, it is not possible to arrive at a definite conclusion as to the reasons for the military not obeying the Deputy Commissioner's requisition more promptly. But the fact remains that it is proved on this record that in the dispersal or in the pursuit of the raiders or in the protection of the life and property of His Majesty's subjects the Military gave no assistance before about 11 p.m. when the raiders had left.

43. The final point we would emphasize is that in the matter of employment of the military in aid of the civil power the law lays on the Military Commander the duty of obedience, and confers on the Civil authority the right of requisition. The circumstances of the present case suggest that during the 12 hours between about 10 a.m. and 10 p.m. on the 23rd July 1938 the correct relationship between the two authorities was not properly appreciated in Bannu.

Action taken by Frontier Constabulary.—

44. The first people who came to know about the arrival of the lashkar near Bannu were the Frontier Constabulary and if they had been turned out at the proper time, they might have succeeded in stopping the raid. Mr. McCrea, District Officer, Frontier Constabulary was asked if he could have stopped the ingress of the lashkar

near Gumbatti but his reply was that he could not because the force at his disposal was not sufficient. It is true that the Frontier Constabulary were at low strength but we are not convinced that when the raiders were reported at Gumbatti, and later in the Kurram bed and were on the way to Bazar Ahmad Khan, they could not have been encountered and located by the Constabulary. It is true that the Constabulary Lines were fired at and they had to take position for the protection of the Lines and also that their attention was diverted by splitting up of the lashkar into two parties one of which stayed on the east bank of Kurram and fired at the party under Mr. McCrea which attempted to cross the Kurram Bridge in order to locate the enemy. But they were obviously unprepared for the raid despite the information earlier in the day from Gumbatti, were cleverly out-manoeuvred by the lashkar and therefore could do no useful work in the matter of pursuing the lashkar on their way to Bazar Ahmad Khan or in cutting off their retreat on their return. The aid they seem to have given was limited to one platoon No. 33 with recruits, which entered the City to put out the fire and later on to strengthen the guards on the City-wall. Beyond this they do not seem to have done much and therefore we may safely conclude that their contribution in the prevention of the raid or in the punishment of the raiders was practically nil.

Magistrates.

45. The senior magistrate in the District after the Deputy Commissioner was Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khalil Khan, who was Assistant Commissioner. He however was absent from his post and had left the District. It is regrettable that during those critical days when there was appréhension of trouble from Mehr Dil and his lashkar both the Assistant Commissioner and the Superintendent of Police were away from Bannu. We have had Khan Bahadur Ibrahim Khalil Khan as a witness before us and he has struck us as an able and efficient officer. We do not think that leave of absence should be so readily granted to key officers in times of disturbance. The presence of a capable Assistant Commissioner on the 23rd July might have made much difference and would have strengthened the Deputy Commissioner's hand. The same comment applies with equal force to the Superinten-

dent of Police.

46. Two other magistrates have appeared before us. They are Arbab Muhammad Abbas Khan, Treasury Officer and Bawa Jaggat Singh Bedi, Magistrate 1st Class. They do not seem to have been aware of any impending danger, nor were they assigned any particular task by the Deputy Commissioner. Both resided in the City, but when they came to know of the raid they seem to have done nothing. Arbab Muhammad Abbas Khan no doubt did go to the scene of occurrence when the Administrator went there, but that was at a very late stage. Bawa Jaggat Singh did not go there at all and the reason given by him was that when he wanted to cross the Chauk near his own house, he was not allowed to do so by the people who said that it was dangerous. Both of them have given us the impression that they considered themselves to have no public duties outside their respective courts and offices. Arbab Muhammad Abbas Khan was asked a question "As a magistrate did it occur to you to go to the Police Station to see whether you could render any assistance in organisation of defence or otherwise" and the answer was "No, because our general instructions in cases of riots and disorders are that we should proceed to the spot. In case of attacks by raiders it would be useless for a magistrate to go single-handed. I do not consider that it was my duty to go to the Police Station to get in touch with the Deputy Commissioner on such an occasion, because the matter was really a concern of the political authorities and the Police." These two gentlemen seem to have forgotten that the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates the presence of magistrates at times of commotion and disorder in order to disperse unlawful assemblies. In a case reported as R. V. Pinny, 3 St. Tr. (U. S.) 11, it was laid down that "The general rules of law require all the magistrates that at the time of riots they should keep the peace, restrain the rioters pursue and take them; and to enable them to do this they may call on all King's subjects to assist them which they are bound to do upon reasonable warning, and in a point of law a magistrate would be justified in giving fire-arms to those who thus come to assist him." (Russell 431-439). The law in India does not seem to be any different. As a matter of fact in Maxwell's Duties of a Magistrate"

page 81 the same passage occurs in the Chapter dealing with duties of magistrates in India. Law and common-sense require that magistrates should not display helplessness at times of danger but should actively come to the assistance of the forces of Law and Order.

47. A careful consideration of the evidence and circumstances leads us to the conclusion that the Civil authorities present in Bannu on the night of the raid did not show the qualities of foresight, alertness and drive needed to meet a difficult and dangerous situation, which did not come upon them entirely unheralded.

Efforts to meet the fire.—

48. The *roznamcha* of the City Police Station shows that at 10-15 p.m. some Hindus came to the Police Station and informed them that fire had broken out in *Mandi Nilgaran* and as there were no men in the Police Station the City Inspector was informed who ordered that they should be told to bring policemen from outside and a hand-pump will be handed over to them. Chaudhari Bhagat Singh in his written statement has stated that when the Police force did not return from the City Police Station, he himself went there and asked why they were standing doing nothing when the fire was spreading. The reply given to him was that a water-pump with six constables and a Head Constable would be sent. At the same time the other people, meaning people other than the policemen, were ordered to go to the place where the fire was raging and help in extinguishing it. The Administrator says that on being asked he allowed the water-valves to be lifted and the water released into the lanes and thereafter he went to the Chauk Kalan, where he saw the Assistant Superintendent of Police with armed Police already there trying to fight the fire. Mr. Bowen says that he got the motor pump working and got as near the fire as it was possible. Thus it is clear that the Police and the people began to put out the fire but the efforts did not begin till the fire had assumed considerable proportions. Major Lang-Anderson has said that due to paucity of water the fire was not controlled as quickly as it would otherwise have been. The Deputy Commissioner seems to have arrived at the place somewhere after 10-45 p.m. as stated by Mr. Bowen with a guard of constabulary and he also helped in putting out the fire. The military arrived

soon after and as Major Lang-Anderson says all helped in extinguishing the fire. The fire was controlled at about 1 a.m. On this evidence we are satisfied that there was co-operation of the different sections of the people as well as of the Police and Military in fighting the fire.

Damage done by the fire.—

49. According to the claims put forward by the people whose shops and goods were destroyed by fire the extent of the damage was Rs. 3,08,330/4/-. The claim put forward by the people has been supplied to the Committee and it is being placed with this report as an Appendix. The Deputy Commissioner deputed Mr. A. S. Dhawan, the Municipal Administrator, to adjudicate upon the extent of the damage. He has assessed the damage at Rs. 1,32,464. We received no evidence which would suggest any criticism of the official estimate of the extent of the damage, and we arrived too late to undertake anything in the nature of a reassessment. We therefore accept the assessment made by Mr. Dhawan and hold that the damage was in the neighbourhood of that sum.

Section V.—Situation in Bannu City Before the Raid

Disputes.—

50. The statement of Arbab Muhammad Abbas Khan, Treasury Officer, shows that there was a suspicion amongst the Hindus of Bannu City that the raid was engineered or connived at by Damsaz Khan contractor or by the Khans of Ghazni Khel, whose head is Khan Muhammad Akram Khan. There is no evidence on this record to substantiate this suspicion. As a matter of fact the Arbab himself has given reasons why this suspicion was baseless. The reason for blaming Damsaz Khan was that there was a dispute between him and some Hindus over the lease of some municipal shops in the Chauk Kalan. The other basis for this suspicion seems to have been the occupation of Damsaz Khan's *balakhana* by Mehr Dil's lashkar. Both these facts are insufficient to induce a person to connive at such henious offences as dacoity, arson and murder. We hold therefore that Damsaz Khan has not been proved to have had any connection with the raiders or the raid.

51. Coming now to the Khans of Ghazni Khel, the suspicion is based on two things, one a dispute with regard to the rates of electric energy fixed by the Electric Supply Company of Bannu which is a concern controlled and owned by Muhammad Akram Khan and his relations, and the other some dispute with regard to ice manufactured by this Khan. It is true that the citizens have been complaining and have refused to buy electric energy with a view to force the Company to reduce its rates and even a communal turn was given to this dispute. Muhammad Akram Khan has appeared as a witness before the Committee and he had complained that this boycott is the result of machinations of certain persons and that it has no economic basis. We hold that there was a bona-fide dispute between certain sections of the public and the Electric Supply Company and that certain persons took advantage of this dispute and gave it a communal turn. The second matter, i.e. the manufacture of ice by Muhammad Akram Khan, is a purely personal dispute between manfacturers of ice and has no concern with the public. Both of these things put together cannot lead us to believe that Muhammad Akram Khan, whose evidence favourably impressed us, could have been at the back of this raid. We would also suggest that in the dispute relating to Electric Current where allegations are being made of monopoly on one side and mischief on the other, the Government should intervene and should put an end to an unfortunate state of affairs. If the public are being mulcted in excessive charges, some intervention is called for, and if on the other hand mischief-makers are using these occasions for purposes of blackmail, the Company should be protected from them.

52. A case which came to be known as the Islam Bibi or Ram Kauri case caused much disturbance in the Bannu District and commotion amongst the tribesmen. This case, which was one of abduction, was according to Police witnesses a very ordinary one, but still it aroused communal feelings. It is not so much the nature and the progress of the case which deserves attention, but it is the circumstances that attended it which make it so important. It was during the progress of this case that a mob managed to come in large numbers to the court to intimidate them. As many as 2,000 persons are alleged to have forced themselves into the Deputy Commissioner's

compound. So much disturbance was caused by these tactics that the authorities found it impossible to give protection to a lady with whom the abducted girl was, in the first instance, kept. Even Khan Bahadur Ghulam Haider Khan, who was subsequently given the custody of this young girl, seems to have had a great deal of trouble on that score. The attending circumstances have no doubt contributed to a very large extent in lowering the respect for law and order in this district and gave encouragement to unruly people to break the law.

53. On the occasion of the second visit of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru to Bannu City a tri-colour national flag was hoisted in the Chauk Kalan. This, it is alleged, was not liked by the permanent officials and therefore one evening the Police came into the City and surrounded the flag staff. They also, it is alleged, broke open the lock of the Congress office and went up the building, their real intention being to pull down the Congress flag from the building. The conclusion, which some of the witnesses, who appeared before the Committee, wanted us to draw was that this was an attempt to pull down the flag and thus bring the Congress Ministry into disrepute. When the Police surrounded the flag some of the Congress officials complained on the telephone to the Hon'ble Doctor Khan Sahib and they say that it was this threat of complaint to Doctor Khan Sahib which prevented the Police from pulling down the flag. This incident was put to the Superintendent of Police and he admitted its happening but explained it by saying that it was based on misunderstanding and that subsequently on the matter being explained that the Police was only trying a kind of rehearsal, the matter was amicably settled and left no bad ill-feeling between any section of the public and the Police.

54. Sometime before the raid there were a large number of bomb outrages in the City and round about the Cantonment. The Police arrested certain persons under the Explosives Substances Act and the Indian Penal Code. These arrests caused some commotion. A certain party in the City said that the cases were false and the people arrested were innocent. They also alleged that the Police had used third degree methods in the investigation of these cases and that for this purpose the accused were removed to Police Stations outside Bannu City, the object

being to extort confessions. The Superintendent of Police has admitted that these allegations were made and that complaints were also made to the Premier. Whether these allegations are true or false we are not prepared to adjudicate upon them as both the bomb cases as well as the question of torture are still *sub-judice*. Nor do we think that this occurrence had the remotest connection with the raid.

55. Another allegation made against the District Administration is that they have carried out indiscriminate searches of houses in order to strike terror in the minds of the citizens. Searches were in connection with the bomb outrages and it may be that some of the searches were unjustifiable. As sufficient material has not been placed before us, from which it can be concluded that the searches were either indiscriminate or unjustified, we do not feel able to give any finding on this point. If any of the alleged victims feel aggrieved at the conduct of the Police, the law gives them ample means of redress; but so far as we are aware, no such action has been taken.

56. It has been suggested that a large number of meetings were held in Bannu City, condemning the alleged high-handedness of the District authorities in dealing with the matters above enumerated and that in these meetings some speakers used some intemperate language, verging on abuse, against the Deputy Commissioner and annoyed him so much that he sought vengeance against them by engineering or conniving at this raid.

57. In support of this theory of complicity on the part of the head of the District they say that the object was a two-fold one (i) to bring the Provincial Government into contempt and (ii) to teach a lesson to the erring public. We have given our careful consideration to these arguments and have considered the facts placed before us and have come to the clear conclusion that this charge is not made out. These facts do not necessarily lead to the conclusion to which we have been asked to come. We have already stated in another part of this report that we do not believe the theory of official connivance at this raid. Whatever may have been the nature of omissions in the matter of meeting the raid, they cannot be ascribed to deliberate desire on the part of the Deputy Commissioner or the Police to cause damage to the citizens.

Relations between Hindus & Muslims.

58. With the exception of the Superintendent of Police, other witnesses have stated that there was nothing extraordinary in the relations between Hindus and Muslims in the District. It may be true that on the surface there was nothing extraordinary but there is no doubt that there was considerable friction between the two communities. It may have been due to many causes and may even have been due to the kind of propaganda which is carried on in these days at the time of elections and in the newspapers of the Punjab which have a large circulation in the Frontier Province. But the fact remains that the relations were anything but cordial.

59. There was in Bannu City an institution called the *Danda Party*, the object of which was anti-prostitution propaganda. This society evidently was allowed to function in a manner which left an impression on the mind of the people that organised parties can take the law into their own hand. On one occasion they were allowed to blacken the face of one alleged pimp who was marched through the bazars of Bannu City, evidently unhampered by the Police. This also lowered the respect for law and order.

60. We have given our careful attention to all the facts that have been brought to our notice including the relations between the communities, the dispute between the Police and certain sections of the people, the want of restraint in the use of language against the Deputy Commissioner and other incidents above-mentioned and have come to the conclusion that whatever indirect bearing they may have had in promoting an atmosphere of strain and lack of respect for law and order they were not directly responsible for bringing about the raid. No doubt strained relations lead to the making of wild allegations and even create a suspicion in the minds of credulous people that the raid was engineered or was not deliberately checked, but they still remain allegations and at the best suspicions, which reasonable people cannot accept as established.

PART II

SECTION I.—INTRODUCTORY.

61. We are now in a position to turn to the second term of reference. We have heard a large number of official and non-official witnesses who have given us the benefit of their advice. The evidence has been fully and freely given and we have found it of great value in assisting us in reaching conclusions. We were impressed by the evident fact that many of the older and younger generation of witnesses, who appeared before us, had given the matters at issue deep thought and endeavoured to form constructive conclusions. There was at times a tendency to regard our Committee as a forum for the development of particular political views, but this tendency was not unnatural in view of the fact that the matters at issue before us touched at so many points the large question of control of the Tribal Areas. Our thanks are specially due to the members of the Bannu Bar Association, who as a body gave us full co-operation and of whom a number of witnesses showed a wide grasp of the subject. After considering this evidence and other material before us we will endeavour to set forth our recommendations in the paragraphs that follow. We have, however, in our report endeavoured to confine ourselves within the limits of practical suggestions within the existing frame-work.

SECTION II.—DEFENCE OF TOWNS AND VILLAGES

62. In order to avoid undue prolixity we assume that the Government to which this report is submitted are fully seized of the existing organisation for combating transborder irruptions into the Settled Districts. The Bannu District is in many respects peculiarly situated. It is not only a border District surrounded by a semi-circle of tribal areas, but a number of the tribes resident across the border also possess settlements within the District itself. In fact on three sides of Bannu there is a ring of such tribesmen technically known as *dokora*. Within the district the people live under a regime based on a rule of law with a fairly developed system of Courts

and Procedure. The system of Government is now democratic and a measure of provincial autonomy has been introduced requiring all citizens to possess a degree of ability and public spirit. These people live under restrictions usually placed by all civilized Governments on their nationals including restrictions as to possession of fire-arms and other means of self-protection. Beyond the administrative border are tribesmen heavily armed and well-versed in the use of arms who do not hesitate to make full use of them. They live in a state verging on lawlessness scarcely controlled by tribal custom. The first conclusion therefore which emerges is that in certain respects the inhabitants of the administered districts are at a disadvantage as against the transborder people. A number of non-official witnesses have therefore recommended that the possession of fire-arms, including rifles and revolvers, should be allowed without any restrictions (even the grant of licenses) in order to combat raiding.

63. There are however very relevant considerations which make it impossible for us to reach such a facile conclusion. In the first place, as already stated, a number of tribesmen themselves reside within the district and are subject to the influence of their unrestricted brethren across the border. Secondly there is abundant evidence before us that raiding by the tribes into the districts has assumed a definite communal tendency, and therefore that the minority section of the population are in far greater danger than the majority, whether they reside in towns or villages. Thirdly we have been supplied with figures of crime which establish a serious situation within the Bannu District and show that violent crime has greatly increased above a level which was always high. Lastly we desire to emphasize that the possession of arms by persons who are untrained to use them is not seldom a danger and may in some cases be a provocation to lawlessness rather than a safeguard. The official Member of our Committee has special experience, based not only on material now before us, of the results of indiscriminate use of fire-arms by citizens in the course of urban disturbances. There has been more than one urban disturbance within the Province during the last fifteen years which may be said to have been intensified and even provoked by such indiscriminate use. In the rural tracts

also we have to guard against too lavish grant of fire-arms to a population who are notorious for violent crime. At the same time we recognise that every law-abiding tax-payer has the right to expect facilities from the Government in securing the defence of his person and property. On a review of the whole question we feel that the problem can best be solved by some such scheme as follows.

64. Different conditions prevail in towns and villages and we propose to deal with them separately. In Bannu city we have reason to believe that the number of arms licenses is already in the neighbourhood of two thousand. The problem is to organise these license holders to prevent indiscriminate use of fire-arms by untrained persons. Sections 17-19 of the Police Act provide legal authority for the enrolment of special constables in times of apprehension of disturbance of the peace. The law allows for compulsory enlistment under the penalty of a fine and we think that in such times the district authorities should make use of these provisions by enrolling as special constables members of the public who have been granted the privilege of arms licenses. If such a provision is utilized, it would be of great importance to see to it that such organisations were not on a communal or party basis, and that special constables were a body of public-spirited men enrolled to assist the forces of law and order.

65. In the villages there already exists the *chigha* system and an organisation for distributing the Village Defence Rifles. We cannot recommend a wider distribution of arms beyond the limits which the Provincial Government have already authorised. Nor can we safely suggest the grant of favour to minorities in this respect. But we must point out that the *chigha* system appears to have become disorganised. This may be partly due to the fact that the old relationship between *naiks* and *hamsayas* is no longer honoured as it used to be, and the *hamsayas* in these days are not receiving the protection to which under the traditional system they were entitled. The reasons for this are many : one of them undoubtedly is the modern spirit of liberty and equality, making *hamsayas* no longer prepared to place themselves in a position of inferiority to the land-owners of the village. A further reason may be the 13 years of peace from 1923 to 1936 which led to the *hamsayas* forgetting their helpless position.

Propaganda against money-lending must also have had an effect in leading to deterioration in the relations between the Muslim villagers and their Hindu *hamsayas*. It seems to be forgotten that such propaganda must lead to a drying-up of credit and is useless unless an alternative form of credit can be provided. It must also lead to an increase in the feeling of insecurity and ultimately place a heavier strain on the administration. We think that direct propaganda should be discouraged and that a more proper remedy is the supply of an alternative form of cheaper credit in the form of Co-operative Credit Societies. This however is a digression and the problem of organisation of village defence remains. We think that this should be based on the *chigha* (a kind of village militia) and Village Defence Rifles system in a more organised form. This can only be achieved if inducements are held out for good service and punishment follows for neglect of public duty. We will deal with the penal side of the question in a later paragraph and for the present need only mention that such favours as frontier revenue remissions should be withdrawn for failure to render service in watch and ward of the border. With regard to inducements we are aware that financial provision already exists for rewarding good work by village defence parties and we recommend that such rewards should be promptly distributed on a generous scale. We also think that a further inducement for joining a village militia might be found in offering recruitment in the lower ranks of the services to individuals who had discharged their duties in a meritorious manner in the matter of village defence. Subject to educational qualifications such persons might be given preference in recruitment to the Police and Revenue Departments and meritorious service could be considered a passport to the grant of an arms license.

66. We would further recommend that, when armed tribal bands threaten or enter British territory, news should be broadcasted to the villages within possible ambit of their depredations. This course will have a two-fold advantage. It will define village responsibility, and villagers forewarned will be in a stronger position to fight the raiders or, if a raid is successfully committed, to cut off their retreat.

67. A difficulty is likely to arise with regard to per-

sons with tribal affinities on both sides of the border, since there is a danger that arms granted under such a system might be smuggled into the tribal territory. But proper supervision could be instituted on the existing lines on distribution of Village Defence Rifles and the introduction of a measure of discipline in the manner contemplated should make a beginning with the conversion of these tribesmen into public-spirited citizens.

SECTION III.—OUTLAWS.

68. It is abundantly clear from the evidence before us that the intensity of raiding is largely bound up with the outlaw problem. Technically an " outlaw " is a person residing in British India who commits a crime, absconds to tribal territory, is located at a definite place in T. T., and is proclaimed as an offender. A tribesman resident across the border who enters British India, there commits, a crime, and subsequently returns to the tribal territory, is technically known as a " tribal offender ". It will be apparent from these definitions that in the Bannu District, where the same tribes frequently reside on both sides of the border and many persons move between British India and the tribal territory, the same criminals can often be designated as both "outlaws " and " tribal "offenders." In this report we refer in broad terms to outlaws but it should be noted that in the sense in which we use the term it refers both to transborder tribes such as Wazirs, Mahsuds and Bhitannis and to tribes inhabiting the district such as the Bannuchis, Khattaks, Marwats etc. We have seen that in the case of the Bannu Raid the lashkar comprised a large number of outlaws, who were among the first people to gather round Mehr Dil. The difficulty of effecting the arrest of outlaws sheltered in tribal territory is notorious. When the Frontier Crimes Regulation was in use arrangements were sometimes made to obtain the voluntary surrender of outlaws on the condition that their cases would be submitted to a *jirga* and not to the regular Courts. The other course is by increasing political pressure on a tribe to compel the expulsion of outlaws from their limits. This, however, seems to have been seldom successful in the past partly owing to the Pathan

Code of honour which does not favour the surrender of members of one's own tribe to justice and does not allow of the surrender of persons of other tribes who seek harbourage in any area. There is also the difficulty that outlaws receive much assistance from their friends and relatives within the districts. The case of Lila Sheikh, a notorious outlaw and a resident of Lakki Marwat, has been brought to our notice. This man was in the habit of spending sometime every year living in his own village, and by means of a compound of local influence and terrorisation succeeded for many years in escaping the vigilance of the authorities, until a few months ago he was located and killed in a fight with the forces of the Crown. The problem is thus of great difficulty and complexity and requires the fullest co-operation between the District and Agency authorities.

69. We are not convinced that the method of tribal pressure across the border has been applied with sufficient rigour. These tribes are all in receipt of allowances and many of them are under agreement not to harbour offenders. We recommend that payment of allowances should in all cases be conditional on a tribe's honouring its agreement not to shelter outlaws. In a case such as that of the Bannu Ahmadzai Wazirs when a nest of outlaws is responsible for serious crime within the district we consider that measures of blockade should always be applied until the outlaws are either surrendered or adequate tribal guarantees are given for their behaviour. We suggest further that where damage to person or property is brought home to any tribe, or to outlaws harbouring with any tribe, the loss should be made good within the capacity of that tribe to pay out of its allowances. We understand that a portion of the Ahmadzai allowances have already been expended on the improvement of the Bannu City fortifications, and we think that the Central Government should be asked to consider a reappropriation of allowances which are not at present being paid to the tribe to meet damage done by the raid.

70. A remedy which has been suggested by many witnesses is the grant of an assurance to outlaws that they will be exempted from capital sentences if they surrender. The dangers of this concession have been pointed out by another witness who observed that such

assistance must put a premium on outlawry and will encourage murder by hired assassins who will be able to find sanctuary across the border and claim freedom from capital punishment. We do not think that any such concession can be given at the time of surrender if an outlaw is to appear before the ordinary courts, for no executive authority is competent in advance of trial to give a guarantee of this nature. There may be certain cases in which the provisions of Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be invoked by the Government after trial has taken place, but with jirga trial not in vogue we think it difficult for the Government to give a guarantee to invoke such powers in order to obtain surrender."

71. Another suggestion made was that evidence in the cases of all outlaws should be reviewed by a competent judicial authority and those against whom the evidence is weak should be so informed and allowed to return to their homes, while those against whom guilt was likely to be brought home should be compelled to return by pressure on the tribe and in any case removed to a distance of ten miles beyond the administrative border, security being demanded from the tribes if their surrender cannot be obtained. We think that some such system is workable and that some adjustment on these lines is necessary when an unadministered area abuts on a Settled District. In the former case of weak evidence we think that the old provisions of the Frontier Crimes Regulation can properly be made use of, since a simple pardon by Government without settlement with the complainant will not close a blood-feud or a dispute. The very fact that a person has absconded across the border in a murder-case shows that a "*por*" has been incurred. A free pardon will settle the case with the Crown, but the "*por*" will remain, resulting in yet another murder.

72. The extent to which the law is out of accord with the sentiments of a section of the people is demonstrated by the proposition of some witnesses, who could not be accused of lack of intelligence, that murder should actually be made a compoundable offence, so bringing the law into accord with Pathan custom. Another suggestion was that the law of private defence of the person should be extended to a law of private offence in cases where Pathan custom required vengeance in retribution.

73. Neither of these suggestions can be entertained by any civilised Government, but they serve to demonstrate the difficulty under which the law is worked in a border district. The furthest we could go would be to allow settlement by payment of blood-money in cases where the evidence after review by competent judicial authority was held not to supply a *prima-facie* case in the courts against the outlaw. In other cases we can only adhere to the principle that murder is an offence not only against the individual but against the State, which cannot abdicate its functions in favour of private individuals.

74. There remains the problem of dealing with the assistance rendered to outlaws within the district and generally of maintaining pressure against an outlaw within the district. Some witnesses have expressed the view that the use of Section 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is unjust in that the innocent dependants of such persons are so deprived of their means of subsistence. But we feel that the law should not be allowed to be cheated by any sentimentality of this nature and we do not think that on sentimental grounds the free use of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code can be restricted. A second objection has been put up that the fear of outlaws is so great that other persons will not purchase the land attached. We are not convinced that no persons can be found to risk such dangers and, if it is true that large areas in the Bannu District remain undisposed of, we suggest that they might be utilised for the colonization of deserving tribesmen. In other cases if outlaw's land is valuable it might be taken over by Government for use as Demonstration Farms.

75. We had no doubt from the evidence that outlaws frequently harbour with their relatives in the District. We shall have certain suggestions to make for strengthening the law in this respect, but here observe only that greater vigilance by the Police, who may require to be strengthened for this and other purposes, should result in bringing such persons to justice under the Indian Penal Code. The Superintendent of Police put out certain suggestions which appear to us to be useful for dealing with this problem. These were that Police Reserves and the Frontier Constabulary should be used for intensive patrolling within the District in villages known to harbour outlaws. He

also recommended the use of Constabulary assisted if necessary by military for counter-raiding of tribal villages close to the border, mentioning particularly the three villages of Kui, Sein and Chappari which are known to be harbouring large nests of outlaws. We think that pressure on these lines both within and beyond the border should receive the fullest support of the Central and the Provincial Governments and would form a useful adjunct to all other measures undertaken on both sides of the border.

Section IV.—Raiding and the Forces to meet it.

76. In the previous two sections we have dealt with certain symptoms of raiding and made suggestions for the better organisation of the public to meet it. We will now consider the Government organisation for meeting raids. Ever since the annexation of the Punjab raids have been more or less of a menace to the administered districts. Whenever there has been disturbance in the tribal territory raids on the settled districts have increased, and conversely disturbed conditions and rise in crime in the districts encourages raiding from across the border. There is constant action and reaction between the conditions which subsist on either side of the border. In the past an epidemic of raiding has been met by the employment of military force against the tribes which has been followed by a comparative period of peace. From 1919-23 large scale operations were carried out in Waziristan resulting in thirteen years of peace. That peace was again disturbed in 1936, followed by tribal disorders across the border and a wave of crime inside the districts. Some witnesses have suggested that this unrest is due to what is called the "Forward Policy" and that the campaign conducted by the tribal leaders is with the object of combating this Forward Policy. They therefore suggest a return to the administrative border. Other witnesses, including many non-officials, believe that withdrawal from Waziristan would bring increased disorder and that the positions already occupied should continue in occupation. This problem we consider to be beyond the scope of our enquiry, which we have endeavoured to confine to the

protection of the border. We do not think that the mere use of military force against the tribes can produce a lasting state of peace within British India. A large number of operations have been undertaken since the time of the annexation of the Punjab with varying results, but the problem remains. Under our terms of reference we have only to view it as it affects the Bannu District. From this angle we have the following suggestions to make.

Frontier Constabulary—

77. We consider that the Frontier Constabulary has been reduced beyond the safety point if it is to be a secure shield against incursions over the administrative border, and we recommend that it should be increased and made more mobile to enable it to keep all main routes into the districts under observation and control. The District Officer, Frontier Constabulary emphasized the difficulties resulting from an undue reduction in the strength of Mounted Infantry and we consider that the increase of mounted men, and the provision of mechanical transport, would make the force more useful and efficient. We also think that with the object of increasing mobility the old Frontier Road along the administrative border should be reconditioned. In order to assist irregulars, and if necessary troops, to reach and reinforce any place threatened by raids one suggestion was made by an official witness for the construction of a sort of Chinese Wall along the border which he estimated as costing about Rs. 1 lakh per mile. We are unable to support any such proposal not only because of its prohibitive cost but because of its doubtful utility in our view and the inexpendiency of shutting off tribesmen from inter-course with the districts.

78. With regard to the class composition of the Constabulary it has been suggested that minority communities should also be recruited and Gurkhas and Sikhs have been particularly mentioned. We are doubtful whether recruitment on a communal basis would achieve any end, but we suggest that no person should be excluded on the ground of his community, if he is otherwise fit. It would have to be considered whether classes recruited from other parts of India would be able to work in with the Pathan population on the border. Another suggestion has been made that the Frontier

Constabulary should be commanded by military and not Police officers on the grounds that the duties of the force are quasi-military and require tactical knowledge of a high order. Against this the District Officer contends that Police officers are in a better position to co-operate with the District Administration, approximating the duties of the force to those of the Armed Police. To this contention in the district field we agree but we put forward a suggestion that the command of the force at headquarters might be entrusted to a military officer with experience of work with irregulars on the North-West Frontier. Such an officer might be able to co-operate more closely with the military when the aid of the latter had been invoked, and would be more used to commanding large bodies of men concentrated to deal with special emergencies.

79. There remains the anomaly that the Frontier Constabulary although responsible for the protection of the district border is paid for by the Central Government and under their control. We think that in this matter a change ought to be considered. The duties of the force generally approximate more nearly to those of Armed Police than to those of troops and they are responsible for the watch and ward of the district border. The proposal to transfer them to Provincial control was, we believe, considered and rejected by the Haig Committee, but we feel that the time has come for review. If the Provincial Government thought its officers are not in a position to control the first line of defence of the district, it is obvious that its responsibility for law and order within the districts is difficult to discharge. At present the only force at the disposal of the Provincial Government is the District Armed Police which experience shows to be insufficient to meet raiding even on a small scale. It is true that the financial resources of the Provincial Government are not sufficient to meet the cost of the Frontier Constabulary. This however is a matter for adjustment between the Central and Provincial Governments, and it will be remembered that this Province already enjoys a large subvention. At the same time partly because of the incidence of charges and partly because the Frontier Constabulary is designed to meet threats from across the border we think it should not be difficult to devise some scheme whereby control of this force vested in the Governor

(not in his capacity as Agent to the Governor-General) as part of his special responsibility within the frame-work of the Government of India Act. Thus the Constabulary would work under the Provincial Government through the Inspector-General of Police, who, if our recommendations were accepted, would operate through a military officer at Headquarters and Police Officers in the districts.

80. We think, too, that one failing of the Frontier Constabulary is shortage of gazetted officers and we suggest that every district should dispose of the services of a District Officer and an Assistant at all times. If the Frontier Constabulary became in this manner an addition to the Police Reserves the relations of the District Officers with the Superintendents of Police will require careful consideration.

81. We are unaware how far telephone communications have been provided in all Posts occupied or to be occupied by Frontier Constabulary or Khassadars, and we think that if these do not exist they should be established without delay. It is true that telephone wires can be cut by raiders, but we imagine that the cost of provision of wireless would be prohibitive even if it were possible to train Frontier Constabulary to use it.

Police—

82. The dependence of raiders on accomplices in the Districts has already been stressed, but we must again emphasize the reactions of crime on raiding and the great importance of Police work as a counter-measure to raiding. We have been supplied with statistics of violent crime which are attached to this report as an appendix. This crime is not necessarily due to laxity on the part of the authorities but is a general sign of the unrest prevailing. We do not think that the incidence of crime can be ascribed to the suspension of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, if only because there were many periods during which that Regulation was in force when crime was at a very high level. The incidence of crime and—a disquieting feature—the large number of undisposed cases left over from previous years at the present juncture are very serious. The Superintendent of Police has given us his view that the strength of the Bannu Police is inadequate to keep level with the present volume of violent crime. Insufficient officers of the rank of Sub-Inspector are avail-

able for investigation and the number of reports is so unending that the attention cannot be given to the investigation of individual cases. He told us that the result of the present deficiencies is overstrain of duty, desertions and unpopularity of Bannu as a District for Police service. We think therefore that the Provincial Government must seriously consider whether it is not necessary to increase the strength of the Bannu Police. Possibly if the Frontier Constabulary and the Police are brought under a unified control, some reduction of the existing District Armed Reserves could be made to off-set an increase in the staff for investigation and prevention of crime.

83. We put forward a further suggestion that the control of crime might be improved by the strengthening of the Inspector-General's Office at the centre through the establishment of a trained crime branch in the Criminal Investigation Department. Such officers, could, assist the District Police in the investigation of important cases, and would be in a position to lighten the load of a District staff overcome by a wave of crime. This Bureau could co-ordinate its activities with the Intelligence Branch across the border.

Magistrates—

84. It is possible, too, though we have no figures to support this conclusion, that the magistrates are insufficient in number to dispose of the volume of cases coming before them and require some special aid to clear up their pending files. We cannot support a suggestion made by one witness that the frontier judiciary should be amalgamated with that of the Punjab on the ground that undue influence is brought on a judiciary locally recruited.

Khasadars—

85. The remaining force which should be available, for countering raids is that of the tribal *khassadars*. Many witnesses have attacked the *khassadari* system on the main ground that the *khassadars* will not work against the interests of the tribe which *ex-hypothesi* are in support of raiders. It is true that *khassadars* did not in the case now under enquiry, and as far as we are aware do not ordinarily, offer armed resistance to raiding gangs. The utility or otherwise of the *khassadari* system is beyond the scope of our enquiry except in so far as it is worked

within the districts or at the administrative border. It has however been the practice to retain the majority of the Ahmadzai *khassadars* in border Posts and to this extent it is proper for us to give our opinion. The *maliks* who appeared before us attributed the failure of *khassadars* to their inadequate number. This however can be dismissed as special pleading and it must be remembered that *khassadari* is paid to a tribe to enable the maliks to discharge the responsibility of the whole tribe. Even in the present case it is clear that the *khassadars* at Gumbatti old and new posts sent information of the movements of Mehr Dil's lashkar, which if sufficiently prompt measures had been taken, should have enabled the local authorities to meet the threat. Their use as intelligence agents is therefore proved in the present case and we are averse to their abolition if only because they enable Government to maintain a lever for the good behaviour of the tribe. When the tribe as a whole turns hostile, or when the *khassadars* of any section cease to perform the service for which they are paid, the *khassadars* should be dismissed. But if they are retained in Border Posts and not within the tribal territory, we consider that they should work under the control of the Frontier Constabulary to whom their reports should be submitted. The Constabulary would then pass them on to the District authorities. In all cases the principle of payment by results should be strictly observed, and tribal benefits should never be open to the criticism that they are a form of blackmail or bribe.

Section V—Kidnapping.

86. Kidnapping is of course a part of raiding and in many cases at present the chief incentive for raiding. It has recently shown a markedly communal trend, the majority of the victims being Hindus, though Muslims have sometimes been kidnapped. It is a fruitful source of income to the tribesmen in that in most cases ransoms are paid. One witness who was kidnapped in 1912, thus showing that this feature is no new one, stated he was required to pay a ransom of Rs. 23,000 before he secured release. If no ransom were paid it is clear that kidnapping

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would come to an end and many witnesses have urged that efforts should be made to stop the paying of ransom by relatives of kidnapped persons. In theory this solution would be admirable; in practice it is difficult to see how an absolute assurance can be given to relatives that the release of kidnappees can be secured by authority. Relatives are therefore loath to sacrifice those who have been kidnapped. It follows that paying of ransom can not be stopped but without the stopping of such payment kidnapping will not come to an end. We thus have a vicious circle. The best solution that commends itself to us is this.

87. As soon as the location of a person kidnapped has been ascertained every kind of pressure, political in the first instance, should be brought to bear on the tribe concerned for his release. In any case whether or not ransom is paid a fine should be imposed on the tribe responsible. This fine should not be less than any ransom likely to be demanded but should not be based on the ransom and should not ordinarily on realisation be paid to the relatives of the person kidnapped for to do so will merely encourage payment of ransom. Exceptions to this rule could be allowed where it could be shown that the executive measures taken had been inadequate to secure release within a reasonable time. The realisation of the fine will make the tribe feel that the business of kidnapping is not remunerative. At the same time the Police should carefully investigate the channels of payment of ransom which, we are informed, is conducted through regular agents. It is possible that a special Police branch will have to be established in any district where kidnapping is rife to trace out connections within the district. Pressure on the guilty tribe can often be increased by the arrest in *barampta* of members of the section to which the kidnappers belong and this form of reprisal is not only in accord with tribal sentiment but is obviously just. We shall later have a suggestion to make for the amendment of the law to deal with kidnappers or those who help them.

Section VI—Suggested Changes in the Law.

88. Many official witnesses have asked for the revival of the Frontier Crimes Regulation to arm the authorities

with greater power to control the activities of outlaws and tribal offenders. We do not propose to traverse the ground covered by the Niamatullah Committee, nor has sufficient material been placed before us to enable us to review the findings of that Committee. Moreover we are impressed by two considerations. The first is that, when Sections 8 and 11 Frontier Crimes Regulation were in use, they did not succeed in giving to the Districts a regime of freedom from violent crime or of immunity from raids and their presence must have lowered the standard of investigation. The second is that under the party system the regular use of jirga proceedings under Sections 8 and 11 Frontier Crimes Regulation might be a weapon which would be abused by politicians and turned against their political opponents. We have already said that a measure of adjustment is needed in certain cases where it is proposed to settle outlaws against whom no *prima-facie* case can be made out in the Courts. Beyond that we are not prepared to go.

89. We are however impressed by statements made by both official and non-official witnesses to the extent that crime of transborder origin cannot be controlled without rigorous measures against those who connive at it within the Districts. The harbouring of outlaws, and assistance to raiders and kidnappers generally, are offences widely attributed to accomplices in administered territory; and we have been urged to strengthen the law to meet these special problems and to give protection to law-abiding citizens in a border tract. Clauses (c) (d) and (e) of Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allow of the institution of security proceedings against habitual harbourers, habitual kidnappers and their accomplices, and persons who habitually abet the commission of offences involving a breach of the peace. But all these provisions of law require proof that the person who is required to show cause indulges "habitually" in these practices. It appears to us that in the special situation arising on the border an amendment of Section 110 is required to bring persons, against whom proof of habit cannot always be had, within the clutches of the law. Reasonable information of a single indulgence in such activities should in our opinion suffice to justify the institution of proceedings for security.

90. There is further the arrangement of frontier remissions of revenue, which are given to villages for the protection of the border, and are granted on a collective basis. A number of witnesses, including non-officials, have emphasized their view that raiding and kidnapping cannot be stopped unless collective responsibility is enforced in villages, which for instance connive at a raid, fail to render all assistance in their power to effect the arrest of raiders or kidnappers, or connive at the harbouring of outlaws. We think that a provision of law is needed for collective fines or forfeitures on proof of failure to discharge village responsibilities of this nature. Such action would require the Provincial Government's previous sanction. Further, if the village militia system, which we have recommended, is to be a reality,... there should be some legal basis for village watch and ward.

91. Again we would emphasize that bad characters, both in urban and in rural areas, are a potential danger to the peace. Their expulsion in case of necessity, as experience in other Provinces has shown, helps in the preservation and re-establishment of peaceful conditions. We are therefore of the opinion that the executive should be armed with sufficient powers to intern or extern such elements, and for this purpose we recommend enactment of a provision on the lines of the " Bengal Gundas Act."

92. Lastly in dealing with punishment for erring tribes a system of blockade seems to us to be a very effective weapon and to serve a two-fold purpose. It applies pressure on the tribes to expel outlaws, and punishment to them for their bad behaviour ; and it is the weapon likely to be the least provocative. Some legal basis for its application is necessary.

93. It is not for us to advise the Legislature as to the exact form which any enactment embodying these suggestions ought to take, but the requisite provisions may perhaps be broadly grouped under the head of Border Defence. And should the Legislature desire to circumscribe the powers of the executive, it is open to them to provide suitable checks ; but these should be imposed solely for the protection of the subject and not with the object of thwarting or retarding the effectiveness of any action proposed.

SECTION VII—POLITICAL DYARCHY.

94. A number of non-official witnesses have referred to the present system of division of administrative functions in the Districts and the Agencies by this term. Some of them say that for the safety of the districts it is necessary that the political control of the Agencies should be transferred to the Provincial Government. Others advocate the amalgamation of the whole of tribal territory with British India as part of the North-West Frontier Province. Others suggest that those parts of the tribal territory under the political control of the Deputy Commissioners should become either part of the Frontier Province or be placed under the Political control of the Provincial Government. Others again advise the extreme course of complete withdrawal of the Government of India's control and forces from the tribal territory. Even if this large question were within the scope of our enquiry, there is so much divergence of opinion in the evidence which has been given that it would be impossible for us to come to even a provisional conclusion. The frame-work within which this report must be written is the existing Government of India Act which has separated the functions of Government in British India and in the Tribal Areas. No doubt a set plan in Waziristan based on proper appreciation of past experience and present conditions, and not excluding international considerations, might go far to solve the difficulties with which the Provincial Government are faced, and enlightened handling of tribes may assist in the solution of the problem. But the problem is one of great intricacy and can only be investigated under the orders of the Central Government. We have however already proposed one modification of the existing division under the head of Frontier Constabulary and we have one more suggestion to make.

95. At the time of the Bannu Raid there was no senior Civil Officer in the neighbourhood in a position to give advice to the Deputy Commissioner and it is clear that even in regard to his own powers the Deputy Commissioner had certain erroneous notions. To remedy this and to associate the functions of Government in the Districts and in the Agencies we suggest that the Resident in Waziristan might become a Commissioner *cum* Resident. It is not for us to make suggestions as to whether a similar

system might be considered in the northern area of the Province, but as regards the southern area it appears that our suggestion would not entail any extra expenditure in that the Resident *cum* Commissioner would presumably remain an official of the same status as the present Resident in Waziristan. The result would be that the assistance and advice of a senior official would be made available for the Settled Districts. We are aware that there exists a demand in most Provinces for the abolition of Commissionerships, but the conditions on the North-West Frontier require different treatment. In any case if the responsibility of the Resident is extended in the capacity of Commissioner to the Districts, his experience should be of use in the preservation of peace and the prevention of trans-border raiding and assist in associating the functions of Government on the two sides of the border. Moreover in the Provincial sphere it may be possible to establish a convention whereby in matters in which tribal affairs impinge on law and order in British India the Provincial Government should be in a position to tender advice through the Governor to the Department of the Central Government entrusted with the control of the Tribal Areas. Such advice could not be binding under the provisions of the Government of India Act, but the convention might be helpful in promoting the re-establishment of peace and in driving out lawlessness in the Frontier Province.

Section VIII—Publicity

96. Both official and non-official witnesses have mentioned propaganda as playing a considerable part in promoting harmony or deterioration in the relations between different sections of His Majesty's subjects. Publicity is notoriously a two-edged weapon and it is difficult to fix on the agency responsible for carrying it out. Political parties no doubt have their agents and political exigencies will more and more lead to the use of this weapon, but the propaganda of one party is not what we have in view, nor do we think that Government is in a position to employ a body of publicists in the ordinary sense for this purpose. We do, however, think that frontier affairs are too apt to be shrouded in mystery and that

more efforts should be made to give publicity to the truth both in the Press and otherwise.

For instance tours by legislators in the tribal areas were previously in vogue, and might well be resumed. And one of the best form of publicity is well-considered touring by members of the Government and by competent officials. On the other side it has been brought to our notice that violent propaganda often carried out by some Political parties leads to a deterioration in communal relations, and we strongly recommend that propaganda with a communal tinge of any kind should be dealt with with the utmost rigour of law.

SECTION IX—MISCELLANEOUS.

97. There remain a few points of a miscellaneous nature. One witness recommended the undertaking of an economic survey of the Province and of Waziristan and others pointed out that large tracts of land in Districts remain unirrigated and that much could be done to increase the area under irrigation both in Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. We do not think that the conditions in Waziristan are at present suitable for an economic or geological survey, and we believe that such survey as has already been undertaken has proved infructuous. Nor do we believe that the cause of frontier unrest is primarily economic, at any rate among the Wazirs.

98. With regard to the districts further irrigation from the Indus beyond that already provided by the Paharpur Canal is unfortunately impossible owing to lack of command, but there is reason to believe that more attention and continuity in District appointments would be able largely to extend the flood torrent irrigation in both districts. The lack of continuity in appointments may be regarded as at least one cause for failure to bring improvement in this respect.

We understand too that the possibilities of constructing a major irrigation work at the debouchment of the Takki Zam above Tank were closely examined in recent years, the projectr being to harness the flood-waters of that stream for the better irrigation of the thirsty Derajat lands below Tank. Without

possessing any technical knowledge we venture to recommend that these possibilities be further explored, and that the survey be extended to the debouchments of other streams such as the Khaisora, Shaktu, and Gomal Rivers.

99. There is moreover a further venture which in our opinion holds out some prospects of success. Some tribal sections in Waziristan among the Mahsuds suffer from land-hunger which must be one cause of raiding. If the poorest sections from the tribal belt could be colonised in any part of the frontier districts, in the Punjab, Sind, or in Indian States, preferably the first, this land-hunger would become alleviated, and with a properly regulated scheme control over the tribal sections themselves should be increased. It is possible that preference could be given at the tail of the Paharpur Canal to lessees from Waziristan and in other cases land-owners may be prepared to offer land on lease to tribesmen with a Government guarantee, secured on tribal allowances, for payment of rent. The close co-operation of the Central and Provincial Governments would be necessary to make any such scheme a success, but we think that if the end is admitted by both Governments as desirable there should not be great difficulty in working out details almost on a no-cost basis.

100. Some witnesses made a grievance of the fact that a larger number of non-Muslims were not employed in the subordinate Political and Police and indeed in other services. We are not prepared to recommend any fixed proportions, but we think that there should be no exclusion on the score of religion. Even in the Frontier Constabulary, we understand, Tirah Sikhs were formerly enlisted, and we are not aware of the reasons for discontinuance of such enlistment. In view of the insistence by these witnesses that a larger number of non-Muslim employees would give a greater sense of security to the minority population of this Province we have thought fit to draw the attention of the Government to this matter.

O. K. Caroe, *President.*

J. L. Kapur, *Member.*

APPENDIX I

List of persons who suffered loss in the dacoity dated the 23rd July 1938.

iSeral No.	Name and address of the sufferer	Detail of business	Loss claimed by claimants	Amount of loss as appears to me as correct
			Rs.	Rs.
1	Jetha Nand, son of Jiwan Das Giroti.	Maniari seller ..	4,000	500
2	Shiv Ram, son of Sobha Ram Juneja.	Cloth merchant ..	7,000	2,000
3	Sant Ram, son of Ishar Das Kumar.	Ditto ..	22,000	6,000
4	Bhoja Ram, son of Lal Chand Juneja.	Ditto ..	16,000	13,000
5	Tikaya Ram, son of Rup Chand Taneja.	Ditto ..	60,000	35,000
6	Sant Ram, son of Khem Chand Huja.	Ditto ..	8,000	2,300
7	Lakhmi Chand, son of Mani Ram Gambhir.	Ditto ..	20,000	6,000 to 8,000
8	Harnam Das Charanjit Lal, Gogaliani.	Ditto ..	25,000	6,000
9	Bhoja Ram, son of Lekh Nath Chandna.	General cloth merchant.	55,000	25,000 to 30,000
10	Attar Singh, proprietor firm Messrs. Sewa Ram Harnam Das.	Ditto ..	15,000	3,000
11	Arjan Das Nakra ..	Soda Water Factory.	2,000	500
12	Lachhman Das, son of Hukam Chand Virmani.	Perfumer ..	2,500	500
13	Lakha Singh Hakim ..	Pansari ..	2,500	500
14	Rajan Singh ..	Cotton-seller ..	500	200
15	Pdt. Hukam Chand, Hakim.	Pansari ..	5,000	500
16	Sant Ram, son of Naina Ram Virmani.	Attar and oil seller.	200	50

APPENDIX I—continued

List of persons who suffered loss in the dacoity dated the 23rd July 1938—continued

Serial No.	Name and address of the sufferer	Detail of business	Loss claimed by claimants	Amount of loss as appears to me as correct
			Rs.	Rs.
17	Roshan Lal No. I ..	Flour seller ..	50	Nil.
18	Roshan Lal No. II ..	Flour seller ..	200	Nil.
19	Jodha Ram ..	Ghee and sugar seller.	4,500	1,500
20	Parma Nand, son of Talu Ram Wadhawa.	Ghee seller ..	200	100
21	Dittu Ram Chhokra ..	Pan and cigarettes seller.	300	50
22	Rup Chand Gurwara ..	Tobacco seller ..	350	100
23	Hukam Chand Deva Ram Matta.	Cloth merchants ..	10,000	4,000
24	Kishan Lal, son of Hira Nand Kumar.	Saraf and cloth merchant.	4,000	200
25	Khiland Ram Khurana..	Ditto ..	1,700	200
26	Dasu Ram Chhokra.. ..	Trunk merchant..	200	Nil
27	Bhawani Das ..	Maniari seller ..	200	Nil
28	Kuljas Rai, son of Khan Chand Juneja.	Cloth merchant ..	2,000	200
29	Chaodhri Ram Dehra Ram.	Halwai ..	500	50
30	Gela Ram, son of Indar Bhan, Shop No. I.	Do.	250	100
31	Ditto ..	Do.		
32	Parma Nand Kanal ..	Coal merchant ..	300	Nil
33	Kirpa Ram, alias Babu (he has been killed).	Flour merchant ..	1,000	1,000

APPENDIX I—continued

List of persons who suffered loss in the dacoity dated the 23rd July 1938—continued

Serial No.	Name and address of the sufferer	Detail of business	Loss claimed by claimants	Amount of loss as appears to me as correct
			Rs.	Rs.
34	Tara Chand, son of Bhagat Tej Bhan.	Perfumer ..	200	200
35	Thakar Das, son of Bhagat Tej Bhan.	Do " ..	200	100
36	Hira Nand, son of Nanak Chand Virmani.	Atta and Ghee shop.	100	50
37	Devi Dial ..	Soda Water Factory.	50	50
38	Hira Nand, son of Parma Nand Mandhan.	Halwai ..	24	24
39	Jetha Nand, son of Gobind Ram Minocha.	Soda Water Factory.	40	20
40	Balak Ram, contractor (he has been killed).	Opium, Bhang and Charas contractor.	1,000	500 to 1,000
41	Bhakhshi Ram ..	Halwai ..	80	Nil
42	Mohan Lal ..	Do. ..	20	20
43	Mehr Chand Kanal ..	Soda Water shop	200	Nil
44	Narain Das ..	Milk seller ..	70	Nil
45	Sobha Singh, son of Mehr Chand.	Cost of two sewing machines with clothes of customers.	150	Nil
46	Ram Chand, son of Lal Chand	Cost of one sewing machine and clothes of customers.	50	Nil
47	Bogha Ram ..	Ditto ..	200	Nil
48	Indar Singh, son of Butta Singh.	Ditto ..	100	Nil

APPENDIX I—concluded

List of persons who suffered loss in the dacoity dated the 23rd July 1938—concluded

Serial No.	Name and address of the sufferer	Detail of business	Loss claimed by claimants	Amount of loss as appears to me as correct
			Rs.	Rs.
49	Hira Nand Chandna ..	Cost of one sewing machine and clothes of customers.	500	Nil
50	Lal Chand Chandna ..	Ditto ..	400	Nil
51	Sewa Ram ..	Ditto ..	200	Nil
52	Mehr Chand ..	Ditto ..	100	Nil
53	Kanshi Ram ..	Ditto ..	130	Nil
54	Mukand Lal ..	Ditto ..	200	Nil
55	Parma Nand ..	Ditto ..	100	Nil
56	Bawa Singh ..	Ditto ..	200	Nil
57	Bur Singh ..	Ditto ..	200	Nil
58	Kishan Chand ..	Ditto ..	200	Nil
59	Sobha Ram ..	Ditto ..	100	Nil
60	Roshan Lal ..	Ditto ..	25	Nil
61	Dardial Singh Bhaikhel..	Ditto ..	130	Nil
62	Main Lall ..	Ditto ..	50	Nil
63	Mohan Lal Huja ..	Gramophone dealer	800	Nil
64	Gulab Singh Amir Singh	Bankers ..	550	Nil
65	Tara Singh Sobha Singh..	Saraf ..	170	Nil
66	Kishan Gopal Virmani ..	Do. ..	70	Nil
67	Mengh Raj, son of Gopal Das.	Do. ..	125	Nil
68	Attar Singh Harcharan Singh.	Arti ..	176	Nil
69	Khan Chand Chawla	Munim ..	Rs. a. p. 40 4 0	Nil
		Total ..		1,17,214

APPENDIX II

List showing the names of the owners of the shops which have been burnt.

Serial No.	Name and address of the owner	Amount of loss claimed by owners	Amount which appears to be correct
		Rs.	Rs.
1	Mool Chand Mangat Ram, Kanal, Bannu	One shop Single storey. 1,000	500
2	Sunder Lal Chawla and Jagan Nath Gandhi, Chawla, Bank, Bannu.	,, 1,000	500
3	Tharia Ram Marchandi, of Dera Ismail Khan.	,, 1,000	500
4	Bogha Ram Babla, of Himalayas Talkies Dharamsala, Kangra.	,, 1,000	500
5	Sant Ram Huja etc. of Bannu ..	,, 1,000	500
6	Narsingh Das Narula of Dera Ismail Khan.	,, 1,000	500
7	Charanjit Lal Khana of Bannu City ..	,, 1,000	500
8	Ponu Ram Mukand Lal Jawa, Bannu City.	,, 1,000	500
9	Bodh Raj Gulati of Isa Khel ..	,, 1,000	500
10	,, ,, ..	,, 1,000	500
11	Hira Nand Jawa of Bannu City ..	,, 1,000	500
12	Punu Ram Mukand Lal Jawa, Bannu City.	One platform. 500	500
13	Bodh Raj Gulati, Isa Khel ..	Double storied shop. 2,000	1,000
14	Pumu Ram Mukand Lal Jawa ..	,, 2,000	1,000
15	,, ,, ..	,, 2,000	1,000
16	Daulat Ram Kumar, son of Hira Nand, Bannu.	,, 2.000	1,000
17	Guli Chand Wadhwa, Bannu City ..	,, 2,000	1,000
18	Punu Ram Mukand Lal Jawa, Guli Chand and Gurdawara Chothu Ram, etc.	Single storied shop. 1,000	500
19	,, ,, ..	Ono platform. 500	100
20	,, ,, ..	,, 500	100

APPENDIX II—concluded.

List showing the names of the owners of the shops which has been burnt—concluded.

Serial No.	Name and address of the owner	Amount of loss claimed by owners		Amount appears to be correct
		Rs.		Rs.
21	Punu Ram Mukaud Lal Jawa, Guli Chand and Gurdawara Chothu Ram, etc.	Single storey shop	1,000	500
22	,, ,, ..	,,	1,000	500
23	,, ,, ..	Double storied shop.	2,000	1,000
24	Mussammat Mukandi Bai of Bannu City widow of Harbha Mal.	Single storiey shop.	1,000	500
25	,, ,, ..	,,	1,000	500
26	Chetan Das Adhlakha, of Lakki ..	,,	1,000	500
27	,, ,, ..	One platform.	100	50
		Total ..		15,250
		Loss as per list No. 1 ..		1,17,214
		Grand Total ..		1,32,464

APPENDIX III

Years	Total crimes dealt with	Total admitted crimes	Cases tried	Cases convicted	Percentage of column 3 to 5	Percentage of column 4 to 5	Percentage of column 3 to 4	Percentage of cases cancelled to cases reported	Cancelled	Pending	Remarks
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1928 ..	898	762	586	403	52·88	68·77	76·90	15·14	136	..	
1929 ..	908	813	640	445	54·73	69·53	78·72	10·46	95	..	
1930 ..	1,985	1,771	1,144	732	41·89	64·	64·6	10·78	214	..	
1931 ..	2,016	1,767	1,161	786	44·42	67·7	65·7	12·35	249	..	
1932 ..	2,273	1,970	1,205	834	49·33	69·21	61·16	13·33	303	..	
1933 ..	1,368	1,178	763	551	46·77	72·21	64·77	13·88	190	..	
1934 ..	1,757	1,518	1,038	852	56·12	82·08	68·37	13·60	239	..	
1935 ..	1,745	1,501	1,154	1,006	67·02	87·17	76·88	14·	244	..	
1936 ..	1,807	1,580	1,035	850	53·79	82·12	65·50	12·56	227	7	
1937 ..	2,568	2,276	821	664	29·17	80·87	36·07	8·25	292	767	
25-11-38 ..	1,988	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	

DACOITY.

Years	Total crimes dealt with	Total admitted crimes	Cases tried	Cases committed	Percentage of column 5 to 3	Percentage of column 4 to 5	Percentage of column 3 to 4	Percentage of cases cancelled to cases reported	Cancelled	Pending	Remarks
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1928 ..	6	6	3	1	16·66	33·33	50	..	..	..	
1929 ..	6	6	3	2	33·33	66·66	5	..	..	..	
1930 ..	12	9	7	4	44·44	57·14	77·77	25	3	..	
1931 ..	14	12	6	3	25	50	50	14·3	2	..	
1932 ..	30	27	10	5	18·52	50	37·3	10	3	..	
1933 ..	10	8	6	3	37·5	50	75	20	2	..	
1934 ..	4	4	3	1	25	33·33	75	..	..	..	
1935 ..	2	1	1	1	100	100	100	50	1	..	
1936 ..	7	7	5	4	57·14	80	71·42	..	..	..	
1937 ..	48	46	3	2	4·34	66·6	6·52	4·16	2	24	
1938 ..	33	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	

MURDERS.

Years	Total crimes dealt with	Total admitted crimes	Cases tried	Cases committed	Percentage of column 3 to 5	Percentage of column 4 to 5	Percentage of column 3 to 4	Percentage of cases cancelled to cases reported	Cancelled	Pending	Remarks
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1928 ..	83	79	57	31	39·24	54·38	72·15	4·86	4	..	
1929 ..	82	81	71	42	51·85	59·15	87·65	1 22	1	..	
1930 ..	88	84	61	33	39·28	54·09	92·62	4·54	4	..	
1931 ..	102	93	60	30	32·25	50	64·51	8·82	9	..	
1932 ..	126	123	79	44	35·77	55·69	64·22	2·38	3	..	
1933 ..	101	98	55	27	29·59	49·09	56·12	3	3	..	
1934 ..	90	88	46	20	22·72	43·48	52·27	2·22	2	..	
1935 ..	85	85	46	27	31·76	58·7	54·11	..	..	..	
1936 ..	87	83	45	28	33·73	62·22	54·21	4·59	4	..	
1937 ..	135	134	31	15	11·19	48·39	23·13	·74	1	48	
1938 ..	144	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	

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

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

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SOME FACTS ABOUT THE DISTURBANCES IN INDIA 1942-43

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

Signal standard uprooted by mob at Chawkhandi

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COVER PICTURE

Goods train derailed in Azamgarh District, United Provinces

CHAPTER I.

ATTACKS ON RAILWAYS.

Disruption of communications being, perhaps, the main object of the movement, extensive and widespread damage was inflicted on the Indian railways, which are estimated to have suffered as a result of this calculated devastation, damage amounting to half a crore of rupees, in addition to damage to goods in transit and a very large loss of earnings.

The maximum destruction was done to the East Indian, Bengal and North-Western, and Bengal and Assam Railways, and in the first week of the disturbances to the Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway. It has been estimated that replacements and reconstruction on the Bengal and North-Western Railway will cost over Rs. 14,00,000 and on the East Indian Railway over Rs. 12,00,000.

Trains Set On Fire.

Nothing escaped the attention of the miscreants—neither station buildings nor equipment, track, bridges, engines, coaching stock, goods wagons, nor telephone and telegraph wires. Up to the end of December 318 stations had been attacked, many burnt and others wholly or partially destroyed. Practically every station on the Bengal and North-Western Railway in Bihar suffered from mob fury. In most of the stations attacked, the rebels took special care to smash block instruments and signalling installations, cabin and control telephones. Goods and engine sheds, and engines and carriages also suffered. Trains were set on fire, goods wagons looted, the track torn up, wires cut and posts pulled down. Often wires were stolen, thus adding greatly to the task of restoring communications.

In tampering with the track, fishplates and rails were removed. Sometimes whole stretches of the line were torn up. Where this was not possible, boulders, bricks or stones were piled upon the track, telegraph wires were tied across the line, trees were felled and thrown on the permanent way, or if not trees, level-crossing gates, sleepers and, at some time stations, benches and furniture. A rail between Wardha and Pulgaon was cut with acid and a hacksaw at two points, thereby nearly derailing a military goods special. This sabotage was unusual, clever and the work of experts.

Public the Chief Sufferer.

The party to suffer most by this planned and senseless destruction was the public. Fifty-nine derailments occurred up to the end of November, many of these involving passenger trains. There were three particularly bad cases. In October the Down Peshawar Express was derailed near Chalisgaon, 12 passengers being killed and 30 injured. All the persons killed were Indians, the majority being third class passengers. The victims included a mill-hand, a washerman, a labourer; the rest were either agriculturists or workmen. The other two serious derailments occurred in November—the 5 Up Surma Mail near Akhowra, in which 9 passengers were killed and 40 injured, and a troop special near Gauhati, in which 6 persons were killed and 42 injured.

Crowds stoned running trains senselessly, causing injuries to passengers, including women and children. Sometimes trains were held up and set on fire and the stranded passengers left to fend for themselves.

Trade, Commerce and Industry Hit.

The destruction of stations and track meant late trains or no trains at all. Thanks to saboteurs, goods trains were delayed, thus seriously retarding the despatch and distribution of goods required for the maintenance of trade, commerce, industry and civil life. For instance, there was a considerable reduction in sugar despatches from the United Provinces to Bengal, Assam and Madras. In some cases, goods in transit were looted or destroyed or damaged in derailments. At Mokameh, the main transfer point for carrying goods to and from Bengal on the one hand and North Bihar and the North-East of the United Provinces on the other, thousands of maunds of sugar were pulled from wagons, and scattered indiscriminately all over the yard. The daily average loading of 11,600 broad gauge wagons up to August 10 dropped to 9.700—nearly 60,000 less wagons loaded in a month—and it could not be brought back to normal till the end of September. On the Bengal and North-Western Railway traffic was still only 75 per cent. of the normal at the end of October.

Not until September 3, could the main line between Patna and Moghalserai be reopened for traffic under convoy. Except between Pasraha and Katihar, day-light running on every section of the Bengal and North-Western Railway was delayed till September 25. Through running to Katihar could not be resumed until November 2, owing to large breaches which had been made by the Kosi river as a direct result of sabotage.

Railway Losses.

Available statistics show that the railways suffered a loss of over Rs. 18,00,000 through damage to rolling stock. The damage to track has been estimated at over Rs. 9,00,000, to station buildings at approximately Rs. 8,50,000 and to ancillary equipment at Rs. 6,50,000.

In December there was no derailment and in January only two stations were attacked and damaged on the Moradabad division of the East Indian Railway. On the 27th January a serious derailment took place between Kakwa and Suffrai in the Sibsagar District in Assam. The engine and 3 coaches of the Up Assam Mail were thrown off the line and 2 Indian other ranks, 4 civilians and 2 children were killed; 23 were injured including 1 British Officer. Instances of wire cutting and tampering with the track are still reported, but happily they are on the decline. The public have no doubt had enough of it; and the village patrols which have been organised on most of the railways have been doing good work.

CHAPTER II.

ATTACKS ON GOVERNMENT SERVANTS.

From economic boycott to cold blooded murder, Government servants were called upon to suffer every torture that mobs could

ATTACKS ON RAILWAY STATIONS

Damaged Railway stations between Benares and Ballia (U. P.) ; in each case Control Rooms were destroyed



Lower class coach burnt by a mob at Janghai station, East Indian Railway

devise, and for no better reason than that they were doing their duty and were true to their salt. Methods varied but not in their cruelty. All kinds of weapons were used—stones and bottles, daggers, spears, arrows and guns and even kerosene for burning Government servants alive.

In Assam the agitators brought pressure to bear on merchants to refuse to sell rice to Government servants. To this method of slow starvation was added kidnapping. A number of Government servants were waylaid and held in detention—sometimes for ransom. In some parts of Bihar and the United Provinces mobs locked up policemen and other officials in cells at police stations which they had seized. Policemen were stripped and their uniforms burnt. Occasionally they were made to wear Gandhi caps and carry Congress flags at the head of riotous crowds on their way to plunder and bloodshed. On one occasion, at least, these hostages, used by the mob as a shield against the police, were killed when the police opened fire. In Madura City, acid was thrown on a Police Inspector while he was actually leaving a temple. His face and neck were badly burnt.

Overwhelming Odds.

The numerical odds were always against the officials. A crowd varying from 500 to over 10,000 in strength would march upon a police station or a post office or a railway station, attacking officials, destroying records and, in many cases, setting buildings alight. Such instances occurred in hundreds from Bombay to Bengal and from the United Provinces to Madras. In attacks on police stations and in quelling riots, hundreds of policemen suffered injuries from brickbats and bottles. Hopelessly outnumbered, the small Government staffs in outlying thanas fought gallantly. They first tried persuasion and where that failed they resisted to the last. For unflinching devotion to duty, which was a crime in the eyes of the mobs, they were assaulted, injured, murdered and even burnt alive.

Treacherous Attacks.—Bodies of Victims Paraded Through Towns.

One of the revolting features of these outrages was the treachery and callousness displayed. A passenger train in which two Air Force officers happened to be travelling (they were not even on duty in connection with the disturbances) was stopped at Fatwah by a crowd stoning the windows of their carriage. On the intervention of a railway official, the crowd promised to spare the lives of the two officers if they surrendered their arms. The officers agreed, only to be brutally hacked to death. Their bodies were then paraded through the town and later thrown into a river. In Monghyr district, riotous villagers who came in boats surrounded a plane which had crashed in a river, offering to row the survivors to the bank if they surrendered their arms. Here again the victims trusted the crowd who, having reduced them to defencelessness, pounced upon them; two survivors who jumped into the river were beaten to death with lathis. Attempts to parley with

mobs in Bihar cost Police Officers their lives at Katra, Minapur, Singhai, Rupali and Sarath, and similarly the lives of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sitamari, and his party.

Savagery.—Police Officer Tortured.

Some of the attacks on police stations were marked by unusual savagery. On August 16, an armed mob of 4,000—about a thousand of whom marched in regular formation—attacked the Minapore police station in Bihar, seriously wounding a Sub-Inspector and injuring several constables on duty. The Sub-Inspector was beaten and disarmed, tied to a pole and thrown into a fire which was already consuming the station. The tortured officer crawled out of the fire, but was beaten with lathis, thrown back into the flames and pinned in the fire with poles and lathis.

A similar horrible outrage took place at Rupali police station in Bihar. A mob of 10,000 to 12,000 attacked a station and stoned the police staff, including a junior Sub-Inspector and the constables on duty. Kerosene oil was poured on the police station and the policemen were consigned to the flames. On August 16, a mob attacked the police station at Ashti, demanding the surrender of the thana. The police were compelled to open fire in self-defence, but were overpowered when their small stock of ammunition gave out. This was the signal for slaughter. A Sub-Inspector was stoned to death, and one head constable and three constables were murdered. Half-dead constables were burnt alive with kerosene. Only one head constable and one constable escaped.

The Chimur Outrage.

At Chimur, on August 16, a mob of thousands stormed the rest house killing the sub-divisional magistrate and leaving the naib tehsildar nearly dead. The rest house and furniture were then set on fire. Later, in an encounter with the police, a Sub-Inspector and a constable were wounded and carried away, and a constable and an Inspector were overpowered and beaten to death. The mob then returned to the rest house armed with police muskets and bayonets. The naib tehsildar, who was still alive, was done to death with a bayonet, and his and the sub-divisional magistrate's bodies were thrown into the rest house and burnt to ashes.

In an attack on the police station at Qasimabad in the United Provinces, a sub-inspector and a constable were killed and the police arms seized.

In some places in Bengal, the perpetrators came armed with bows and arrows. During an unsuccessful attack on a police station in Dacca district, a policeman was shot dead by an arrow, and about a hundred arrows were shot at a small police party at village Parila in Bengal during a pitched battle with the rioters.

Several police officers paid with their lives while quelling disturbances. At Bhanga in Bengal, a police Sub-Inspector was felled to the ground and bludgeoned to death. A police Sub-Inspector who tried to save the Railway Clearing Accounts Office in Delhi was killed.

THE CHIMUR OUTRAGE



(Above) Remains of unarmed constables' quarters and (below) The Rest House at Chimur (Chanda District, U. P.)





(Above) Another example of the methodical attack on the Control Rooms of Railway Stations

(Below) Bansdih Police station in Ballia District, showing telegraph pole used as battering ram by the mob



Salt Factory Attacked.

Although the police had to bear the brunt of mob fury, other Government servants did not escape. A mob entered a salt factory in Tinnevelly District, overpowered a petty officer and four officers on duty and set fire to the weighing shed. The Assistant Inspector, who was living nearby, hurried to the spot and was brutally killed. A mob of 1,000 in Orissa killed a forest guard of Jeypore State and injured 15 other servants and a magistrate. Mail runners were waylaid and assaulted, engine drivers and guards stoned; mobs fell upon Government servants repairing damage to telegraph wires, railway lines, bridges and roads.

At least 53 Government servants were killed during the disturbances and large numbers injured.

Houses of Official Looted.

Raids on the houses of Government servants by gangs in search of loot occurred at several places. A Guard and a Station Master were robbed at Gandalia in Bengal, and the houses of some Government officials were looted in Ballia in the United Provinces. Hooligans sacked the officer's quarters attached to the Agricultural Institute at Sabur, a Revenue Inspector's bungalow and a village Munsif's house in the Madras Presidency, and a C. I. D. Inspector's bungalow at Nagpur. In Surat, crops belonging to police patels were burnt or otherwise damaged. Officials and persons suspected of loyalty to Government were threatened and molested in Bengal. In some cases, their paddy was looted. Four strangers, boarding a mail bus in Bellary, threw chilly powder into the eyes of the driver who had to stop the bus. Immediately 20 persons, with their faces covered and armed with daggers and sticks, entered the bus and took away the mail bags.

Morals Unshaken.

In spite of these outrages and unprecedented intimidation, the morale of Government servants remained extraordinarily high. For instance, out of a total staff of 1,25,211 employed by the Posts and Telegraph Department, only four officials submitted their resignation and only 13 cases of disloyalty came to notice. Similarly, with but few exceptions, the 700,000 employees of the Railways never faltered in their devotion to duty. Many Government servants displayed heroism of a very high order. When Kiul railway station was attacked by a riotous mob, the Station Master by his courage and initiative saved two wagons containing live ammunition from blowing up, although they were already on fire. An Assistant Superintendent of Way and Works, Dinapore, did exceptionally fine work in convoying to safety trains which had been stranded at various outlying stations. A workman denied a mob access to a power house, thereby saving the oil engine plant and over a thousand gallons of fuel oil.

Gallant Policemen.

Conspicuous gallantry was shown by members of the Police who bore the brunt of the attacks everywhere. In order to deliver a message to the District Superintendent of Police at Akola, a

constable had to force his way through a dangerous and riotous mob of about 2,000 millhands. He was severely injured but delivered the message and then collapsed unconscious. While escorting 16 under-trial prisoners from the Sessions Court to Nasik City sub-jail, a police party of 5 was attacked by a crowd of about 1,000 persons. The Head Constable in charge fell to the ground and three members of the Police party received knife wounds. At this juncture an unarmed constable snatched a musket from another constable and fired three rounds which dispersed the crowd. Two prisoners escaped, but the others were delivered safely at the jail. Such instances could be multiplied.

CHAPTER III.

BOMB OUTRAGES.

In the second half of September, when mass bloodshed and destruction began to abate, a new terror began to make its appearance. This was the bomb. Gunpowder had already been used in one or two instances to blow up culverts and the railway line. Now bomb outrages came into prominence almost simultaneously in Bombay, Madras and the Central Provinces, suggesting central direction and control. Soon explosions were reported from the United Provinces and then from Delhi and Bihar. In the Bombay Presidency alone 50 bomb outrages had occurred up to December 12th.

Often indicating considerable technical skill in manufacture, these bombs were cunningly placed in trains, in cafés and courts, in the vicinity of public buildings, in post and telegraph offices and, in one case, even on the top of a temple.

Attempts to Intimidate Students.

For some perverse reason school buildings and occasionally colleges were singled out for this wicked and inhuman form of terrorism. A bomb thrown into the premises of a high school in Sholapur district injured three boys. Another outrage was attempted at the Science College, Nagpur. There was a loud report when a teacher touched a bottle in a cupboard in the Government Girls' High School, Ahmednagar district. He was seriously injured in the face. Two innocent boys were seriously injured in a High School compound in Ahmednagar. Perhaps the object was to scare students away from educational institutions in the hope that with nothing else to do they would fall an easy prey to the persuasions of saboteurs and help to revive a waning movement. Fortunately, casualties in schools have been small and few educational institutions have been closed under the threat of this form of intimidation.

It soon became evident that the bomb-makers were out to kill or maim Government servants, particularly members of the Police force, and that they cared little if entirely innocent members of the public suffered in the process. Bombs were hurled at Police guards, at constables on point duty and sometimes at Police

stations. A country-made bomb was thrown at an audience in a drama in aid of the Red Cross Society in Kistna, Madras Presidency. Five persons were injured by the explosion, but the District Magistrate, for whom the bomb was obviously intended, escaped. Nor were troops spared. A bomb exploded in a café frequented by British service men, injuring ten persons including a Naval rating who subsequently succumbed to his injuries. Another burst in the compound of a cinema just as the troops were leaving after the show. Eighteen British soldiers and two Indians were injured. A boy of 15, working as a vendor in a tea-stall was killed. A bomb was thrown in a canteen at Sealdah station, Calcutta, as a result of which two lady volunteer helpers and a British soldier received injuries. In another outrage in Bombay, three British soldiers were injured, and seven passers-by, one of whom subsequently died. An explosion in a Poona cinema injured seven British soldiers, three fatally.

Reports so far received indicate that four officials have been killed and 63 injured, 61 in the Bombay Presidency alone, a number of casualties occurring among the Police.

The Aligarh Railway Station Outrage.

The largest number of casualties were, however, inflicted on innocent members of the public who were killed or injured when a bomb burst in a street or in mills or in railway carriages or in other public places. Perhaps the worst case occurred in the waiting hall of the Aligarh railway station. A bomb in a suit-case exploded, killing two constables and a coolie. This bomb had a cast-iron casing with scrap iron filings and there was evidence of an electrical firing device. Similar atrocities were reported from other areas.

Women and Children Killed.

These public enemies cared little whether women or children were blown to pieces by their infernal machines. A child was fatally injured by a bomb which exploded near a railway bridge in Dharwar district, Bombay, and a sweeper woman sustained injuries by an explosion which occurred in the compound of Ahmednagar Cantonment Police station. An explosion near a mill in the Sholapur district injured two women and two children. The perpetrators even planted a bomb in a gymnasium in Pandharpur town in the same district, which killed one boy and injured two others, one seriously. In another explosion, on a road in the Ahmednagar district, three girls who were passing by received injuries. Up to the end of December four children had been killed by explosions in the Bombay Presidency and seventeen children and eight women had received injuries mostly in Bombay.

The public will agree that the death penalty, which has recently been provided for bomb-fiends, is fully justified and it is, perhaps, an instance of natural justice that in the Bombay Presidency several persons who were either manufacturing or carrying bombs

have been killed by their own engines of destruction. Three Congress volunteers were killed by a Mills bomb in their possession in a Bihar village. The bomb had been stolen from a military vehicle some weeks earlier.

It is known that up to the end of December, 12 members of the public had lost their lives and 154 had suffered injuries in bomb explosions.

Network of Hidden Arsenals. "Gandhi Blasting Stick".

The simultaneous and persistent use of explosives in different parts of India pointed to a network of hidden arsenals for making and distributing bombs. This suspicion was confirmed when the police discovered a manufactory in Ahmedabad city and seized large quanties of chemicals and small gunny-bags full of material for making bombs. A bottle containing some ingredients of the 'Molotov cocktail' was recovered from four persons who were attempting to blow up the railway line at Argora railway station in Chota Nagpur. The arrested persons had clearly learnt the process from an Axis broadcast directed to India, which gave instructions for making 'Molotov cocktails'. Soon after, raids in Delhi yielded 186 sticks of gelignite, 183 detonators, 1,200 feet of safety fuse, large quantities of chemicals and gunpowder, 48 empty bomb shells and three incendiary and explosives bombs. Documents seized in the raids revealed significant names which the bomb-makers had invented for their products—such as 'Subhas blasting jelly', 'Jawahar grenade' and 'Gandhi blasting stick'.

Similar bomb arsenals have been discovered in Bombay and the United Provinces.

CHAPTER IV.

SENSELESS DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY.

As already noted, the main target of the rebels during the opening stages of the disorders was communications of all kinds. But mob violence, as was bound to happen, soon turned to wanton destruction, and a feature of the later disturbances was the peculiarly senseless nature of the damage done. From the point of view of the promoters of the disturbances there was at least some logic in the attacks on railways and police stations, and even posts and telegraphs. Success here would certainly have made things very difficult for Government, even at the cost of a great deal of inconvenience to the public. But what is one to think of arson and sabotage directed against public utility services, civil courts, rest houses, schools and even hospitals, A. R. P. centres, and evacuee camps? No conceivable purpose can be discerned in such outrages, the only result of which was to cause hardship, suffering and financial loss to the public and the general tax payer.

Even so far as the Postal Department was concerned, it was small branch post offices that chiefly suffered. Little or no em-

CIVIL COURT DESTROYED



(Above) Civil Court, Ramtek, Central Provinces, burnt by mob
(Below) Another destroyed Police station in Ballia

NON-VIOLENCE ?



A wreckage-strewn and charred lower class railway carriage

barrassment was caused to Government thereby. In fact it was only the long-suffering public that were put to inconvenience. Eight hundred and ninety-five post offices had been raided by mobs up to the end of December, of which 57 were completely destroyed and 252 seriously damaged, many by fire. Loss of cash and other valuables amounted to nearly Rs. 2,00,000. In addition, furniture and equipment in post and telegraph offices valued at over Rs. 1,00,000 were destroyed.

Yarn and Cloth Bales Set Ablaze.

Railway wagons, carrying the property of Indian traders and firms, were plundered on the East Indian and Bengal and North-Western Railways. A mob of 2,000 stormed the goods sheds at Palacole Railway Station in the West Godavari District of Madras Presidency, setting fire to yarn and cloth bales worth Rs. 1,00,000. Three hundred wagons were looted at one station—Baurani junction on the Bengal and North-Western Railway. The North-Western Railway suffered a loss of several lakhs of rupees by the senseless destruction of the Railway Clearing Accounts Office in Delhi.

At Ramtek the treasury was looted, resulting in a loss to the taxpayer of Rs. 3,50,000.

Attack on Educational Institutions.

Particularly to be condemned was the widespread attack on schools and colleges, mostly run by district boards, municipalities or on private funds. The number of school buildings damaged or destroyed must run into many hundreds. The technique was generally the same—window panes were smashed, furniture burnt, records destroyed, and, in some cases, typewriters stolen. Even libraries came in for attention. An attempt was made to set fire to the library of the Andhra University at Guntur and a library in Bengal was set alight. The chemistry laboratory of the Ceded Districts College in the Anantapur district of Madras Presidency was reduced to ashes. The lecture hall of Grant Medical College burst into flames as a result of sabotage, the damage being estimated at one lakh of rupees. These are only a few instances.

Silk institute looted seed stores destroyed.

In some areas mobs wrought havoc on agricultural farms, crops, seed stores, grain godowns, forest depots and forest nakas. The buildings of the Agricultural Institute at Sabour in Bihar were attacked and damaged. In the same province an armed mob looted the Silk Institute. In the United Provinces, 21 seed stores were burnt and the land records of some 420 villages were torn up or destroyed. A flax godown at Pusa was set ablaze. Government grain shops were destroyed in Bombay and also grain godowns in the Madras Presidency. Not satisfied with the inducements offered by rice merchants who attempted to buy it off by distributing the cargo of a boat, a mob proceeded to attack a rice mill in

Assam with the intention of destroying it. Hundreds of bags of wheat were looted by a mob in a flour mill in Delhi.

Clinic and leper asylum damaged refugee camps burnt.

Inhumanity set up new records. A tuberculosis clinic in Delhi and a leper asylum in Sholapur were stormed and damaged. Angry mobs raided first-aid posts in the United Provinces and sacked the private dispensary of a doctor who suffered a loss of Rs. 10,000. Medicines and other articles were also destroyed in a public health centre in Midnapore, the health officer being forced to attend a Congress parade. Some Red Cross articles were stolen in Coorg. In Bihar an evacuee camp went up in flames and labour huts in Tippera, Bengal, met with a similar fate. Eight dharamshalas in Bombay and two refugee camps in Assam were also burnt down. Even a few churches were burnt.

Markets looted.

In towns shopkeepers and traders were forced to close their shops partly by intimidation and partly by rowdyism. Markets were looted in Orissa, liquor and excise shops sacked or burnt in Madras and Bengal, bazaars in Nagpur and grocers' shops in Bengal. Restaurants were damaged in Poona. In the Koraput district in Orissa the agitators threatened shopkeepers with violence. Movable property like foodstuffs, cloth, iron, etc., was plundered in Surat district.

Estates and private houses raided.

The mobs indeed brought ruin to their own people. At Punnur in the Madras Presidency, the sheds of the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development Company were burnt. A mob raided an estate at Tiruvenganpet, burning or carrying away property. In Cawnpore a servant of one of the largest cloth dealers was robbed of Rs. 50,000 which he was taking from his master's shop to the bank. The rioters raided private houses and set them ablaze in the Madras Presidency. A private kerosene dump was set alight in the Colaba Suburb of Bombay and several instances of fire and sabotage were reported from mills and factories. In another place a mob looted the property of two private persons, in one case removing jewels, rice and kerosene worth Rs. 2,000. Fires consumed bales of cotton in Bombay and Sind, buildings in tea-gardens in Assam, a bazaar in Midnapore. Hand carts and wooden P. W. D. boards were burnt, and even haystacks.

Damage to public utility services.

The financial loss as a result of dislocation of commerce and trade can never be measured. The normal movement of goods and necessaries of life from producing to consuming areas was seriously interrupted, thus creating shortages and inflicting untold damage on innocent citizens. Mills were picketed with the result that workmen earned less. In bigger towns trams and buses were burnt or destroyed. Damage to public utility services deprived citizens

of electric light, telephones, postal and telegraphic facilities and transport. Security to life and property was endangered by lawlessness, crime and dacoities.

CHAPTER V.

OTHER ATROCITIES.

Other atrocities included attacks on citizens, attempts at the rescue of prisoners, mutinies engineered in jails and other acts of anti-social destruction or violence.

A number of people in no way connected with Government were subjected to horrible tortures by self-constituted courts. In district Monghyr, for instance, five persons accused of theft were produced before a panchayat court which promptly delivered judgment. The fingers of their right hands were cut off, three men lost an eye each and some were branded with hot irons. In Gaya district, two burglars tried by a self-constituted court were condemned to death and killed on the spot. In some Bengal villages, each household was asked to give a volunteer for making raids on Government property, the penalty for refusal being the destruction of the house.

Citizens kidnapped and assaulted.

In some parts of Bengal, citizens suspected of loyalty to Government were kidnapped, beaten, kept in detention and sometimes held to ransom. Peaceful citizens were blackmailed in the guise of "fines". During one raid seven citizens, including a collectorate clerk, were rescued from one of the so-called "Gandhi hajats". A headmaster and his four brothers and several watchmen were kidnapped in Midnapore. A citizen on his way from Kadamtala to Tamluk was waylaid, overpowered, blindfolded and carried away to a dilapidated hut. The kidnappers took him from village to village at night and finally decided to try him in a self-constituted criminal court. Luckily he managed to escape. Another kidnapped person was kept in detention for a fortnight, blindfolded with rubber pads and brutally beaten. Because he was suspected of being a police spy, a pujari of a temple in Bihpur in Bhagalpur district was done to death on November 30.

Occasionally innocent persons, mostly poor, were trapped in fires. Two drivers and a coolie were burned to death when a lorry shed adjoining an aerodrome in South India was attacked by a mob and set alight. A watchman and his wife met with a similar fate in a blazing toddy shop in Tuticorin.

Blackmailing gangs.

Blackmailing gangs appeared in Nagpur, Cawnpore, Fatehpur, Midnapore and some parts of Bombay. A gang of 45 men armed with guns and pistols demanded Rs. 1,000 "for the cause of the country" from a merchant at Fatehpur in the United Provinces. On resisting the demand he was shot dead and a relative of his shot in the arm. Dacoities in Bihar reached a record height in October, the worst districts being Bhagalpur, Saran, Santal Parganas, Gaya, Monghyr and Patna. In the village of Khar in the same district, a citizen was tied with ropes and threatened with death

unless he agreed to pay Rs. 1,000 as fine for co-operation with Government.

Attacks on food queues.

Wanton anti-social violence was exhibited when in October some students, entering the convocation hall in Nagpur during an examination of nurses and medical students, threw chilly powder, water and ink on the students and tore up the question and answer papers. A worse case occurred in Bengal when acid was thrown in the second class compartment of a passenger train, injuring five persons. A European lady who was organising Red Cross work was molested in Coorg. In urban areas, mobs compelled passers-by dressed in European clothes to give-up their hats and ties; a bonfire was made of the articles seized. A peculiarly loathsome form of hooliganism has appeared in Bombay—the throwing of soda-water bottles at persons standing in queues outside Government grain shops.

Raids on jails.

In full knowledge of the dangers of releasing convicts, deliberate attempts were made to attack jails or engineer mutinies in prisons. In Bihar a sub-jail was raided and the prisoners set free. A crowd forced open a jail in the Madras Presidency. Police guards escorting accused persons were targets of attack and in several cases arrested persons charged with heinous crimes were rescued. Six hundred prisoners mutinied in Bhagalpur jail on September 4th. A deputy superintendent, the carding master and a warder lost their lives in this affair and their bodies were burnt. Extensive damage was also done to the jail factory, which was set on fire.

Planned operations.

In Midnapore in Bengal, the operations of the rebels indicated considerable care and planning; an effective warning system had been devised, elementary tactical principles were observed, for instance, encirclement and flanking movements, clearly on pre-arranged signals. The forces of disorder were accompanied by doctors and nursing orderlies to attend to casualties and the intelligence system was efficient. Something of the kind was also noticeable in an attack on Saidraja station on the main East Indian Railway line in the United Provinces near the Bihar border. The attackers advanced in some sort of formation and when repelled, carried off their dead in bullock-carts brought either for that purpose or for loot. Wireless transmitters are known to have been used by some of the organisers of the movement. Fifteen miles from Nagpur on the Bhandara road, a crowd attacked a police station. Some of the rioters were armed with guns. The police were fired on an a head constable and a constable were wounded. The crowd took away rifles and ammunition from the station house. When subsequently the police searched the house of the alleged leader, they found an electric generating set for use with a wireless transmitter.

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Passenger train derailed on Aug. 21, 1942, on the Partabgarh-Allahabad section, E.I.R.

MAY 13 1939



CONGRESS RESPONSIBILITY

FOR

THE DISTURBANCES

1942-43

(Published with authority)

NEW DELHI: PRINTED BY THE MANAGER
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA PRESS: 1943

PREFACE

In response to demands which have reached Government from several sources, Government have now prepared a review which brings together a number of facts, whether derived from official documents or otherwise, bearing on the responsibility of Mr. Gandhi and the Congress High Command for the disturbances which followed the sanctioning of a mass movement by the A. I. C. C. on August 8th, 1942. Almost all the facts presented in this review are, or should be, already within the knowledge of the public. The review does not purport to disclose all the information in the possession of the Government. In addition to the facts here stated, there is a large volume of evidence which it is undesirable to publish at present.

R. TOTTENHAM,

Additional Secretary to the Government of India,
Home Department.

NEW DELHI ;
The 13th February 1943.

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CONGRESS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DISTURBANCES, 1942-43

CHAPTER I

THE "QUIT-INDIA" MOVEMENT : SETTING THE STAGE

In an article written on April 19th, 1942, which appeared in "Harijan" of April 26th, Mr. Gandhi first gave public expression to the theory which was to crystallize into his "Quit-India" move. In this article, after deploring the introduction of foreign soldiers into India to aid in India's defence, Mr. Gandhi asserted that if the British were to leave India to her fate, as they had had to leave Singapore, non-violent India would lose nothing and Japan would probably leave India alone. "Whatever the consequences, therefore, to India," he continued, "her real safety and Britain's too lie in orderly and timely British withdrawal from India".

It will be suggested that during the period between Mr. Gandhi's first advocacy of British withdrawal from India and the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee in Bombay on August 7th, the Congress High Command and in the later stages the Congress organisation as a whole were deliberately setting the stage for a mass movement designed to free India finally from British rule. The type of movement that they envisaged and the plans they made for it will be examined later. An essential preliminary to any such examination, however, is a clear understanding of the real motives underlying the move ; and though no detailed record of the many discussions which took place at Sevagram and elsewhere during this period is available, Mr. Gandhi's writings in "Harijan", and the record of the discussions in the Working Committee during its meeting at Allahabad at the end of April are sufficient to provide an ample insight into the true motives of Mr. Gandhi and the Congress in demanding the immediate withdrawal of the British power from India. The period falls naturally into two halves, in the first of which, lasting up to the passing of the Working Committee's resolution of July 14th, Mr. Gandhi held the stage alone and the essential structure of his proposals for the withdrawal of the British was developed. In the second half, extending to the Bombay meeting of the A. I. C. C., the emphasis lay on the struggle to be launched by Congress should the British not withdraw voluntarily, and the centre of interest shifted from Sevagram to other parts of the country, where Congress leaders placed before the people their varied interpretations of the resolution of July 14th.

In the article on Foreign Soldiers in India already alluded to, Mr. Gandhi expressed the opinion that should the British withdraw from India, Japan would leave her alone and that the withdrawal was therefore necessary for India's safety. This theme of India's safety from Japan dominates all Mr. Gandhi's earlier writings on the subject. It finds expression in "Harijan" of May 3rd, when, in denying that by asking the British rulers to withdraw he was inviting Japan to

attack India, Mr. Gandhi stated : " I feel convinced that the British presence is the incentive for the Japanese attack." It is even more precisely expressed in 'Harijan " of the following week, in which Mr. Gandhi says : " The presence of the British in India is an invitation to Japan to invade India. Their withdrawal removes the bait." It was not till May 24th, nearly a month after the debut of ' Quit India,' that Mr. Gandhi first admitted the possibility of Japan still invading India despite the withdrawal of the British. His advice to the people was then characteristically that they should offer stubborn non-violent non-co-operation to the Japanese, which he suggested would be infinitely more effective in the absence of the British.

Although his earlier proposals for British withdrawal all emphasised the importance of this withdrawal being a voluntary act willingly performed, Mr. Gandhi had already by May 10th decided that he must devote the whole of his energy to this ' supreme act ' ; and it is clear that very shortly afterwards, he began to think in terms of a struggle to achieve his object. The following paragraph appears in " Harijan " of May 31st, in an article entitled ' Friendly Advice ', in which Mr. Gandhi says that he is taking every care humanly possible ' to prepare the ground ' :

> " Of course the people must not on any account lean on the Japanese to get rid of the British Power. That were a remedy worse than the disease. But as I have already said, in this struggle every risk has to be run in order to cure ourselves of the biggest disease—a disease which has sapped our manhood and almost made us feel as if we must for ever be slaves. It is an insufferable thing. The cost of the cure, I know, will be heavy. No price is too heavy to pay for the deliverance."

In its earlier stages, Mr. Gandhi's ' Quit India ' move was meant and was widely interpreted as a proposal for the physical withdrawal from India of the British, and of all British and Allied troops. As late as June 14th, he makes, for the purpose of his scheme, the assumption " that the Commander-in-Chief of the united American and British Armies has decided that India is no good as a base, and that they should withdraw to some other base and concentrate the allied forces there." Added strength is given to the belief that this is a correct interpretation of Mr. Gandhi's original intentions by the prominence, to which attention has already been drawn, of the theme that the British withdrawal would remove any Japanese motive for invading India ; for with the British and Allied armies still in India, how is the bait removed ? At the same time, he made it clear that on the British departure the Indian Army would be disbanded. Opposition to Mr. Gandhi's move, which besides developing strongly in Britain and America as was to be expected, had also been expressed in portions of the Press in India on which he and the Congress had become accustomed to rely for support, centred chiefly round this proposal for the withdrawal of the Allied

armies in the face of what appeared imminent Japanese aggression. Realists were unable to see how India's defence and the cause of the Allies would thus be strengthened and indeed Mr. Gandhi's defence of this position by the assertion that, in the absence of the violent resistance of the British, Indian non-violent resistance would be able to attain the maximum effectiveness did appear somewhat inadequate in the face of his well-known admission that only a very doubtful proportion of the Indian people was sufficiently imbued with the doctrine of non-violence to be capable of offering successful non-violent resistance. Bowing to the gathering force of this opposition, and also, as we shall seek to show later, with a possible view to reconciling disagreement among members of the Working Committee, Mr. Gandhi discovered the 'gap' in his original proposals. In "Harijan" of June 14th, he paved the way,—by the slightly cryptic assertion that, if he had his way, the Indian National Government when formed would tolerate the presence of the United Nations on Indian soil under certain well-defined conditions but would permit no further assistance,—for the more definite statement made to an American journalist in the following week's "Harijan," when in reply to a question whether he envisaged Free India's allowing Allied troops to operate from India, he said: "I do. It will be only then that you will see real co-operation". He continued that he did not contemplate the complete shifting of Allied troops from India and that, provided India became entirely free, he could not insist on their withdrawal.

Before any attempt is made to assess the motives actuating Mr. Gandhi in his 'Quit-India' move, reference must be made to the important evidence as to the working of his mind and the reactions of the members of the Working Committee furnished by the record (Appendix I) of the latter's Allahabad meeting, which was recovered in a subsequent police search of the All-India Congress Committee's office. Mr. Gandhi was not present at this meeting, but he sent for the consideration of the Working Committee a draft resolution which was the direct precursor of the resolution of July 14th. "Japan's quarrel," he states in the draft, "is not with India. She is warring against the British Empire.... If India were freed her first step would probably be to negotiate with Japan." Britain, Congress was of opinion, was incapable of defending India, whereas if the British withdrew India would be able to defend herself against the Japanese or any other aggressor. The draft goes on to assure the Japanese Government that India bears no enmity against Japan and desires only freedom from alien domination, which she will attain and retain through her non-violent strength. The hope is expressed that Japan will not have any designs on India; but should she attack India, all Indians who look to the Congress for guidance would be expected to offer non-violent non-co-operation to the Japanese.

The draft revealed a marked division of opinion in the Working Committee, and the remarks of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, its two principal opponents, are of sufficient interest to merit quotation at length:

> "Withdrawal of troops and the whole apparatus of civil administration," said Nehru, "will create a vacuum which cannot be filled up immediately. If we said to Japan that her fight was with British Imperialism and not us she would say 'we are glad the British army is withdrawn; we recognise your independence. But we want certain facilities now. We shall defend you against aggression. We want aerodromes, freedom to pass our troops through your country. 'This is necessary in self-defence.' They might seize strategic points and proceed to Iraq, etc. The masses won't be touched if only the strategic points are captured. If Bapu's (Mr. Gandhi) approach is accepted, we become passive partners of the Axis powers.... The whole background of the draft is one which will inevitably make the world think that we are lining up passively with the Axis powers. The British are asked to withdraw. After the withdrawal we are to negotiate with Japan and possibly come to some terms with her. These terms may include a large measure of civil control by us, a certain measure of military control by them, passage of armies through India, etc..... Whether you will like it or not, the exigencies of the war situation will compel them to make India a battleground. In sheer self-defence they cannot afford to keep out. They will walk through the country. You can't stop it by non-violent non-co-operation.....the whole thought and background of the draft is one of favouring Japan. It may not be conscious. Three factors influence our decisions in the present emergency (*i*) Indian Freedom (*ii*) sympathy for certain larger causes (*iii*) probable outcome of the war—who is going to win. It is Gandhiji's feeling that Japan and Germany will win. This feeling unconsciously governs his decision."

To this penetrating analysis of Mr. Gandhi's draft, Mr. Rajagopalachari added:

> "I do not agree that if Britain goes away India will have some scope for organising itself even if Japan should make some headway. Japan will fill the vacuum created by the British withdrawal. Our reaction to the evils of Britain should not make us lose our sense of perspective. It is no use getting upset on small matters. Do not run into the arms of Japan, which is what the resolution comes to."

For those of the Working Committee who supported the draft, let Achyut Patwardhan speak:

> "If we do not take decisions, Jawaharlalji's attitude will lead to abject and unconditional co-operation with British

machinery which must collapse....Our co-operation with Britain is an invitation to Japan....The war is an imperialist war. Our policy can be that we take no sides. The world is in the grip of a fear complex. I would consider the position if the Allies could defeat the Axis, but I see clearly that Britain is going towards the deep."

And finally, Mr. Rajendra Prasad:

"We cannot produce the proper atmosphere unless we adopt Bapu's draft"

—a draft, to repeat, of which the whole thought and background is one of favouring Japan, a resolution which amounts to running into the arms of Japan.

CHAPTER II

WARDHA TO BOMBAY—THE MOTIVES AND AIMS OF THE RESOLUTIONS

By the time the Working Committee met at Wardha in July, Mr. Gandhi's proposals were complete in their essentials. These were not later changed, and the succeeding period was concerned rather with how the essentials were to be brought about and how the dish was to be served up in such a way as least to antagonize world opinion.

On July 14th, the Working Committee passed a resolution which differed in only one *fundamental* respect from Mr. Gandhi's Allahabad draft—in that the Congress agreed to the stationing of Allied troops in India to ward off Japanese attack. It is difficult to find an adequate explanation, in the events of the period between the Working Committee's Allahabad meeting in April and their Wardha meeting in July, of this reversal of their former decision. In particular, the external threat to India was virtually unabated and the psychological background of the resolution remained the same. It is hard to resist the conclusion therefore that the decisive factor by which those realists who had formerly opposed the resolution were swayed was Mr. Gandhi's decision to permit the retention of the Allied troops in India—a decision which may well have been due to his eyes having been opened by an American journalist to what America would think of the original plan. A further legitimate inference is surely that the necessity of carrying his former opponents in the Working Committee with him was a reason, if not *the* reason, for Mr. Gandhi's striking change of front on this fundamental issue; such an explanation is at least as plausible as that a man of Mr. Gandhi's mental calibre should be guilty, in placing a carefully pondered scheme before the world, of such a glaring oversight as his later explanation required one to believe. But this theory goes far to resolve a further difficulty: it was always hard to believe that Mr. Gandhi, a well-known opponent of any form of military regime, should fail to see the obvious danger that, with the British civil

Government removed, the troops who remained and who would require to safeguard their communications and supplies would immediately establish some form of military rule over at least the major part of the country ; this danger was forcibly expressed to him by many, including Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, and the following extract is from a letter written by the latter to Mr. Gandhi and subsequently made public (Appendix II) :

> " Your proposal that while the civil power may be withdrawn the British and Allied forces may continue in India in anticipation of a treaty with a problematical provisional Indian Government will only lead to the exercise of all governmental functions by the military forces. This will happen if only for their own safety and effective functioning. They are further likely to be urged towards this step by local chieftains and suffering people. This would be the reinstallation of the British Government in a worse form "..

No satisfactory solution of this difficulty was ever made public by Mr. Gandhi ; but it is impossible to suppose that he had achieved no solution and it must be inferred that the solution was one which he preferred should remain a secret. Now while the details of Mr. Gandhi's personal solution of this problem must remain a matter for speculation, an explanation which fulfils the logical requirements of the above situation immediately comes to mind ; it is that, as we have shown above to be probable, Mr. Gandhi's admission of this amendment to his scheme was intended primarily as a bid for American support and perhaps secondarily as a sop to his opponents on the Working Committee, but that he envisaged, or planned to create, circumstances in which this permission would be meaningless, that is to say, circumstances in which the troops would either be forced to withdraw, or would if they remained be rendered ineffective. The nature of Mr. Gandhi's plans will be discussed later ; meanwhile, some slight added plausibility is given to this view by the following reply of Mr. Gandhi's to one of his early questioners as to the nature of his proposed movement :

> " It will be a move which will be felt by the whole world. It *may* not interfere with the movement of British troops, but it is sure to engage British attention ".

But the chief attraction of this explanation is that it provides a background of logical thought for Mr. Gandhi's most illogical writings on this subject and also supplies continuity of motive ; for without some such explanation, we are faced with the paradox of Mr. Gandhi, having proposed a scheme one of the principal objects of which was to avoid India's becoming a theatre of war, and suddenly introducing a new feature the result of which was apparently likely to be the direct negation of that object.

From the foregoing somewhat lengthy survey two basic motives emerge as the foundation of Mr. Gandhi's proposals :—the first is a desire to free India finally from British domination ; the second is a desire to avoid at all costs India's becoming a theatre of active warfare, a battlefield between Britain and Japan.

Few will deny the existence of the first of these motives. Complete freedom for India is the openly expressed goal of Congress. Controversy enters only over the time factor. Why, many have asked, when freedom had been promised to India after the war, should the Congress engage upon a venture the extreme riskiness of which had been pointed out on many occasions by Mr. Gandhi himself ? There were it may be suggested, two main reasons. The first was a growing sense of frustration in Congress itself. This is well illustrated by the following extract from an article by Mr. Gandhi entitled ' To Resist Slave Drivers ' which appeared in " Harijan " of June 7th :

> " I waited and waited until the country should develop the non-violent strength necessary to throw off the foreign yoke. But my attitude has now undergone a change. I feel that I cannot afford to wait. If I continue to wait, I might have to wait till doomsday. For the preparation that I have prayed and worked for may never come, and in the meantime I may be enveloped and overwhelmed by the flames that threaten all of us. That is why I have decided that even at certain risks which are obviously involved I must ask the people to resist the slavery."

The Congress campaign of selected satyagraha having failed to achieve any practical object and having long ceased to attract any attention, had finally been called off ; and partly on account of this and partly owing to the general lack of political interest which marked the period before the Cripps mission, Congress influence with the masses was at a low ebb. The arrival of Sir Stafford Cripps and the negotiations which appeared to come so near to success roused political feelings to a fever pitch. The very suddenness with which final failure came, and the recriminations which succeeded it, opened the door to the inculcation of a deep and widespread bitterness against Britain and against the Government in this country. The Congress High Command was at this time a house divided, serious disagreements which had shown themselves during the Cripps negotiations continuing over the question of non-violence with particular reference to the defence of India against Japan. A powerful and unifying cause was thus necessary then, both to save the Congress from internal disruption and to rescue their hold over the masses. What better cry than the removal of the British, especially when common cause could be made in spreading bitterness against Britain and exploiting the agitation in some parts

of the country against the discomforts inevitably attendant on war? The second reason connects with the second main motive postulated above. The threat of Japanese invasion seemed imminent. If an armed clash in the East was to be avoided, action must be immediate, as soon as the necessary preparations could be made.

The second motive was never explicitly admitted by Mr. Gandhi or the Congress, but it is implicit in all the former's earlier writings on the 'Quit India' theme and is even more clearly shown in the draft resolution sent by him to Allahabad. Mr. Gandhi, and not only he but also apparently Achyut Patwardhan and the members of the 'non-violent' clique in the Working Committee, were convinced that the Axis must win the war and that Britain would prove incapable of defending India against Japan.

That this attitude persisted long after the Allahabad Working Committee meeting is shown by the following remark made by Mr. Gandhi in "Harijan" of July 19th, in reply to a question whether it would not be wiser to postpone his movement until Britain had settled with the Germans and the Japanese:

> "No, because I know you will not settle with Germans without us".

A passage in Mr. Gandhi's letter to the Viceroy of August 14th is significant in this connection:

> "I have taken Jawahar Lal Nehru as my measuring rod. His personal contacts make him feel much more *the misery of the impending ruin of China and Russia* than I can".

They foresaw a British rearguard action across India and the devastation that this must entail; and it is no coincidence that, at the same time as Mr. Gandhi was developing his 'Quit India' theme in "Harijan", he was also inveighing against any form of 'scorched earth' policy. (Mr. Gandhi's solicitude for the property, largely industrial property be it noted, which it might have been necessary to deny to the enemy contrasts strangely with his readiness to sacrifice countless numbers of Indians in non-violent resistance to the Japanese. The property must be saved; it is perhaps legitimate to ask—For whom?) It seems possible that at first Mr. Gandhi genuinely hoped that, with the removal of the British from India, Japanese incentive to attack would be removed; and that he hoped to be able to treat with Japan after the British withdrawal is clearly shown in his Allahabad draft resolution. Subsequently proposals for non-violent non-co-operation with Japan, should she attack India after the British withdrawal, were developed. We have however his own admission that he could not guarantee that non-violent action would keep the Japanese at bay; he refers indeed to any such hope as an 'unwarranted supposition'. Since, therefore, Mr. Gandhi had no illusions as to the likelihood of effective non-violent resistance to the Japanese, we can only infer that in the admittedly possible event of Japanese aggression on India after the departure of the

British, he was prepared to concede to their demands. Such an inference accords with what we have shown to be his frame of mind at the time and it is strengthened by the following extract from an appeal addressed by him to the Japanese which appeared in "Harijan" of July 26th :—

> "And we are in the unique position of having to resist an imperialism that we detest no less than yours (the Japanese) and Nazism".

That Mr. Gandhi would have preferred to see India entirely free from any form of domination, whether British or Japanese, cannot be doubted ; and it seems clear that only in the grip of some dominant emotion would he have contemplated such a capitulation ; this emotion was, it seems clear, his desire to preserve India from the horrors of war.

The principal difficulty in the way of accepting any such interpretations of Mr. Gandhi's motives during this period is the apparent contradiction in his consenting to the retention of Allied troops on Indian soil. It has already been shown that the reasons advanced by Mr. Gandhi for this admission, which bid fair to disrupt his whole scheme, are not such as can reasonably be accepted. And this entire difficulty disappears with the explanation previously given of the motives underlying his consent to the retention of the Allied troops.

Efforts have been made above to demonstrate that the dominant motives underlying Mr. Gandhi's 'Quit India' move, dominating to some extent even his intense desire to see India freed from foreign rule, was his wish to avoid India's being turned into a battlefield between Britain and Japan. It remains to examine the ostensible motives with which Mr. Gandhi and the Working Committee presented their move and to assess the genuineness of these motives in the light of the foregoing material.

Three main *ostensible* aims are common to both the Wardha resolution of July 14th [Appendix III (1)] and the Bombay resolution of August 8th [Appendix III (2)]. These are :—

> (1) To remove foreign domination over India.
>
> (2) To check the growing ill-will against Britain, with its danger of passive acceptance by the masses of aggression against India ; to build up a spirit of resistance to aggression among Indians ; and by granting India's millions immediate freedom to release that energy and enthusiasm which alone can enable India to play an effective part in her own defence and in the war as a whole.
>
> (3) To achieve communal unity, by the removal of the foreign power with its policy of divide and rule, which will be followed by the formation of a Provisional Government representative of all sections of the Indian people.

Three further aims appeared for the first time in the Bombay resolution.

(4) To bring all subject and oppressed humanity to the side of the United Nations, thus giving these nations the moral and spiritual leadership of the world.

(5) To assist Asiatic nations under foreign domination to regain their freedom and to ensure that they are not again placed under the rule of any colonial power.

(6) To bring about a world federation, which would ensure the disbanding of national armies, navies and air forces, and the pooling of the world's resources for the common good of all.

The genuineness of the first of these aims is undeniable. The freedom of India, in whatever terms it may have been expressed, has long been the main goal of Congress and it has been shown above how this aim coincides with one of the main motives underlying the ' Quit India ' move.

The second ostensible aim consists of two supplementary halves —to check India's growing ill-will against Britain and to enable India to play a more effective part in the war. It has been suggested that far from seeking to allay the bitterness left by the failure of the Cripps Mission, it was the aim of the Congress to seize upon the opportunity thus offered to regain her lost hold over the masses. Added reason to believe that this interpretation is correct is given by the fact, as will be seen later when the type of movement for which the Congress was preparing comes to be examined, that racial antagonism was deliberately aroused by the Congress leaders who, during the period between the Wardha and Bombay resolutions, toured the country-side preparing the masses for the coming rebellion. The further claim that the move was designed to enable India to play a more effective part in her own defence is belied by Mr. Gandhi's own writings. As already shown, Mr. Gandhi had little belief in the effectiveness of non-violence as a means of resisting Japanese invasion ; he referred to such a belief, in fact, as an " unwarranted supposition " and it was on these grounds that he purported to consent to the retention of foreign troops in India for her defence. Grounds have, however, already been given for doubting whether this was the real reason. It is also amply clear from Mr. Gandhi's own writings that the presence of allied troops in India vitiated to his mind such effectiveness as non-violent resistance by Indians to the Japanese could be supposed to have. Thus, in his draft Allahabad resolution he says :—

" In such places where British and Japanese forces are fighting our non-cooperation (with the Japanese) will be fruitless and unnecessary."

This theme is repeated in the " Harijan " as the following extracts will show :—

> " I make bold to say that, if the British withdraw and people here follow my advice, then non-cooperation will be infinitely more effective than it can be today, when it cannot be appreciated for the violent British action going on side by side."

> " It must be admitted, therefore, that there will be little scope for non-violent resistance of aggression, with the Allied troops operating in India, as there is practically none now."

To summarise briefly, Mr. Gandhi did not believe that non-violence alone was capable of defending India against Japan. Nor had he any faith in the ability of the Allies to do so ; " Britain ", he stated in his draft Allahabad resolution, " is incapable of defending India." His ' Quit India ' move was intended to result in the withdrawal of the British Government to be succeeded by a problematical provisional government or, as Mr. Gandhi admitted to be possible, by anarchy ; the Indian army was to be disbanded ; and Allied troops were to be allowed to operate only under the terms imposed by this provisional government, assisted by India's non-violent non-cooperation to Japan, for which, as Mr. Gandhi had already admitted, there could be little scope with Allied troops operating in India. Finally, even if, in the face of the above arguments, it could be supposed that Mr. Gandhi and the Congress proposed to pin their faith on the ability of Allied troops to defend India, it should be noted that the former himself admitted that the ability of Allied troops to operate effectively would depend upon the formation of a suitable provisional government. Now since this government was to be representative of all sections of Indian opinion, it is clear that neither Mr. Gandhi nor the Congress could legitimately commit it in advance to any particular course of action ; they could not, that is to say, undertake that it would support the Allies in defending India against Japan. They could not in fact make any promise on behalf of this provisional government unless they intended that it should be dominated by Congress ; and the whole trend of Congress policy coupled with the extravagant promises made in the Bombay A. I. C. C. resolution on behalf of this provisional government, leave little doubt that this *was* their intention,—a view held, significantly, by the Muslim League and Muslims in general. You have then a situation in which the Allied troops would be dependent for support on a Government dominated by a clique which it has already been shown to be thoroughly defeatist in outlook, and whose leader had already expressed the intention of negotiating with Japan.

It is not the intention here to examine the third aim, the establishment of communal unity followed by the formation of a provisional government, at all closely. It has been suggested in the

preceding paragraph that the Congress intended this government to be under their domination and a note has been made of the strength added to this view by the unity of Muslim opinion that the Congress move was aimed at establishing Congress-Hindu domination over India. It will suffice here to show, from Mr. Gandhi's own writings, the doubts that he entertained as to the feasibility of establishing any such government.

> " Under my proposal, they have to leave India in God's hands—but in modern parlance to anarchy, and that anarchy may lead to internecine warfare for a time or to unrestrained dacoities ".

> " I have not asked the British to hand over India to the Congress or to the Hindus. Let them entrust India to God or in modern parlance to anarchy. Then all the parties will fight one another like dogs, or will, when real responsibility faces them, come to a reasonable agreement. I shall expect non-violence to arise out of that chaos."

That Mr. Gandhi's doubts on this subject were fully shared by Mr. C. Rajagopalachari is shown in the letter addressed by him to Mr. Gandhi, a copy of which is attached as Appendix II.

No detailed examination is necessary of the last three ostensible aims outlined at the top of page 10. It will be observed that they all have this point in common—they have no application to India and are concerned solely with the effect on the world of India's proposed move. It is surely significant that these three aims should have made their first appearance in the Bombay resolution, after a period when the Congress had been subjected to strenuous criticism both in Britain and America for what was almost universally held to be a betrayal of the Allied cause. That the additions were the result of this criticism may be taken for granted. Whether the authors of the resolution genuinely believed that the Congress demand would, if accepted, help rather than hinder the cause of the United Nations and intended that it should have that effect, depends on the answer to two questions. In the first place, could any body of men who honestly desired that result have deliberately called the country, if their way of achieving it was not accepted, to take part in a mass movement the declared object of which was to have precisely the opposite effect by paralysing the whole administration and the whole war effort ? In the second place, bearing in mind that less than a year previously it had been proclaimed under Mr. Gandhi's orders to be a " sin " to help the war with men or money, can it be denied that these men saw their opportunity in Britain's danger and believed that the psychological moment for the enforcement of their political demands must be seized while the fate of the United Nations hung in the balance and before the tide of war turned—if it was ever going to turn—in their favour ? The answer to these two questions is left to the reader.

CHAPTER III

THE CONTEMPLATED CHARACTER OF THE MOVEMENT

So far an attempt has been made to show the true motives underlying Mr. Gandhi's ' Quit India ' move and to establish the hollowness of the grounds advanced for this move in the Congress resolutions of July 14th and August 8th. We shall now proceed to examine the nature of the steps which Mr. Gandhi proposed to take, should the British not accede to his request for their voluntary withdrawal.

As early as May 10th, Mr. Gandhi had determined that the withdrawal of the British from India was a " supreme act ", to the realisation of which he must devote his whole energy. It very shortly became clear that he was already thinking in terms of a final struggle against the British, should they refuse to withdraw and in " Harijan " of May 31st he referred to it as a struggle in which every risk must be run in order that India should be cured of the disease of British domination, and of the spirit of hatred and slavery which it had engendered. Of this, he said :—

> " It is an insufferable thing. The cost of the cure I know will be heavy. No price is too heavy to pay for the deliverance."

From this point onwards Mr. Gandhi's conception of the struggle developed rapidly. His writings on the subject are too lengthy to quote in full, but the following excerpts from " Harijan " illustrate the direction in which his mind was moving :—

> " It will be a move which will be felt by the whole world. It *may* not interfere with the movement of British troops, but it is sure to engage British attention."
>
> " My proposal for the withdrawal of the British power involves two actions. One is to deal with the present emergency, and the other to secure freedom from British supremacy. The second admits of delay. There is a lot of confusion about its implications. I am trying to the best of my ability to deal with the questions as they arise from time to time."
>
> " The first admits of no delay and demands specific action irrespective of the proposal for British withdrawal. This is in connection with (1) the behaviour of troops, (2) the impending salt famine, (3) control of food-grains, (4) evacuation for the sake of the military, (5) discrimination between Europeans and Anglo-Indians and Anglo-Burmans on the one hand and Indians on the other hand."
>
> " It is worth fighting for, it is worth staking all that the nation has."
>
> " They (Indians) will fight, not to seize power but to end the foreign domination, cost what it may."

" But you may know that it will be a mass movement of a strictly non-violent character and then you can fill in the details. It will include all that a mass movement can include.....I do not want rioting as a direct result.....If in spite of all precautions rioting does take place, it cannot be helped.....I am not going to court imprisonment. The struggle does not involve courting imprisonment. It is too soft a thing.....My intention is to make the thing as short and swift as possible."

" Ours is an unarmed revolt against British Rule."

" Therefore I shall take every precaution I can to handle the movement gently, but I would not hesitate to go to the extremest limit, if I find that no impression is produced on the British Government or the Allied Power.....

It will be your biggest movement ?—

Yes, my biggest movement."

" I have no false notions of prestige, no personal considerations would make me take a step that I know is sure to plunge the country into a conflagration."

" Is the possibility of strike precluded ? "

" No ", said Gandhiji " strikes can be and have been non-violent. If railways are worked only to strengthen the British hold on India, they need not be assisted."

That the movement was to be the final effort of the Congress party, in which it must win freedom or be wiped out, was made clear by Mr. Gandhi in his speech at the Bombay meeting, after the A. I. C. C. had passed the ' Quit India ' resolution.

" Every one of you should, " he said, " from this moment onwards, consider yourself a free man or woman and act as if you are free and are no longer under the heel of this imperialism.....You may take it from me that I am not going to strike a bargain with the Viceroy for ministries and the like. I am not going to be satisfied with anything short of complete freedom..... *We shall do or die.* We shall either free India or die in the attempt."

In conclusion there are the famous words uttered by Mr. Gandhi at a press conference in Wardha, after the Working Committee had passed the resolution of July 14th, which show clearly how even at that early stage he was fully determined on a final struggle :—

" There is no room left in the proposal for withdrawal or negotiation. There is no question of one more chance. After all it is an *open rebellion.*"

There also lies the answer to those who have since accused Government of precipitating the crisis by the arrest of Mr. Gandhi and the Congress leaders, and have suggested that the period of

grace referred to by Mr. Gandhi in his Bombay speech should have been utilised for negotiation ; " there is no room left for withdrawal or negotiation ", Mr. Gandhi had said a month earlier. Moreover the Wardha resolution merely threatened a mass movement if the demands of Congress were not accepted. The Bombay resolution went further. It no longer *threatened* a movement with the delay that that might entail. It *sanctioned* the movement ; and if any further delay was intended, are there not at least good grounds for believing in the light of all that had been said, that it was to be used not for the purpose of negotiation but for putting the finishing touches to a plan to which its authors were already committed but which might not yet be completely ready to put into execution ?

The general character of the movement contemplated by Mr. Gandhi emerges clearly from the foregoing extracts. It was to be a struggle, a fight to the finish, in which foreign domination must be ended, cost what it may ; it was to be an unarmed revolt, short and swift, sure to plunge the country into a conflagration—a grimly accurate forecast!—in which Mr. Gandhi was prepared to risk the occurrence of riots, in which he was prepared to go to the extremest limit, including, if necessary, the calling of a general strike ; the struggle was to include everything that a " non-violent " mass movement could do, including strikes and the stoppage of railways, and possibly interference with British troop movements ; and full use was to be made of existing grievances against the British ; former Congress methods such as courting imprisonment were to be eschewed as too soft for the present occasion : finally every man and woman was to consider himself free and act for himself. These last words, or at least their sense, find a place in the resolution itself ; and any body of men that makes such an appeal to its followers can hardly disclaim responsibility for anything that may follow.

A question of sufficient importance to demand separate consideration is whether a movement of the kind that Mr. Gandhi is shown to have been contemplating, could, by its nature, be non-violent, and further whether Mr. Gandhi intended that it should be so or hoped that it would remain so.

It is significant that the entire phraseology of Mr. Gandhi's writings in connection with the movement is of a type associated in the ordinary man's mind with violence. Thus the struggle is referred to as a revolt and a rebellion in which the people must stake their all and be ready to do or die. The ordinary man to whom these writings were addressed was surely not to be blamed if he understood them as exhorting him to take up whatever arms lay handy and fight his British rulers. Supporters of non-violence will reply indignantly by pointing out that the word non-violence appears frequently in Mr. Gandhi's writings on the subject. It is necessary, therefore, to examine exactly what Mr. Gandhi meant in his use of this word in this context and how far he believed that the

" conflagration ", once under way, would remain non-violent. It has already been shown that Mr. Gandhi had little faith in the effectiveness of non-violence to resist Japanese aggression, while Maulana Abul Kâlam Azad and Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru made no secret of their opinion that only armed resistance could defend India against Japan. Mr. Gandhi, however, had openly expressed the view that the British and Japanese imperialisms were equally to be detested. Why then should it be supposed that he would consider non-violence any more effective against the British than against the Japanese ? Again, he had, as shown above, no illusions as to the very doubtful proportion of Indians who were full believers in his theory of non-violence ; yet he proposed embarking on a movement in which he expressed the hope that all classes and communities would join and in which he directed every man and woman to consider themselves free and to think and act for themselves. Contrast this with his previous movement, the " satyagraha campaign " of 1940-41, in which, in order to maintain the desired standard of non-violence, he had been forced to limit participation to specially selected *satyagrahis*, who were even then only allowed to commit a special formal offence ; remember too that he had before him the example of his previous movements, each professedly non-violent, yet each giving rise to the most hideous violence. The certainty that his movement could not remain non-violent is plain enough and, if further indication were wanted, it is supplied in the extracts from Mr. Gandhi's own writings quoted in the preceding paragraphs, which make it clear that even if violence and rioting occurred during the movement this would not deter him, that he was prepared to go to the extremest limit.

It is perhaps worth examining one of Mr. Gandhi's own many definitions of non-violence, and endeavouring to relate it to this particular case :—

> " If a man fights with his sword single-handed against a horde of dacoits armed to the teeth, I should say he is fighting non-violently. Haven't I said to our women that, if in defence of their honour they used their nails and teeth and even a dagger, I should regard their conduct as non-violent. She does not know the distinction between Himsa and Ahimsa. She acts spontaneously. Supposing a mouse fighting a cat tried to resist the cat with his sharp teeth, would you call that mouse violent. In the same way, for the Poles to stand bravely against the German hordes vastly superior in numbers, military equipment and strength, was almost non-violence."

In other words, in any fight, the weaker of the two combatants may employ as violent measures as he likes or is able, and may still be considered to be fighting non-violently ; or to put it in another way, violence when employed against superior odds automatically becomes non-violence. Surely a very convenient theory for the rebels in " an unarmed revolt ".

Having endeavoured to show the type of struggle envisaged by Mr. Gandhi, it is time to turn to his colleagues in the Congress High Command and observe how they interpreted his views to their Congress followers and to the masses. During the period between the Working Committee's resolution of July 14th and the Bombay meeting of the A. I. C. C., almost all the Members of the Working Committee and many other important Congress leaders were engaged in endeavouring to explain and interpret Mr. Gandhi's proposed move to the public and to indicate in broad terms the nature of the struggle upon which, if the A. I. C. C. ratified the Working Committee's resolution, the Congress would embark if the British refused to withdraw. Thus Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru in the United Provinces, Babu Rajendra Prasad in Bihar, Mr. Shankerrao Deo and Mr. Vallabhbhai Patel in Bombay and many others addressed public meetings and Press conferences, urging the masses, in speeches many of which were openly seditious, to be prepared for the fight to the finish against the British which the Congress would shortly launch.

Before endeavouring to give examples from these speeches, attention may be drawn to two points which stand out in all this activity: the first is the insistence with which almost all speakers urged that every man should be prepared and willing to act on his own initiative; the second is the extraordinary attention paid by the speakers to the student community. Thus Congress speakers in Bihar, and the Central and United Provinces, made a point of canvassing the support of the student community, while Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru is known to have taken steps to enlist the support of students from the Benares Hindu University, a fact of particular significance in view of the prominence later assumed by this University in the serious disturbances which occurred in the east of the United Provinces. In Bombay, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Mr. Shankerrao Deo publicly exhorted students to take an active part in the movement and to assume the leadership of Congress should Mr. Gandhi and the other leaders be arrested.

Space does not permit of a full or even a representative reproduction of the many speeches made by Congress leaders during this period and the following selection aims at displaying only the broadest trends:—

Typical of the speeches of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru at this time were his words to a mass meeting of peasants in Allahabad on July 27th, when he warned them that there would be a mass movement in the country within a very short time and said that it was the duty of every *kisan* to understand the movement properly and to respond to the call. In other speeches he made it clear that there was no question of Congressmen deliberately choosing to go to jail; that

the Congress might perish in the terrible ordeal which was ahead of it ; but that a free India would emerge out of its ashes.

> " India is now determined to take a dip in this world-wide storm. In a few weeks we will have a mass movement. This will be our final struggle and we must be prepared to face the worst ".

Finally at the Bombay A. I. C. C. meeting, Pandit Nehru said that the Congress had now burnt its boats and was to embark on a desperate campaign.

The following is an extract from the speech made by Babu Rajendra Prasad at a meeting of the Working Committee of the Bihar Congress held on July 21st and 22nd :—

> " One thing required special attention that no act should be done which would weaken the moral strength of the people. According to Gandhiji's view the movement would kindle a fire all over the country and would only be extinguished after either obtaining the independence of the country or wiping out Congress organisation altogether ".

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who paid particular attention to students, addressing a student meeting in Ahmedabad is reported to have asked them to pick any item from the struggles that had been fought so far, since 1919, and also to tell every Britisher to quit India immediately ; Congress would not come any more to tell them what to do and what not to do, and they must take the initiative and do what seemed proper under the circumstances ; they should consider themselves free men and disobey all Government's orders ; they would have to pass on this message from house to house, as most newspapers would be suppressed ; it would be necessary for them to become living newspapers ; if they failed in their duty, it would bring nothing but disgrace on them.

Mr. Shanker Rao Deo, speaking at a public meeting held by the Bombay Congress on August 4th, said that in the coming struggle they would have to request workers in factories in which war material was being produced, and railway workers and others, to stop work until the British left India. The following is an extract from another speech in Bombay by Mr. Shanker Rao Deo.

> " Some students ask us whether they have to leave schools and colleges during the struggle. My answer is that they will have to do it, if ordered by Gandhiji. Students have always wanted revolution. Here is their opportunity. Revolution is coming to them, they should embrace it now without losing the opportunity ".

Finally, in yet another speech, he said that the movement would be like a mutiny based on non-violence and would resemble the fight of 1857.

The above examples, which could be greatly multiplied, serve to give considerable further insight into the type of movement which the Congress intended to launch. It must be remembered that the members of the Working Committee, and through them the other first rank Congress leaders, were in the closest contact with Mr. Gandhi during this period and the working of their minds, exhibited in their speeches, must be regarded as in some sort a projection of Mr. Gandhi's own thoughts. Reference has already been made to the emphasis laid on the importance of each individual acting for himself ; and the type of action which he was urged to take confirms and strengthens the previous impression of a fundamentally violent movement of an " all-in " nature. Thus in addition to the more orthodox *hartals*, and no-rent and no-tax campaigns, defiance of all forms of Government authority was enjoined upon the people ; they were urged to endeavour to undermine the loyalty of the police and the military, and of Government servants as a whole ; prisoners were recommended to foment disorder inside the jails ; and the stoppage of work in mills and factories, including war factories, was recommended, as also strikes on the railways. Finally, there is the significant reiteration of the theme that students are to play an all-important role and are to take over the leadership of the Congress, should the established Congress leaders be arrested. No one knowing the inflammable nature of their audience, and the intolerance that youth has always displayed of the Gandhian creed of non-violence, could possibly address such appeals to students as those quoted above by Mr. Shanker Rao Deo and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, without realising the violence which must inevitably result.

Enough has now been said to show the general nature of the movement contemplated by Mr. Gandhi and projected by his lieutenants on to the public screen. To what extent were more detailed instructions regarding the conduct of the movement in existence before the All-India Congress Committee meeting in Bombay and did they conform to the general outline of the movement which we have pictured above ?

The first example will again be chosen from " Harijan " ; in the issue of August 9th there appeared an article entitled " Ways of non-violent co-operation ". Though not phrased in terms of definite instructions for the coming campaign, it is quite clear that the article was meant to be read in that context. It describes detailed methods of paralysing Government, and of conducting strikes. A feature of the examples quoted is the racial theme underlying the struggle in each case. In the two subsequent issues of " Harijan ", edited by Mr. Gandhi's mouthpiece, K. G. Mashruwalla, detailed instructions for conducting various phases of the movement were given, to which a further reference is made later on.

Before the Bombay All-India Congress Committee meeting, instructions were circulated by the Congress organisations in Madras,

the United Provinces, Bihar and doubtless in other Provinces also. Space forbids their reproduction at length and the present purpose, which is to demonstrate the continuity of development from the general programme outlined by Mr. Gandhi to detailed instructions issued by local Congress organisations will be served by the examination of a single set of such instructions; for this purpose may be chosen those issued in Madras. A series of instructions definitely outlining the programme of mass disobedience was produced by the Andhra and Tamil Nad Congress Committees, with, it must be presumed, the approval of Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya. The full instructions are reproduced as Appendix IV; it will suffice here to mention that although the removal of rails was in these instructions specifically forbidden, this ban was significantly raised by a written amendment immediately the arrests of the leaders took place.

It is of the greatest interest to observe the logical development of Mr. Gandhi's general ideas, through the more specific suggestions made by Congress leaders, into the final detailed instructions such as the Andhra circular quoted above. Thus Mr. Gandhi's expressed preparedness, if necessary, to interfere with the working of the railways and the movement of troops develops finally into detailed proposals for the pulling of alarm chains, ticketless travel and the uprooting of the permanent way, for the cutting of telegraph and telephone wires, and for the picketting of troops. A similar process of development can be traced in the case of most of the other items in the programme.

The closest reflection, however, of Mr. Gandhi's ideas in any set of instructions is exhibited by what has come to be known as the "All-India Congress Committee 12-point programme". The correspondence between the various items of this programme and ideas already expressed by Mr. Gandhi is so close that it has been thought best to illustrate it in tabular form. The resulting table is reproduced as Appendix V.

Before proceeding to examine the actual form taken by the disturbances and the extent of Congress implication in them, it will be as well to summarise briefly the conclusions which we have so far reached.

After tracing briefly the development of Mr. Gandhi's "Quit-India" move, and after examining the reactions of the Congress Working Committee at Allahabad to Mr. Gandhi's draft resolution, it was suggested that the two principal motives by which he was actuated were firstly the desire to obtain freedom *now* for India and secondly the desire to avoid at all costs, even if necessary by capitulation to the Japanese, India's being made a battlefield between Britain and Japan. The next step was to point out that Mr. Gandhi had himself clearly admitted the ineffectiveness of non-violence to resist a Japanese invasion and that this was the reason advanced

by him for the alteration of his original scheme to allow of the retention of Allied troops to defend India ; that this willingness on his part to allow Allied troops to remain was only on the surface ; and that he had no intention of allowing them to operate effectively in resisting Japan. A comparison of the ostensible motives displayed in the two Congress resolutions of July 14th and August 8th with the basic motives underlying the move revealed that of the three main ostensible aims, only the first, the desire to free India from British rule, was genuine ; and that the remaining two, the contention that India would thus be enabled to play a more effective part in her own defence and that communal unity would be achieved, were wholly specious. An examination followed of the period between the Wardha and Bombay resolutions, with a view to ascertaining what type of struggle Gandhi was himself contemplating, should the British refuse to withdraw, and how Gandhi's views were interpreted to the masses by the Congress leaders.

A composite picture of the projected movement, as it emerges from Gandhi's writings or statements (Appendix V) and from the speeches of Congress leaders, developed in detail in the two sets of Congress instructions referred to, has clearly three main features. By its nature, the movement cannot be non-violent, nor did Mr. Gandhi expect it to be so ; his doubts on this subject were clearly voiced and, as clearly, his resolution to proceed with the movement despite any violence which might occur. Secondly, every man was exhorted to think and act for himself and to be his own leader. Finally students were urged to play a prominent part and to assume the leadership of the Congress should the recognised Congress leaders be arrested. On a more detailed view, the movement was to include all possible forms of mass demonstration and was to be marked by a defiance of Government authority ; individual items were to include interference with communications including the stopping and sabotaging of railways, interference with troop movements, the cutting of telegraph and telephone wires, incitement to strikes and the fomentation of no-tax and no-rent campaigns, and efforts to suborn the police, the military, and Government servants as a whole from their allegiance.

At Bombay on August 8th, the All-India Congress Committee ratified by an overwhelming majority a resolution sanctioning the starting of a mass struggle on the widest possible scale.

CHAPTER IV

The nature of the disturbances

On the morning of August 9th Mr. Gandhi and other Congress leaders were arrested in Bombay and simultaneously throughout the country a round-up of important Congressmen took place. The total number of arrests probably did not exceed a few hundreds.

In view of the efforts since made to attribute the disturbances to what is invariably called " Government repression ", it is important to note that this was probably the only occasion throughout the rebellion on which Government took the first step. Practically everything that followed was the result, and not the cause, of action taken by the other side. First reactions to the arrests were surprisingly mild. On August 9th there were disturbances in Bombay, Ahmedabad and Poona, but the rest of the country remained quiet. On August 10th disturbances occurred also in Delhi and a few towns in the United Provinces ; but still no serious repercussions were reported from elsewhere. It was from August 11th that the situation began to deteriorate rapidly. From then onwards, apart from the *hartals*, protest meetings and similar demonstrations that were to be expected, concerted outbreaks of mob violence, arson, murder and sabotage took place ; and in almost all cases these were directed either against communications of all kinds (including railways, posts and telegraphs) or against the Police. Moreover, these outbreaks started almost simultaneously in widely separated areas in the Provinces of Madras, Bombay and Bihar and also in the Central and United Provinces. Finally, the damage done was so extensive as to make it incredible that it could have been perpetrated on the spur of the moment without special implements and previous preparation ; and in many instances the manner in which it was done displayed a great deal of technical knowledge. Block instruments and control rooms in railway stations were singled out for destruction ; and the same technical skill appeared over and over again both in the selection of objects for attack—on the railways, in P. & T. offices and lines, and on electric power lines and installations—and also in the manner in which the damage was carried out. On the other hand—and this is a significant fact—industrial plant and machinery, even where it was fully employed on Government work, escaped any serious injury.

The position was at one time extremely serious in the whole of Bihar, except its most southern districts, and in the eastern part of the United Provinces. In these areas, the trouble soon spread from the big towns to the outlying areas ; thousands of rioters gave themselves up to an orgy of destruction of communications and certain classes of Government property ; whole districts, with their small defending forces of Government officials and police, were isolated for days on end ; a very large part of the E. I. and practically the whole of the B. & N. W. Railway systems were put out of action. For a considerable period, Bengal was almost completely cut off from Northern India, while communications with Madras were also interrupted by the damage done to the railways in the Guntur District and around Bezwada. It was, indeed, significant that the areas in which the disturbances took the most serious form were

also the areas of greatest strategic importance. Not only did they contain the centre of India's coal supplies, stoppage of which would have paralysed all transport, trade and industry, but also they lay immediately behind those parts of India which were most obviously exposed to enemy attack. They could not have been better selected if the object was to dislocate the communications of the defending forces on the east coast of India. On the other hand, Assam, Orissa, the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province remained free from serious trouble throughout the first week after the arrests, and there was comparatively little disorder in Sind.

In all the affected Provinces, students, invariably Hindu students, were in the forefront of the initial disorders. Everywhere the Congress creed of non-violence was ignored and mobs were recklessly incited to extremes of fury. It was from these mobs that the provocation came and most certainly not from the Government forces. They had to open fire, no doubt, but in many cases they did so in sheer self-defence. Apart from attacks on communications and various forms of transport such as trams, buses and motor vehicles, the violence of the mob was directed against certain classes of Government buildings, but many buildings escaped of the kind that one might have expected to be the target of indiscriminate popular anger. Municipal, and even private, property also suffered; and there was some looting. Speaking generally, however, what might be called the ordinary manifestations of mob violence were, by comparison and to begin with, unremarkable—there were no communal clashes—and the whole picture was much more one of calculated venom directed against selected objectives than of indignant people hitting out indiscriminately at the nearest object in blind resentment at the arrest of their leaders. Cases were, indeed, reported of mobs operating against railway lines over 40 miles from their homes; and, after all, these very same leaders, except Mr. Gandhi himself, had been arrested less than two years previously and there had been scarcely a ripple on the smooth waters of India's peace.

In the large towns where disorders first broke out, the situation was quickly brought under control, though not without the use of force in the face of violent activities by crowds of great numerical superiority. Subsequently, the disorders spread out from urban areas into the countryside, where, as already noticed, the marked similarity between incidents reported from widely separated places was a feature that attracted immediate attention. Muslims took practically no part in the disturbances; and labour, although in some cases unable to resist the temptation to suspend work and in other cases succumbing to open political pressure to do so, behaved, as a whole, with commendable restraint. There was no general

strike and work was soon resumed in mills and factories, with the one important exception of the Ahmedabad mills. These were subjected to special political pressure, backed by ample funds.

During the first two weeks following the arrests the disturbances continued with varying intensity mainly in the Central Provinces, Bihar and the United Provinces. By the third week, indications of a growing disapproval of mob violence among the general public began to appear and by the fourth week firm action had largely succeeded in suppressing mass lawlessness, except in Assam, where disorders began to appear similar in nature to those which had occurred earlier elsewhere. Indiscipline in jails was a part of the Congress programme and jail mutinies duly occurred in two Provinces. By the sixth week normal conditions had been restored throughout most of the country except in the eastern Provinces. With the close of the first phase of violent mass disorders three new tendencies became apparent. In the first place, signs appeared of an orthodox " non-violent " civil disobedience movement. Secondly, there was a development of serious crime as a direct result of the failure of rebellious groups to subvert constituted authority. The third and the most important development was the drift towards terrorism, which experienced observers had from the beginning anticipated, as soon as the realisation of the failure of the initial attempt at open rebellion became general. Cases of arson, sabotage and of murderous assault on public servants continued. Bombs made their appearance in Bombay, the Central Provinces and the United Provinces. These were at first crude and ineffective but technical improvement was rapid and by the twelfth week of the movement bombs and other explosive mechanisms, some of a highly dangerous type, were in use on a fairly extensive scale, particularly in the Bombay Province.

The attempts to develop a " non-violent " civil disobedience movement proved abortive and in spite of the temporary stimulus afforded by Mr. Gandhi's birthday there was no public enthusiasm or support for such a programme. At the end of November instructions for a no-tax, no-rent and no-grain campaign were issued from Bombay in the name of the All-India Congress Committee (Appendix VI). These instructions outlined a programme designed to paralyse Government by cutting off its sources of revenue, undermining confidence in the currency, creating apprehensions of food and cloth famines, and developing parallel Government in the form of independent village communities. By this time, however, the public were becoming more and more disgusted with Congress and its programmes, except in a few isolated areas, and the new campaign failed from the start to gather any momentum. The Congress organisation, by now entirely underground, had been further weakened by continued and successful police pressure. From the beginning of the struggle the Congress Socialist Party, a group

within the main party and an integral part of the Congress, had played an important part, with Bombay as its main centre. The escape from Hazaribagh Jail in early November of Jai Prakash Narain, the General Secretary of the Congress Socialist Party—the same man whose detected attempt to smuggle letters from Deoli in 1941 had caused such a sensation and who in those letters had poured scorn on the " farce of satyagraha " and had called for the organisation of a secret wing which would not pay even lip service to the creed of non-violence—further increased the influence of this left-wing section of Congress. With the arrest from time to time of certain of the other leaders, Jai Prakash Narain came to play an increasingly important part in the direction of a movement, which was by now indistinguishable from an underground revolutionary movement with all the trappings of terrorism, political dacoity, sabotage, unscrupulous opportunism and complete disregard of the safety and welfare of the general public.

Of the steady decline of the movement none was more aware than the underground leaders themselves. Programme followed programme and repeated attempts at re-organisation were made, in the hope of imparting new life to a dying cause. In early December a review and programme entitled " The Freedom Struggle Front " (Appendix VII) made its appearance. This was followed in January, 1943, by a new programme to commence from " Independence Day ", January 26th (Appendix VIII). A significant feature of this programme was the stress placed on "guerilla bands." Finally at the end of January, 1943, a circular entitled " To all Fighters for Freedom " (Appendix IX) was issued by Jai Prakash Narain. This revealing document admits the failure of the " Open Rebellion envisaged by our incomparable leader Mahatma Gandhi " and ascribes this failure to two reasons : (1) " There was no efficient organisation " and (2) " After the first phase of the rising was over there was no further programme placed before the people ". It admits that " there was some violence indeed under extreme provocation, but it was remarkably little as compared with the magnitude of the rising and the staggering manifestation of individual and collective non-violence ". But what this staggering display really meant is further explained :

> " I would first remind you of the difference between Gandhi-Ji's views on non-violence and those of the Working Committee and the A. I. C. C. Gandhi Ji is in no event prepared to depart from non-violence. With him it is a question of faith and life-principle. Not so with the Congress " ; and again, " I should add that I have no hesitation in admitting that non-violence of the brave, if practised on a sufficiently large scale, would make violence unnecessary, but where such non-violence is absent, I should not allow cowardice, clothed in Shastric subtleties, to block the development of this revolution and lead

to its failure ". The circular concludes with instructions for the preparation of a new and " last phase of the revolution " but makes it clear that " preparation does not mean that fighting entirely ceases for the moment. No, " Skirmishes ", " frontier activities ", " minor clashes ", " sniping ", " patrolling "—all this must go on. These are in themselves a preparation for the offensive ".

The violent and widespread nature of the disturbances which followed the arrests of August 9th, 1942, soon led to endeavours in certain quarters to suggest that this was no Congress movement but a spontaneous outburst on the part of the public at large precipitated by the action of Government against the popular leaders. The evidence of events themselves against this theory has already been sketched. A further point is that it presupposes that the whole populati on, or at least a very large majority, rose as one man all over the country in united and blind resentment, which does not correspond with the facts. The Muslim community, the Scheduled Castes as a whole and a very large proportion of organised labour stood entirely aloof, and large areas of the country were quite free from any form of disturbances. Although the news of the Bombay arrests was flashed all over India and simultaneous arrests were being made all over the country, on August 9th there were disturbances only in the Bombay area and the rest of the country remained quiet. Again, during the first week after the arrests those Provinces most remote from Bombay remained either entirely undisturbed or only slightly affected. (It is true there were some early student demonstrations in Bengal but these soon subsided and a considerable interval elapsed before more serious disorder and sabotage developed in that Province at a later date.) It is difficult to reconcile the theory of a spontaneous countrywide mass uprising with this gradual spread of disturbances. It is also difficult to reconcile this theory with the undoubted emergence after a comparatively short period in some of the areas worst affected of a desire on the part of the law-abiding population to co-operate with the authorities in preventing further disorders and damage to public property.

Since the theory of a spontaneous rising does not fit in with the actual post-arrest events, who was responsible ? Mr. Gandhi, unquestionably the leader of Congress notwithstanding the fact that he held no official position in the organisation, had been vigorously propagating his " Quit-India " move for weeks ; the Congress Working Committee had formally endorsed this policy ; the Congress Party was indubitably the largest and best organised political organisation in the country ; all the arrested leaders belonged to Congress ; it is hardly likely, in view of these facts, that any other political party would have been capable or desirous of organising these disorders. It is not enough, however,

to say that the Congress Party was the party most concerned and most likely to have caused the disturbances ; it is necessary to show how this was done.

There can be no doubt that the initial and concerted action of the Government of India and Provincial Governments struck the Congress organisation a very severe blow ; but it did not entirely put it out of action. On August 7th most of the important Congress leaders and a large number of leaders of Provincial and lesser importance were present in Bombay for the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee. Not all these leaders and minor leaders were arrested. After the arrests, instructions were at once prepared at Bombay and distributed all over India by post and messenger with remarkable efficiency. There were two sets of instructions. One consisted of the " 12-point programme " to which reference has already been made and a copy of which is reproduced at Appendix V. Manuscript copies of these instructions, together with a copy of a message (Appendix X) left by Mr. Gandhi at the time of his arrest, on the notepaper of the Bombay Congress office, were seized in a distant Province on August 11th. In another Province copies of the same instructions were recovered on August 12th from a Congress ex-Minister. The second set of " Instructions from the All-India Congress Committee " was divided into two parts, the first addressed to " Provincial Congress Committees and others " and the second to students. This second set of instructions is reproduced in Appendix XI. Un-arrested Provincial delegates to the All-India Congress Committee meeting set out for their Provinces, many of them carrying these instructions with them. Some of them were arrested *en route*, or when they arrived at their destinations ; but many others disappeared underground. Why did they do so ? Some of these have since been arrested ; others are known to be still underground organising the movement. Almost at once, floods of illegal pamphlets appeared in many parts of the country. These inflammatory pamphlets did a great deal of harm in the initial stages of the movement and played an important part in fomenting the trouble in rural areas, which followed the first outbursts in towns. Most of the early leaflets were issued in Mr. Gandhi's name. Many of the earlier productions were based on the Bombay instructions and there was thus a marked similarity at first among leaflets appearing in different parts of the country. There is overwhelming evidence that the instructions issued from Bombay played an important part in stirring up trouble. For example, secret instructions sent from Bombay to the Secretary of the Kerala Provincial Congress Committee on August 12th included the following :

> " Burn important offices, buildings, post offices, Government buildings etc., railways, pull down, issue notices, derail by putting stones, remove all roadside posts, remove lights

from the road sides. Close all shops, offices, etc., cut off communications. These are some of the things, going on daily here. Terrible work we are able to do here ".

They were translated into the local vernaculars and lost nothing in the translation. There can be little doubt that they provided the necessary stimulus to the preparation of more enterprising programmes by local Congress fire-brands. After the first outbreaks in the towns had been brought under control students and underground Congress workers spread out into the rural areas carrying with them the Bombay instructions, which at once began to produce their effect. Confirmation of this well-known fact is provided in the " All-India Congress Committee Instructions, No. 11 ", dated November 27th, 1942 (Appendix VI), which mention—

" (*a*) Those active Congress workers who have spread the fire of revolt in the countryside and have still remained free,

" (*b*) Those students who have left their colleges and schools and who have taken up the leadership of rural revolt ".

This explanation, that the widespread disturbances were precipitated in accordance with a deliberately preconceived plan by the arrival of Congress workers and instructions from Bombay, fits in with the undisputed facts. The theory of a spontaneous mass movement does not. But this by no means completes the evidence against the Congress Party. It is a curious coincidence, if coincidence it is, that in the four Provinces most affected by the disorders, namely, Bombay, the Central Provinces, Bihar and the United Provinces, the strongest Congress organisations existed and from 1937-1939 Congress Ministries with large majorities had been in office. The exception to this rule is even more significant. In Madras which also has a strong Congress organisation and where a Congress Ministry enjoyed a handsome majority, such disturbances as did occur were confined to comparatively small areas. But in this very Province the former Prime Minister and other important Provincial Congress leaders were strongly opposed to the " Quit-India " policy. In other Provinces, where non-Congress or Coalition Ministries have been formed and Congress has not enjoyed absolute power, the disturbances have been on a moderate scale (except in the Congress stronghold of Midnapore) as compared with the four Provinces named above. It has been argued that the undesirable prominence given, in many cases deliberately, by a section of the Press, to news items of incidents, disorders and outrages, was responsible for the country-wide similarity of means and methods. It is undisputable that much harm was done in this way, until the offenders were curbed by executive action; but a study of the recital of events and developments given above at once shows that the offending newspapers could not have alone been responsible for this similarity. The comparative immunity enjoyed by large

areas of the country where some, at least, of the offending newspapers were circulating, the sporadic nature of the disorders even in some of the badly affected Provinces and the late onset of disorders in certain Provinces served by the offending section of the Press, can, none of them, be reconciled with this theory. Furthermore, the Congress can hardly disclaim entire responsibility even for the mischief caused by the section of the Press in question, since it is a well-known fact that they have always counted upon this section of the Press as one of its most effective vehicles for propaganda; and in the United Provinces, at least it is known that previous arrangements had been made to use certain newspapers for publicity purposes and for the conveyance of party directions. It can fairly be claimed therefore that the only explanation that fits all the known and established facts is that the Congress produced and, to the best of its ability, directed the widespread disorders, amounting in some areas to nothing short of open rebellion, which followed the arrests on August 9th. If further confirmation is required it may be found in Bombay Congress Bulletin No. 132, dated 9th January 1943, in which a most revealing survey is made of the first five months of " Our Revolution " (Appendix XII).

CHAPTER V

The part played by known Congressmen

The preparations for a mass movement made by Mr. Gandhi and the other leaders of the Congress party have been described. The outline of a mass movement, of which the chief characteristic during its opening phase was its unbridled violence, has been given. The argument that the movement was a ' spontaneous outburst ' has been countered. The next question to be answered is the extent to which known members of the Congress party have been personally responsible for the disorders which have occurred.

On general grounds, it would be only natural to expect that the persons who before the arrests had been leaders of the local Congress committees in their legal activities should after the arrests continue to be leaders of the illegal activities. Consider the case of an ordinary Congress rural worker, who for years has been carrying out the party instructions—and the Congress party insists on implicit obedience, witness the expulsions of Subhas Bose, Mr. M. N. Roy and Mr. Rajagopalachari: in 1940-41, he will obediently have committed " Selected satyagraha " and have undergone a short term of imprisonment ; during the hot summer months of 1942 he will have read week by week the exciting message of the Mahatma in " Harijan " and he will have keyed himself up to the coming struggle, the " rebellion " ; in the opening days of August, he will have followed closely the proceedings of his masters in Bombay. Their arrests are for him a declaration of war by the Government.

Will he then retire from the field of battle? Known in his village as the representative of the Congress party, will he remain silent and inactive? The natural presumption is that the disorders that occurred after the arrests of the Congress leaders were organized by the people who for years had taken their orders from those arrested leaders. And there is abundant evidence to support this presumption. The instances now to be given are only a minute part of the evidence that could be produced—and that again is only a fraction of what is known, but which, because the movement is still alive, cannot safely be revealed.

The evidence falls, broadly speaking, into two classes—acts of violence committed by Congressmen, and incitements to violence written by Congressmen. The number of instances of *prominent* Congressmen taking open part in the disorders is naturally not large, as most of those who were known to be leaders of importance were arrested at the outset, and those who evaded arrest were at pains not to disclose their whereabouts. But though most of the Congressmen now to be mentioned are not persons known outside their Provinces, or even outside their districts, they are well-known in their own localities—and if the question whether Congressmen were responsible for the disturbances that followed the arrests of the Congress leaders were put to the ordinary public in those localities, they would have no doubt in answering it in the affirmative.

It is appropriate that the instances of Congress complicity should begin with one from Wardha, the headquarters of Mr. Gandhi. On August 11th the son of a prominent Congressman of Wardha, who had returned from attending the A. I. C. C. meeting at Bombay, read out in a public meeting the Congress programme which included school and railway strikes and the cutting of telegraph and telephone wires; the District Superintendent of Police succeeded in seizing the copy of the programme, but the police party was at once mobbed. On the same day a professor in the Commerce College at Wardha, who had resigned his post on the arrest of Mr. Gandhi, harangued a crowd, urging them to boycott the police and threatening traders that their shops would be looted if they sold any articles to the police; the deaths of two men at Wardha by police firing would be avenged, he said, and two men would be considered equivalent to two hundred constables. As a result of these speeches a post office and police station records were burnt and telegraph wires and poles were broken. On August 14th, Pandit R. S. Shukla, the former Congress Premier of the Central Provinces, told the police officer in whose custody he was that if they had been given ten days time instead of being arrested on their way back from Bombay, every police station in the district would have been burnt down. On August 15th the vice-president of the Mandla District Congress Committee asked a crowd of about 1,500

people to destroy Government records, railway lines and bridges. In the same district the previous day four members of the Congress party had instigated villagers to blow up a bridge ; when they failed in their attempt they looted some passing Government grain carts instead. Two prominent Congress workers (one being a woman) in Akola addressed lightning meetings of mill hands on August 13th and urged them to sabotage communications, march on banks, railways and post offices and burn them down.. As a result of these speeches the mill hands succeeded in destroying some telephone poles and wires before they were dispersed by the police. On August 14th a crowd of two or three thousand set fire to all the public buildings of Ramtek including the tahsil, the civil court, the police station, the post office and the railway station ; a train in the station was set on fire and the treasury looted of about three lakhs of rupees ; many known Congressmen took part in this affair.

All these incidents occurred in the Province of the apostle of non-violence within a week of his arrest. But evidence of mass attacks led by members of the Congress can be given from most parts of the country.

In Bihar, Mr. Jaglal Chaudhury, who had been a Congress Minister from 1937 to 1939, and who was one of Mr. Gandhi's trusted men, personally instigated the burning of a police station in the Saran district and during the attack urged the crowd to tie up the Sub-Inspector in a sack and throw him into the river. This same Minister made plans to resist troops with spears, lighted torches and boiling oil. He has been tried and sentenced to ten years imprisonment, the sentence being reviewed and upheld by a Judge of the Patna High Court. Mr. Jagat Narain Lal, who had been a Parliamentary Secretary in the same Ministry (and who moved the resolution at the A. I. C. C. at Allahabad on May 2nd, 1942 in opposition to Mr. Rajagopalachari's " Pakistan " resolution) was personally responsible for instigating a mob that committed arson and looting in the Patna area on August 12th. When he was arrested a month later, he was found in possession of literature advocating sabotage. He has been sentenced to three years imprisonment on the first charge and two years imprisonment on the second. In the same Province, an Australian missionary who has spent 25 years doing educational, medical and evangelical work was the victim of a mob of Congress hooligans, who made a determined attempt on his life. When his bungalow was first mobbed, he tried to reason with the leaders, saying that if he had done them or the Congress any harm, he was willing to pay the penalty ; but they paid no attention and he was extremely fortunate to escape with his life.

An account of the movement in the backward hill district of Koraput in Orissa is interesting. The Congress had built up an organisation and acquired a hold over these backward tribes by making attractive promises that when *Swaraj* came there would be no

rents and taxes and no forest laws ; they also played on their superstition, and in some areas Mr. Gandhi was deified and temple ritual took place at the Congress office. On receiving instructions from the District Congress Committee, the subordinate workers rapidly passed the word round that the British Raj was no more and that police stations should be attacked. Violent disorders took place for a few days, but the local authorities got the situation in hand and, as the movement had been based entirely on false promises, its collapse was as rapid as its rise. There was no disturbance among the hill-tribes of a neighbouring sub-division simply because the Congress had not yet built up an organisation there. The most serious incident in this Province occurred at a place called Eram in Balasore district. A body of armed police who had gone to make some arrests there found themselves confronted by a mob of four or five thousand persons, who had been mobilised by the sounding of conch-shells from village to village as the police party approached. They disobeyed an order to disperse, and the police had to open fire, ultimately causing 25 or 26 deaths and about 50 injuries. A joint enquiry was made by the Revenue Commissioner and the Inspector-General of Police, who found that the extent of the firing was fully justified. Their report showed that the disturbance was in no sense spontaneous but was incited among ignorant villagers by the deliberate efforts of mischievous politicians playing on their economic difficulties. The moving spirit in this affair was a lieutenant of Sri Jagannath Das, a Congress M. L. A.

A typical instance of mass attacks on Government buildings led by Congressmen occurred at a tahsil in Ballia district in the east of the United Provinces (which was one of the main storm centres in the opening phase). At this tahsil, there was a well-constructed office with a strong record room and good quarters. A mob, led by a local Congressman, who installed himself as "Swaraj Tahsildar" for a short period, broke down the perimeter wall, destroyed every record in the office, broke into the treasury, and looted Rs. 15,000. At the headquarters of this district, a mob led by prominent local Congressmen sacked the residences of four Government officers and two non-official gentlemen who had given some support to Government ; one of the latter was a doctor the entire contents of whose dispensary was wantonly destroyed. In the neighbouring district of Azamgarh, the District Magistrate was besieged in an outlying police-station by a mob of about five thousand men and a pitched battle lasting two hours took place before the mob was driven off. Before the battle started, the leaders explained that as Swaraj had been attained they wanted to hoist the Congress flag on the police station. In the Pilibhit district in the United Provinces an excited crowd directed by three locally well-known Congressmen, including a secretary of the District Congress Committee, murdered a constable, for no other reason than that he was a constable. In the Bijnor district a mass attack on the police station was led by a

" four-anna " Congressman mounted on horseback. In another part of the same district, the secretary of the local Tahsil Congress Committee organised and led a mass attack on a railway station. In another attack on a railway station in Barabanki district the local Congress " dictator " and nine other members of the District Congress Committee were prominent among the attackers. In the Muttra district, thirteen men, all of whom were members of the Congress party, were concerned in the derailing of a goods train. In Allahabad city, the president of a Ward Congress Committee was involved in an attack on a police outpost, the looting of cash and the cutting of telephone wires on August 12th. In the same district, 17 persons, all of them four-anna members of Congress, were convicted of looting a post office and burning a dak bungalow.

In Madras, the campaign of sabotage of communications started with the violent attack on Tenali railway station in Guntur district on August 12th; the previous day two persons who had just returned from the A. I. C. C. meeting at Bombay had held a public meeting at Tenali, at which a most provocative description of the events at Bombay had been given.

C. Krishnan Nair, an important rural Congress worker of Delhi and a member of the Narela Gandhi Ashram, who went underground at the time of the August arrests, has been sentenced to two years imprisonment for setting fire to a railway station on November 12th.

A more recent case of particular interest comes from Midnapore district in Bengal. On November 19th, seven members of a Thana Congress Working Committee sent a resolution to the Thana Officer in the following terms :—

> *"The Keshpur Thana Congress Committee started their movement in the Thana area according to the direction of the A.I.C.C. and their working plans.* The residents of the villages of this police station are very much terror-stricken at the action taken to quell the movement ..... in order to remove the anxieties of the countrymen, and also for their safeguards, this Committee resolve that they should surrender themselves with their rifles, guns and cartridges snatched by the Congress mob. This Committee have joint liability for the snatching and concealment of the guns ".

Here is an example of open admission of Congress responsibility.

So far, the instances given have been mainly of mass attacks. Congressmen have been equally responsible for individual acts of arson, sabotage and murder. In the United Provinces, the Secretary of the Naini Tal District Congress Committee confessed to damaging telegraph communications on several occasions and also to attempting to burn down a forest rest-house. In the West Godavari district of Madras, the police arrested on the night of Christmas Eve a number

of persons who were preparing to remove bolts from railway lines; some big wrenches and drilling machines and two packets of gunpowder were recovered from them, and it appeared that they were going to try to blow up a railway bridge; several of the arrested persons were known Congressmen. Among the members of a gang arrested at Nagpur (Central Provinces) in February, with whom were found five revolvers and a quantity of ammunition and explosives, was an ex-member of the Women's Mahila Ashram at Wardha. Another gang arrested at Wardha at the same time and found to be responsible for two cash robberies and five cases of sabotage included members of Vinoba Bhave's ashram near Wardha.

In Bombay on January 14th, 1943, the Police searched a flat and found a revolver, time-bombs, stocks of high explosives and all the paraphernalia needed for lethal bombs. One of the persons arrested on the spot was a well-known leader of the Maharashtra Provincial Congress Committee who was also President of the All-India Spinners Association. Again in the same Province there were systematic attacks by a gang of saboteurs on electric pylons and installations, and robberies were committed by the gang to obtain arms. The head of this gang, who has since been killed in an encounter with the police, was a well-known Congressman who held office in that organisation as the Secretary of a local Congress Committee. In Broach district an armed gang of about 75 persons headed by two Congress leaders raided a Police Station and took away government arms and cash. The Office Orderly who was present and tried to escape was fired at and wounded. Another mob headed by the same Congress leaders raided a Police post in Wagra Taluka, killed the sentry, overpowered and beat the other policemen in the outpost and looted the lines.

Many of the mob cases arising out of the rebellion are still *sub-judice*, but in those that have been concluded particular weight must be attached to the observations of the learned Judges. One such case from Bihar and two from the Central Provinces may be considered. The case from Bihar concerns an attack on the police-station of Minapur in Muzzaffarpur district on August 16th by an armed mob of four or five thousand men. They looted and burnt the police-station, assaulted the officers and constables and burnt the Sub-Inspector alive. There is no doubt whatever that these acts were perpetrated in the name of the Congress. Leading members of the mob were shouting Congress slogans and carrying Congress flags. The main accused, who was responsible for holding the Inspector down in the fire (and who has been sentenced to death) was seen hoisting a Congress flag on the roof of the thana; this was an exhibit in the case. At the conclusion of the judgment,

in discussing the interpretation of section 121 of the Indian Penal Code (waging war against the King-Emperor) the Judge observed:

> " It is a matter of common knowledge that the object of the recent disturbances and risings throughout the country was to paralyse the administration and to compel the Government to submit to the demands of the Indian National Congress ".

Simultaneously the notorious cases of Ashti and Chimur had occurred in the Central Provinces. The following are extracts from the judgment in the Ashti case relevant to the question of the responsibility of the Congress for the murders :—

> " At about 11 A.M. a mob consisting of about 250 men came right up to the gate of the Station House shouting the usual Congress slogans. The Sub-Inspector and Head Constable met them at the gate, and the former tried to argue with them in vain. He was even prepared to shout with them the Congress slogans and to permit them to hoist the Congress flag on the Station House building, but the leaders of the mob wanted him to hand over the Station House records for destruction .....When he declared that he would protect Government property with his life, the leaders ordered the mob to get to their work.... At this stage, finding the mob uncontrollable, two constables opened fire knocking down about half a dozen men out of whom five succumbed to their injuries. The firing had the desired result and the mob fled in disorder ".

It is not necessary to pursue this story of barbarism to the end by describing the subsequent murder of the Sub-Inspector and four constables.

The disorders at Chimur resulted in the murders of a Sub-Divisional Magistrate and a Naib Tahsildar in a dak bungalow, and the murders of a Circle Inspector of Police and a constable shortly after. The following are extracts from the judgment of the High Court Judge in his review of the case relating to the first pair of murders :—

> " The main facts in the case are not disputed and have been set out at length in the judgment of the Special Judge. I will merely summarise them briefly: Chimur is a town of about 6,000 inhabitants, about 30 miles from Warora in the Chanda district with which it is connected by road. From the 11th August onwards there were Congress meetings there at which inflammatory speeches were made and the people were urged to rise against the Government and to obey only Congress orders.....The moral responsibility for such an appalling crime, of a sort that has seldom disgraced this province, rests mainly upon the leaders, mostly not before me, who worked the mob up to the pitch of brutality and fury required to batter defenceless and innocent men to death. I have detected few

signs of any genuine remorse amongst the residents of Chimur, and the crime has hardly received the condemnation there or elsewhere that one might have expected ".

In the second case the Circle Inspector at the head of a small body of police (including a Sub-Inspector) was pursued along a road by a frenzied mob. After the pursuit had gone on for some time, the Sub-Inspector surrendered. The words he used to denote his surrender (as a result of which his life was spared) are significant. To quote the description of the Special Judge:

" At this stage the Sub-Inspector decided the position was hopeless and turning to the crowd he threw off his cap, and probably part of his uniform at the same time, and cried 'Mahatma Gandhi ki jai' ".

The mob, not appeased by this recognition of their ultimate leader, went on to butcher the Circle Inspector. The earlier actions of the Sub-Inspector, described in another passage, also throw light on the question of Congress responsibility:—

" It is apparent that the Sub-Inspector was not from the beginning inclined to use force and had been negotiating with the Congress leaders in the town. He had allowed a big procession to come in front of his station house on the 15th morning and done nothing about it; he had made no attempt to arrest leaders, though his subordinate officers in his absence had made such attempts. By this attitude he had effectively vacated police authority and the town was under control of the Congress. They were perfectly satisfied with that state of affairs and the subsequent happenings on the 16th are the expression of the resentment of the Congress leaders ".

Passing now from crimes of violence in which Congressmen took part to incitements to crime written and distributed in the name of the Congress, it will again be appropriate to start with an instance from the Central Provinces—a pamphlet entitled " Six Commandments of Gandhi Baba ". This and similar productions were without doubt accepted by the rank and file of local Congressmen as genuine accounts of Mr. Gandhi's last message. The leaflet, the text of which is contained in Appendix XIII, is divided into two parts. The first part " (Bapu's message to the Nation at the time of going to jail) " contains six commandments in the style that might be expected from Mr. Gandhi. " Regard yourself as independent ", " We are free to do anything so long as we remain within the limits of non-violence ", " Do or Die ", etc. But the second part describes how this message can be put into execution and this includes instructions to compel the closure of factories, mills, colleges, schools, and bazaars until independence is achieved; to destroy the administration of Government; to destroy tram, motor and railway services; to destroy telephone and telegraph wires; to advise the police not to obey Government orders; and

to violate all prohibitory orders of Government. Similar doctrines were preached in issues of the " Harijan " published soon after the arrests. The editors of the various editions of " Harijan " would hardly have dared to depart radically from the ideas of Mr. Gandhi ; yet, the cutting of telegraph wires, the uprooting of railway tracks, the destruction of bridges and burning of petrol tanks are described as permissible within the bounds of non-violence. (The text of this matter also is reproduced in Appendix XIV.)

An equally wide definition of " non-violence " is contained in an interesting letter recovered from Kesho Deo Malaviya, the Congress Socialist leader who acted as Provincial " dictator " in the United Provinces during the opening phase of the movement until he was arrested on September 29th. " We shall never " he wrote, " forsake our principle of non-violence. It is not violence to get the vital communications suspended or to prevent the functioning of railway stations, tahsils and police stations, or take possession of property found there. You have also to make every effort to prevent the running of railways. *As far as possible,* you must ensure that no life is lost in this connection. *Distribute handbills in villages announcing that no one should travel by train after October 15th or else his life will be in danger* ". Other passages in this letter are also of interest. " Dear Comrades ", he began, "our initial struggle has completed two months. *We can pride ourselves on the happenings of the past two months ..... Generally speaking, Congress workers have given a good account of themselves.* They have fought bravely against the enemy and are still fighting heroically. I appeal to them to strain every nerve in keeping the Congress flag flying in their respective circles ". After Malaviya's arrest, he was succeeded by Acharya Jugal Kishore, who was a Parliamentary Secretary in the time of the Congress Ministry. The following are extracts from cyclostyled instructions sent by him " to the dictators of all the districts and towns and chief workers ". " Dear Sir, *On receipt of instructions from the All-India Congress Committee* and after consulting the chief workers of the Province who are still out of jail, I am forwarding to you the scheme which has been chalked out to push vigorously this great revolution for the independence of India by organizing ourselves ". Detailed instructions for the organisation of disorders then follow. The position is summarized in the following passage :—

> " At this juncture two kinds of programmes are going on in the country : (i) within the scope of the non-violent principle to dislocate the means of communications and transport so as to smash Government machinery in such a way as to render it impossible for the improper use of them by these oppressors and to destroy all emblems of the Government, and, (ii) propaganda, demonstrations and other work such as non-payment of revenue and organization. The first part is to

be done by selected persons and the work they can do should be selected by them. This requires experienced hands and technicians and only such men should be selected for this work as can perform it secretly ".

The part played in the organization of the movement by Jai Prakash Narayan since his escape from Hazaribagh jail has already been mentioned. A few passages from a recent appeal issued by him to the student world are of interest :—

" The first phase of our revolution was a great success inasmuch as it succeeded in uprooting the British power from large tracts of the country. Its further development was checked not because the superior physical force of the enemy blocked its way, but because of our lack of adequate organization and complete conscious programme of revolution. This relates to the second point, namely that present task is clearly to prepare, organize and discipline our forces for the second and last major offensive. We have not much time before us and therefore we must not lose a moment. In every field of preparation we need your help. We have to work in the villages and industrial centres, on the railways and in the mines, in the army and the services ; we have to publish and distribute our literature, maintain our contacts and communications ; we have to raise and to train a militia and bands of technical workers for sabotage and similar activities ; and we have to continue our present clashes and skirmishes with the enemy. A network of organization, working under a co-ordinated and central command is being built up .....I have faith that when the time for the next offensive comes, you will be at the front of the battle again as you were in August. But in order that the offensive might this time completely rout the enemy, it is essential that you take up seriously and immediately, the work of preparation and organization ".

A specimen of mischief-making by students is given in a leaflet circulated by a students' organization in Gujarat, making arrangements for a no-revenue campaign. (It may be mentioned that these arrangements were wholly unsuccessful).

" This time the no-tax movement differs from the old one in one important point. In the old campaign, after refusing to pay land-revenue, we allowed the Government to attach our property, cattle, etc. This meant that we accepted the legality of the Government at that time, and only non-cooperated with it for certain reasons. This time, we do not consider the present Government as the legal Government of the country and consequently we have raised the banner of open rebellion against it and are carrying on a guerilla warfare. This time, after refusing to give land-revenue, the peasants have to resist with their full strength the attachment of their property ".

It is impossible to describe even a small proportion of the manifold leaflets which are being churned out by presses and duplicators in many parts of the country. (The number has greatly diminished owing to effective action by the police. In Madras, for example, two secret production centres in Tamilnad, one in Andhra and one in Malabar, have been located; known Congressmen were found to be in charge of all these centres.) A selection of harmful pamphlets put out in the earliest phase of the rebellion is reproduced in Appendix XV. A few recent instances may be given. An issue of the "Bombay Congress Bulletin" of November 23rd contained an elaborate programme of revolutionary activity which included two new items, urging the withdrawal of all post office savings bank accounts and attacks on docks where British troops were loading and unloading. Leaflets in circulation in Bengal have been notable for their racial animosity: one declared that India was "fighting against the brutal British power and not against Japan", and another advocated attacks on British troops and police and the boycotting of Europeans. Finally, Congress underground workers have made the most of the recent difficulties of the economic situation; a particularly mischievous leaflet emanating from Delhi contains the following passage:—

> "Our city population should learn to come out of the streets every day indignant and raging at the British incompetence and bungling and deceit that has resulted in internal food scarcity and external defencelessness. Strikes for freedom and wage increase should become a permanent feature of our industrial life..... Food riots, strikes and agitation among the military and police, all on a mass scale, should culminate in the supreme moment when the usurpers, Linlithgow and Wavell, are prisoners and the Indian Republic is proclaimed".

CHAPTER VI

Conclusion

At the risk of some repetition it is necessary to emphasize again the fact that Mr. Gandhi knew that any mass movement started in India would be a violent movement. He knew this from his bitter experience of the movements he had led ten and twenty years before. In spite of this knowledge, he was prepared to take the risk of outbreaks of rioting and disorder—a risk which in his writings he tried to minimize but in his mind he must have estimated correctly. Consider again this series of statements:—

> (1) "Leave India to God. If that is too much, then leave her to anarchy". (Harijan, May 24th).
>
> (2) "That anarchy may lead to internecine warfare for a time or to unrestrained dacoities". (Harijan, May 24th).

(3) " This ordered, disciplined anarchy should go, and if there is complete lawlessness in India as a result I would risk it ". (Harijan, May 24th).

(4) " I waited and waited until the country should develop the non-violent strength necessary to throw off the foreign yoke. But my attitude has now undergone a change. I feel that I cannot afford to wait.....The people have not my Ahimsa, but mine should help them. I am sure there is ordered anarchy around and about us. I am sure that the anarchy that may result because of the British withdrawal or their refusal to listen to us and our decision to defy their authority will in no way be worse than the present anarchy. After all those who are unarmed cannot produce a frightful amount of violence or anarchy, and I have a faith that out of that anarchy may arise pure non-violence ". (Harijan, June 7th).

(5) " I don't want rioting as a direct result. If in spite of all precautions rioting does take place, it cannot be helped ". (Harijan, July 19th).

Once it is realised, as has been clearly demonstrated, that Mr. Gandhi, the fountain-head of non-violence, knew perfectly well that the Indian masses were incapable of non-violence, a new light is shed on the events of the six months which have elapsed since the August arrests. It follows that every reference to non-violence, in the forecasts of the forms the movement would take made by Mr. Gandhi and his Congress disciples and in the post-arrest programmes and instructions, is nothing more than a pious hope, or at best a mild warning, which was known to have no practical value. Since such references have been shown to be valueless, they may be ignored and the pre-arrest forecasts and post-arrest instructions may be examined shorn of their " non-violence " mask. Omitting these valueless references to non-violence, Mr. Gandhi wrote in " Harijan " of 19th July 1942, " It would be a mass movement..... It will include all that a mass movement can include "; and again in " Harijan " of 26th July 1942, " The programme covers every activity included in a mass movement.....I would not hesitate to go to the extremist limit, if I find that no impression is produced over the British Government or the Allied Powers.....(It will be) my biggest movement...(With the arrests of leaders) it should gain strength, if it has any vitality ". The Working Committee of Congress in the resolution passed at Bombay on August 4th and endorsed by the All-India Congress Committee on August 8th stated : " The Committee resolves therefore to sanction for the vindication of India's inalienable right to freedom and independence, the starting of a mass struggle on the widest possible scale so that the country might utilise all the strength it has gathered during the last 22 years ". Again, omitting the lip-service to " non-violence ", the 12-point programme called for " non-cooperation on the widest

possible scale" in a "titanic clash between the people and the alien Government," a struggle in which "Victory or death" is to be the motto of every son and daughter of India, a struggle which would "include all activities that a mass struggle can include," a struggle in which "whatever helps in the attainment of that objective" (of ending foreign rule) "is permissible and legitimate", and in which "people in the Provinces have to devise and adopt all ways of paralysing the administration". As a description of what actually occurred these instructions present a very accurate picture bearing in mind the limitations imposed by the prompt and firm action taken by the Central and Provincial Governments and the lack of sympathy for the Congress programme in large sections of the population.

In the face of all this evidence—the evidence of the atmosphere produced by Mr. Gandhi's writings in the "Harijan", the evidence of the speeches of the members of the Working Committee before and at Bombay, the evidence of the programmes involving violent action distributed at the time of the arrests, the evidence of the form of the uprising, the evidence of known Congressmen personally proved guilty of violent action, the evidence of the pamphlets broadcast in the name of the Congress—only one answer can be given to the question as to who must bear the responsibility for the mass uprisings and individual crimes which have disgraced and are still disgracing the fair name of India. That answer is—the Indian National Congress, under the leadership of Mr. Gandhi.

APPENDIX I

Record of the Allahabad Meeting of the Congress Working Committee

Gandhiji was not present at this meeting (at Allahabad from April 27 to May 1) of the Working Committee. But he sent from Wardha a draft resolution for the consideration of the Committee. Miraben who brought the draft explained how Gandhiji's mind was working along the lines sketched in it. The Committee gave earnest and careful consideration to the draft (Appendix A).

The draft contained the following points :—(*i*) A demand to the British Government to clear out, (*ii*) India is a zone of war as a result of British imperialism, (*iii*) No foreign assistance needed for the freedom of this country, (*iv*) India has no quarrel with any country, (*v*) If Japan invaded India it shall meet with non-violent resistance, (*vi*) Form of non-co-operation laid down, (*vii*) Foreign soldiers a grave menace to Indian freedom.

Jawaharlalji : Gandhiji's draft is an approach which needs careful consideration. Independence means, among other things, the withdrawal of British troops. It is proper ; but has it any meaning, our demanding withdrawal ? Nor can they reasonably do it even if they recognize independence. Withdrawal of troops and the whole apparatus of civil administration will create a vacuum which cannot be filled up immediately.

If we said to Japan that her fight was with British imperialism and not us she would say, " We are glad the British army is withdrawn ; we recognize your independence. But we want certain facilities now. We shall defend you against aggression. We want aerodromes, freedom to pass our troops through your country. This is necessary in self-defence." They might seize strategic points and proceed to Iraq, etc. The masses won't be touched if only the strategic points are captured. Japan is an imperialist country. Conquest of India is in their plan. If Bapu's approach is accepted we become passive partners of the Axis Powers. This approach is contrary to the Congress policy for the last two years and a half. The Allied countries will have a feeling that we are their enemies.

Kripalaniji intervening said that the draft was a declaration of their stand. England and America might put what interpretation they liked but they (the Congress) had no designs against them.

Maulana Saheb : What is our position ? Shall we tell the British Government to go and allow the Japanese and Germans to come or do we want the British Government to stay and stem the new aggression ?

Pantji : I want the right of self-government and we shall exercise it as we like. If the British troops and the rest must withdraw let them do so by all means and we shall shift for ourselves.

Jawaharlalji : A draft like this weakens their (the British Government's) position. They will treat India as an enemy country and reduce it to dust and ashes. They will do here what they did in Rangoon.

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel : The draft says to the British, "You have proved your utter incompetence. You cannot defend India. We cannot defend it either because you won't let us do. But if you withdraw there is a chance for us."

Asaf Ali : The draft asks us to accept non-violence for all time.

Achyut Patwardhan : It was put to Gandhiji. He said that the Congress can take the stand that under existing circumstances non-violence was the best policy.

Jawaharlal Nehru : The whole background of the draft is one which will inevitably make the world think that we are passively lining up with the Axis Powers. The British are asked to withdraw. After the withdrawal we are to negotiate with

Japan and possibly come to some terms with her. These terms may include a large measure of civil control by us, a certain measure of military control by them, passage of armies through India, etc.

Kripalaniji : Why should it mean passage of armies through India, etc. Just as we call upon the British and the Americans to withdraw their armies so also we ask others to keep out of our frontiers. If they do not, we fight.

Jawaharlal Nehru : Whether you will like it or not, the exigencies of the war situation will compel them to make India a battle ground. In sheer self-defence they cannot afford to keep out. They will walk through the country. You can't stop it by non-violent non-co-operation. Most of the population will not be affected by the march. Individuals may resist in a symbolic way. The Japanese armies will go to Iraq, Persia, etc., throttle China and make the Russian situation more difficult.

The British will refuse our demand for military reasons apart from others. They cannot allow India to be used by Japan against them. Our reaction in the event of refusal will be a passive theoretical lining up with the Axis Powers. Japan may have an excuse for attack. We get involved in a hopeless logical quandary. We get hostility from every other element outside the Axis Powers. Japan will occupy strategic points. We get no chance to offer mass civil disobedience. Our policy of sympathy with one group is completely changed.

So far as the main action is concerned there is no difficulty about Bapu's draft. But the whole thought and background of the draft is one of favouring Japan. It may not be conscious. Three factors influence our decisions in the present emergency : (*i*) Indian freedom, (*ii*) sympathy for certain larger causes, (*iii*) probable outcome of the war ; who is going to win ? It is Gandhiji's feeling that Japan and Germany will win. This feeling unconsciously governs his decision. The approach in the draft is different from mine.

Achyut Patwardhan : I agree with Jawaharlalji's background but there are certain difficulties. The British Government is behaving in a suicidal manner. If we do not take decisions, Jawaharlalji's attitude will lead to abject and unconditional co-operation with British machinery which must collapse. If the battle of India is to be fought by Wavell, we shall do ourselves discredit if we attach ourselves to him. We talk of allying ourselves with the Allied nations. I doubt if America is a progressive force. The existence of the American army in India is not a fact which improves our situation. I was opposed to the Poona offer but not to talks with Cripps. Jawaharlalji's statement after the negotiation broke down distressed me. The trend of thought it disclosed lands us in a position which obliges us to offer unconditional co-operation to Britain. Our co-operation with Britain is an invitation to Japan.

Rajendra Babu : We cannot produce the proper atmosphere unless we adopt Bapu's draft. The Government has closed the door on armed resistance. We have only unarmed resistance to offer. We have therefore to strengthen Bapu's hands.

Govind Ballabh Pant : There is no difference of opinion so far as non-violence is concerned. There may be two opinions as to its effectiveness. Non-violent non-co-operation is not meant to be a demonstration. It is designed to prevent invasion or resist occupation, what will be our attitude to armed resistance. Shall we assist it or at least do nothing to hamper it ?

Jawaharlal Nehru : It (Babu Rajendra Prasad's amendment) retains the approach in Bapu's original draft. The approach is a variation from the attitude we have taken up about the Allies. At least I have committed myself to that sympathy 100 per cent. It would be dishonourable for me to resign from that position. There is no reason why that choice should arise. But it has arisen somewhat in this approach. The portion of the draft about resistance has some substance. The

portion about minorities, Princes are unrealistic. We go on thinking in terms of what was and not what is, and that is a dangerous thing in a rapidly changing situation. There is no difference among us about (*i*) our reactions to Government and (*ii*) our total inability to co-operate with the Government. Our programme of self-sufficiency and self-protection helps the Government but that cannot be helped. (*iii*) We do not embarrass the British war effort because that in itself would mean aid to the invader. We agree on these points but we have different ways of getting at them. It is true that since my approach is different my emphasis too would be different.

Pantji : One test to apply to the draft is whether it is consistent with our previous resolutions. The language about the condemnation of Cripps' proposal is highly exaggerated. If the proposals were so bad why did we spend so much time over them. My attitude to-day is : We must do our utmost to defend the country and swallow many things. If I can't co-operate with the British it is because it is not consistent with our dignity. But the approach in the draft makes every soldier I see my enemy.

Asaf Ali : The draft will not make any effective appeal to the Axis Powers. Telling the British to withdraw will do nobody any good.

Bhulabhai Desai : No resolution is called for. We passed at Wardha one which expressed our definite position. The resolution is made in an unreal way. It is inconsistent with our previous stand. We have said that if offered an opportunity we shall side with the Allies.

Rajaji : I do not think the changed draft is different from the original. We appeal to Britain and Japan. The appeal to Britain will fail but certain tangible results will follow. The entire policy of the Congress will be reinterpreted and the new interpretation will go terribly against us. Japan will say " excellent."

I do not agree that if Britain goes away India will have some scope for organizing itself even if Japan should make some headway. Japan will fill the vacuum created by the British withdrawal. Our reaction to evils of Britain should not make us lose our sense of perspective. It is no use getting upset on small matters. Do not run into the arms of Japan, which is what the resolution comes to.

Dr. Pattabhi : It is a comprehensive and appropriate draft. A time has come when we must realize ourselves. After the rejection of Cripps' proposals we must reconsider our attitude and restate our position. We have varied our position from time to time during the time the war has been on. Poona was a variation from the old position. Bombay was a variation from Poona. Bombay was followed by C.D. and C.D. by Cripps.

Sarojini Naidu : The changed draft is much better than the original. There is however a great deal of unnecessary matter in the resolution. The appeal is a rhetorical gesture. It is however good as an expression of our extreme disgust and dislike and hatred of the British Government. The appeal to Japan is a useless gesture. India is a part of the map they have drawn. I agree with the non-violent non-co-operation part of the resolution. It can be recast keeping the substance of the original. The draft is a narrowing of sympathies not consistent with the position we have taken up. I do not like foreign soldiers. The portion dealing with them is good.

Biswanath Das : I see two conflicting views in the Committee. This division of opinion is fatal at this juncture. I generally agree with the draft. The Cripps' proposals if accepted would have kept us in permanent bondage. The appeal to Britain to withdraw is very proper. We can tell them that neither will they defend us nor allow us to defend ourselves.

The protest against the introduction of American soldiers in the country is also proper. They have brought in troops from the Dominions and other foreign nations. This is highly objectionable and dangerous.

Bardoloi : One portion of the draft is operative and another ideological. If we lay emphasis on the operative portion the differences will be greatly minimized. For joint action I should be prepared to delete the portion which deals with the ideological background. We are already in the danger zone. This is no time for ideological discussion. Let us concentrate on the present action which cannot be anything other than non-violent non-co-operation.

Satyamurti : The changed draft is an improvement. I do not agree with the objection to the entry of foreign soldiers. India may defend herself even with the aid of foreign soldiers. I think we must make an approach to the Muslim League.

Achyut Patwardhan : I am in general agreement with the draft. The open door policy is at an end. The resolution emphasizes a factor which has been emphasized by every intelligent man, *i.e.*, the war is lost unless the people are in it. The war is an imperialist war. Our policy can be that we take no sides. The world is in the grip of fear complex. I would consider the position if the Allies could defeat the Axis. But I see clearly that Britain is going towards the deep. We want to create neutrality. Do not look to Japan or Britain.

Jairamdasji : The criticism that the draft is pro-Japanese is wrong. Opposition to the Japanese invasion is there in the draft.

The mention of foreign armies in the draft is very appropriate. The Indian History bears ample testimony of the highly undesirable consequences which foreign armies have led to. The draft creates an atmosphere of neutrality. The attempt is worth making.

Sardar Sahib : I see that there are two distinct opinions in the Committee. We have ever since the outbreak of war tried to pull together. But it may not be possible on this occasion. Gandhiji has taken a definite stand. If his background is unsuitable to some members of the Committee there is the other background which is unsuitable to us. The first four or five paragraphs of the draft is a reply to the Cripps mission. Cripps is a clever fellow. He has gone about saying that his mission has not been a failure. The draft is a perfect reply to his propaganda.

I am not in favour of making any approach to Jinnah. We have made repeated attempts and courted many insults. The Congress to-day is reeling under two blows, one Cripps and the other Rajaji's resolutions which have done us enormous harm. I have placed myself in the hands of Gandhiji. I feel that he is instinctively right, the lead he gives in all critical situations. In Bombay, at the time of the A.-I. C. C. meeting there was a difference in approach but the door to negotiations was closed. In Bardoli it was made clear that the door was still open and our sympathies were with Allies. It is time the door is finally closed after the repeated insults heaped upon us. I agree with the draft before us. If there is any pro-Fascist hint in the draft let it be removed.

Acharya Narendra Deo : I do not agree with the view that the war is one and indivisible. The aims of Russia and China are not identical with those of Britain and America. If it is one we should join the war and side with Britain. Our position has not been that we want power because without it we cannot kindle the national spirit. Our position has been that if the war was a people's war and there was proof of it in action we are willing to throw in our weight on the side of democracies.

It is necessary to counteract the mischievous propaganda of Cripps. Cripps has been saying that internal differences have prevented a settlement. Rajaji has strengthened his hands. Japanese threat has also influenced our attitude to Britain. It has led us to even modify Poona. We have to make it clear that Japanese threat has not unnerved us. We can tell the British to go, leaving us to our fate. Whatever unreality there is in Indian politics is due to the British rule. Let it go and the unreality will disappear. I am not interested in defeating Hitlerite Germany. I am more interested in war aims and peace aims.

Maulana Sahib : The discussion has been useful. But it is not clear to me the differences that divide the two groups. Cripps was a great hope. He came here with the reputation of a radical. But he proved a great disappointment. He made things worse. Cripps in his statements after the failure of negotiations has emphasized two points : (*i*) His mission has proved the sincerity of the intentions of the British Government towards India, (*ii*) The anti-Japanese front is the outcome of this mission. All this is false propaganda. Great Britain has made it impossible for us to defend our country. But we have something to do about the Japanese aggression. It is my firm belief that nationalism is the only religion for a subject nation. If I feel that Japan was better than Britain and her invasion was for the good of India I would have said so in public. But it is not so. Gandhiji's prescription is the only alternative though I doubt its effectiveness.

Since the draft presented by Rajendra Babu was not acceptable to Jawaharlalji and a few other members of the Committee the President asked Jawaharlalji to prepare a draft of his own. Jawaharlalji presented the following draft in the next sitting of the Committee.

The draft sought to cover the points contained in Bapu's draft but the approach was different. The discussions showed that the division of opinion revealed in the earlier discussions persisted. Jawaharlalji modified his draft with a view to accommodating better the other group, but the difference in approach remained. The draft was not acceptable to the whole Committee. Thereupon the President put the two drafts to the vote. Those who voted for Gandhiji's draft as modified by Rajendra Babu were Sardar Vallabhbhai, Rajendra Babu, J. B. Kripalani, Shankar Rao Deo, Sarojini Naidu, Prafulla Chandra Ghosh. Those who voted for Jawaharlalji's draft were Jawaharlal Nehru, Govind Ballabh Pant, Bhulabhai Desai and Asaf Ali. Among the invitees Shri Jairamdas Daulatram, Acharya Narendra Deo, Achyut Patwardhan, Bardoloi and Biswanath Das voted for Rajendra Babu's draft and Shri Satyamurti and Mrs. R. S. Pandit voted for Jawaharlalji's draft.

Rajendra Babu's draft was passed by the Committee in the morning sitting on May 1. The subject was however re-opened by the President in the afternoon sitting. He pleaded with those who supported Rajendra Babu's draft to accept Jawaharlalji's draft and make it a unanimous resolution. It was the President's opinion that there was practically no difference between the two drafts though the protagonists of both the drafts held that a vital difference in approach persisted. Supporters of Rajendra Babu's draft yielded to the wish of the President and accepted Jawaharlalji's draft. The draft resolution for the A.-I. C. C. as was finally passed by the Committee is as follows (See Appendix B).

Appendix A

Draft No. 1, dated Allahabad, April 27, 1942; Working Committee

Whereas the British War Cabinet's proposals sponsored by Sir Stafford Cripps have shown up British imperialism in its nakedness as never before, the A.-I. C. C. has come to the following conclusions :—

The A.-I. C. C. is of opinion that Britain is incapable of defending India. It is natural that whatever she does is for her own defence. There is an eternal conflict between Indian and British interests. It follows that their notions of defence would also differ. The British Government has no trust in India's political parties. The Indian army has been maintained up till now mainly to hold India in subjugation. It has been completely segregated from the general population who can in no sense regard it as their own. This policy of mistrust still continues and is the reason why national defence is not entrusted to India's elected representatives.

Japan's quarrel is not with India. She is warring against the British Empire. India's participation in the war has not been with the consent of the representatives of the Indian people. It was purely a British act. If India were freed her first

step would probably be to negotiate with Japan. The Congress is of opinion that if the British withdrew from India, India would be able to defend herself in the event of Japanese or any aggressor attacking India.

The A.-I. C. C. is, therefore, of opinion that the British should withdraw from India. The plea that they should remain in India for protecting the Indian Princes is wholly untenable. It is additional proof of their determination to maintain their hold over India. The Princes need have no fear from unarmed India.

The question of majority and minority is a creation of the British Government and would disappear on their withdrawal.

For all these reasons the Committee appeals to Britain, for the sake of her own safety, for the sake of India's safety and for the cause of world peace to let go her hold on India even if she does not give up all Asiatic and African possessions.

This Committee desires to assure the Japanese Government and people that India bears no enmity either towards Japan or towards any other nation. India only desires freedom from all alien domination. But in this fight for freedom the Committee is of opinion that India while welcoming universal sympathy does not stand in need of foreign military aid. India will attain her freedom through her non-violent strength and will retain it likewise. Therefore the Committee hopes that Japan will not have any designs on India. But if Japan attacks India and Britain makes no response to its appeal the Committee would expect all those who look to Congress for guidance to offer complete non-violent non-co-operation to the Japanese forces and not render any assistance to them. It is no part of the duty of those who are attacked to render any assistance to the attacker. It is their duty to offer complete non-co-operation.

It is not difficult to understand the simple principle of non-violent non-co-operation :—

1. We may not bend the knee to the aggressor nor obey any of his orders.

2. We may not look to him for any favours nor fall to his bribes. But we may not bear him any malice nor wish him ill.

3. If he wishes to take possession of our fields we will refuse to give them up even if we have to die in the effort to resist him.

4. If he is attacked by disease or is dying of thirst and seeks our aid we may not refuse it.

5. In such places where the British and Japanese forces are fighting our non-co-operation will be fruitless and unnecessary. At present our non-co-operation with the British Government is limited. Were we to offer them complete non-co-operation when they are actually fighting, it would be tantamount to placing our country deliberately in Japanese hands. Therefore not to put any obstacle in the way of the British forces will often be the only way of demonstrating our non-co-operation with the Japanese. Neither may we assist the British in any active manner. If we can judge from their recent attitude, the British Government do not need any help from us beyond our non-interference. They desire our help only as slaves—a position we can never accept.

It is necessary for the Committee to make a clear declaration in regard to the scorched earth policy. If, in spite of our non-violent resistance, any part of the country falls into Japanese hands we may not destroy our crops, water supply, etc., if only because it will be our endeavour to regain them. The destruction of war material is another matter and may under certain circumstances be a military necessity. But it can never be the Congress policy to destroy what belongs to or is of use to the masses.

Whilst non-co-operation against the Japanese forces will necessarily be limited to a comparatively small number and must succeed if it is complete and genuine, the true building up of Swaraj consists in the millions of India wholeheartedly working the constructive programme. Without it the whole nation cannot rise from its age-long torpor. Whether the British remain or not it is our duty always to wipe out unemployment, to bridge the gulf between rich and poor, to banish communal strife, to exorcise the demon of untouchability, to reform dacoits and save the people from them. If crores of people do not take a living interest in this nation-building work, freedom must remain a dream and unattainable by either non-violence or violence.

Foreign soldiers

The A.-I. C. C. is of opinion that it is harmful to India's interests and dangerous to the cause of India's freedom to introduce foreign soldiers in India. It therefore appeals to the British Government to remove these foreign legions and henceforth stop further introduction. It is a crying shame to bring foreign troops in spite of India's inexhaustible manpower and is a proof of the immorality that British imperialism is.

Appendix B

All-India Congress Committee Resolution, May 1, 1942

In view of the imminent peril of invasion that confronts India, and the attitude of the British Government, as shown again in the recent proposals sponsored by Sir Stafford Cripps, the All-India Congress Committee has to declare afresh India's policy and to advise the people in regard to the action to be undertaken in the emergencies that may arise in the immediate future.

The proposals of the British Government and their subsequent elucidation by Sir Stafford Cripps have led to greater bitterness and distrust of that Government and the spirit of non-co-operation with Britain has grown. They have demonstrated that even in this hour of danger, not only to India but to the cause of the United Nations, the British Government functions as an imperialist government and refuses to recognize the independence of India or to part with any real power.

India's participation in the war was a purely British act imposed upon the Indian people without the consent of their representatives. While India has no quarrel with the people of any country, she has repeatedly declared her antipathy to Nazism and Fascism as to imperialism. If India were free she would have determined her own policy and might have kept out of the war, though her sympathies would, in any event, have been with the victims of aggression. If, however, circumstances had led her to join the war, she would have done so as a free country fighting for freedom, and her defence would have been organized on a popular basis with a national army under national control and leadership, and with intimate contacts with the people. A free India would know how to defend herself in the event of any aggressor attacking her. The present Indian Army is in fact an offshoot of the British Army and has been maintained till now mainly to hold India in subjection. It has been completely segregated from the general population, who can in no sense regard it as their own.

The essential difference between the imperialist and the popular conceptions of defence is demonstrated by the fact that while foreign armies are invited to India for that defence, the vast manpower of India herself is not utilized for the purpose. India's past experience teaches her that it is harmful to her interest and dangerous to the cause of her freedom to introduce foreign armies in India. It is significant and extraordinary that India's inexhaustible manpower should remain untapped, while India develops into a battle-ground between foreign armies fighting on her soil

or on her frontiers, and her defence is not supposed to be a subject fit for popular control. India resents this treatment of her people as chattels to be disposed of by foreign authority.

The All-India Congress Committee is convinced that India will attain her freedom through her own strength and will retain it likewise. The present crisis, as well as the experience of the negotiations with Sir Stafford Cripps, makes it impossible for the Congress to consider any schemes or proposals which retain, even in a partial measure, British control and authority in India. Not only the interests of India but also Britain's safety, and world peace and freedom demand that Britain must abandon her hold on India. It is on the basis of independence alone that India can deal with Britain or other nations.

The Committee repudiates the idea that freedom can come to India through interference or invasion by any foreign nation, whatever the professions of that nation may be. In case an invasion takes place it must be resisted. Such resistance can only take the form of non-violent non-cooperation as the British Government has prevented the organization of national defence by the people in any other way. The Committee would therefore expect the people of India to offer complete non-violent non-cooperation to the invading forces and not to render any assistance to them. We may not bend the knee to the aggressor nor obey any of his orders. We may not look to him for favours nor fall to his bribes. If he wishes to take possession of our homes and our fields we will refuse to give them up even if we have to die in the effort to resist them. In places wherein the British and the invading forces are fighting our non-cooperation will be fruitless and unnecessary. Not to put any obstacle in the way of British forces will often be the only way of demonstrating our non-cooperation with the invader. Judging from their attitude the British Government do not need any help from us beyond our non-interference.

The success of such a policy of non-cooperation and non-violent resistance to the invader will largely depend on the intensive working out of the Congress constructive programme and more especially the programme of self-sufficiency and self-protection in all parts of the country.

APPENDIX II

Mr. Rajagopalachari's letter of July 18th, 1942, to Mr. Gandhi

"Madras, July 18, 1942.—Dear Mahatmaji, we have carefully read the resolution passed by the All-India Congress Working Committee at Wardha on July 14, which is to be placed before the meeting of the A. I. C. C. next month. In view of the far-reaching consequences of the adoption of this resolution, we feel it our duty, having worked with you since 1920, to place before you our considered views in this matter. While there can be no difference of view over India's demand for complete freedom from foreign domination, the idea of the withdrawal of Government being automatically replaced by another Government is altogether impossible. The State is not a mere superstructure, but is so intimately bound up with the functioning of every activity of the people that the withdrawal of the Government without a simultaneous replacement by another must involve a dissolution of the State and of society itself. It is unnatural for any Government to withdraw without transferring power to a successor by consent or without being forcibly replaced by another. The formation of a provisional government as well as the convening of the constituent assembly are possible only if the continuity of the State is assured.

"We feel, therefore, that, however difficult of achievement the Hindu-Muslim settlement may be, while the British Government is here and functioning, it is essential that, before a demand for withdrawal can be reasonably made, the major political organizations of this country, namely, the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, should evolve a joint plan with regard to the provisional government which can take over power and preserve the continuity of the State. Even if we imagine

that the British could ever under moral compulsion be made to withdraw unconditionally, we are convinced that the chaos that would follow under existing conditions would not permit within any reasonable time the formation of a provisional government such as you contemplate.

"We consider it wrong to formulate a demand which, if complied with, must necessarily lead to anarchy or to frame a programme of widespread self-inflicted suffering based on the refusal of such a demand.

"Your proposal that while the civil power may be withdrawn, the British and Allied forces may continue in India in anticipation of a treaty with a problematic provisional Indian Government will only lead to the exercise of all governmental functions by the military forces. This will happen if only for their own safety and effective functioning. They are further likely to be urged towards this step by local chieftains and suffering people. This would be the reinstallation of the British Government in a worse form.

"In spite of these objections we might have submitted to your proposal if only because of the fact that the British are not going to withdraw, and in actual operation the movement would amount to a nationwide protest against the existing Government and may be productive of a satisfactory settlement in due course. But the critical international situation in which India is directly involved makes it certain that the party to gain immediately by the movement will be Japan. If the movement could possibly displace the British Government, installing a national government capable of resisting Japanese aggression, it might be worth while taking all risks attached to it. But, as this result is not even remotely probable, it will only produce more intense and large-scale repression and suffering which will facilitate Japanese invasion and occupation.

"It is hardly likely that the authorities will allow the movement to proceed under central direction in an orderly and direct fashion. Even if we do not mind sporadic violence that may result from lack of proper control, there is another serious danger. When responsible leaders are removed and their guidance is no longer available, the movement can easily be taken advantage of by the enemy and be converted into a fifth column activity on his behalf.

"Any movement started by you would have commanded our loyal participation, in spite of differences of opinion, if the movement did not involve such grave consequences as pointed out above. Our conviction is strong enough to make it our duty publicly to oppose the proposal on these grounds. But it may be thought at this stage that your move will operate as a protest with an international appeal and bring about a fresh approach towards a political settlement for India without actually plunging the country in direct action. In order that any step on our part may not lessen this chance we refrain from giving public expression to our opposition but send this letter to entreat you to desist from taking the steps you have adumbrated." (Sd.) C. Rajagopalachari, K. Santhanam, S. Ramanathan, Dr. T. S. S. Rajan.

Mr. Gandhi's Reply

Sevagram, Wardha, July 20, 1942.—"My dear C. R., I was about to write to you when your letter came. Of course, I understand and appreciate the exquisite consideration running through your letter. I invite you all four to come here and pour out your love and argument to wean me from what appears to be an error. Anyway your monthly visit is due. You can come any day you like. What I wanted to write to you about was this. Why don't you form a league with Muslim friends to propagate your idea of settlement? Have you Q. A.'s reply to my note? Do you accept his definition of Pakistan? What is the common idea about independence? Surely you should have a common understanding over fundamentals before you come to an agreement. Let not your fear of the Japs betray you into a worse state of things. But more of all this when you come. Love to you all. Bapu."

APPENDIX III (1)

Text of the resolution adopted by the Congress Working Committee at Wardha on 14th July 1942

The events happening from day to day and the experience that the people of India are passing through confirm the opinion of Congressmen that British rule in India must end immediately, not merely because foreign domination even at its best is an evil in itself and a continuing injury to the subject people, but because India in bondage can play no effective part in defending herself and in affecting the fortunes of the war that is desolating humanity. The freedom of India is thus necessary not only in the interest of India, but also for the safety of the world and for the ending of Nazism, Fascism, militarism and other forms of imperialism, and the aggression of one nation over another. Ever since the outbreak of the world war, the Congress has studiedly pursued a policy of non-embarrassment. Even at the risk of making its satyagraha ineffective, it deliberately gave it a symbolic character in the hope that this policy of non-embarrassment carried to its logical extreme would be duly appreciated and that real power would be transferred to popular representatives so as to enable the nation to make its fullest contribution towards the realisation of human freedom throughout the world, which is in danger of being crushed. It had also hoped that negatively nothing would be done which was calculated to tighten Britain's hold on India.

These hopes have, however, been dashed to pieces. The abortive Cripps' proposals showed in the clearest possible manner that there was no change in the British Government's attitude towards India and that the British hold on India was in no way to be relaxed. In the negotiations with Sir Stafford Cripps, Congress Representatives tried their utmost to achieve a minimum, consistent with the national demand, but to no avail. This frustration has resulted in a rapid and widespread increase of ill-will against Britain and a growing statisfaction at the success of Japanese arms.

The Working Committee view this development with grave apprehension as this, unless checked, will inevitably lead to a passive acceptance of aggression. The Committee hold that all aggression must be resisted, for any submission to it must mean the degradation of the Indian people and the continuation of their subjection. The Congress is anxious to avoid the experience of Malaya, Singapore, and Burma and desires to build up resistance to any aggression on or invasion of India by the Japanese or any foreign Power. The Congress would change the present ill-will against Britain into goodwill and make India a willing partner in a joint enterprise of securing freedom for the nations and peoples of the world and in the trials and tribulations which accompany it. This is only possible if India feels the glow of freedom.

The Congress representatives have tried their utmost to bring about a solution of the communal tangle. But this has been made impossible by the presence of the foreign power and only after the ending of foreign domination and intervention, can the present unreality give place to reality and the people of India, belonging to all groups and parties, face India's problems and solve them on a mutually agreed basis.

The present political parties formed chiefly with a view to attract the attention of and influence the British power, will then probably cease to function. For the first time in India's history, the realisation will come home that the princes, 'jagirdars,' 'zamindars' and propertied and monied classes derive their wealth and property from the workers in the fields and factories and elsewhere, to whom essentially power and authority must belong. On the withdrawal of British rule in India, responsible men and women of the country will come together to form a provisional government, representative of all important sections of the people of India which will later evolve a scheme by which a constituent Assembly can be convened in order

to prepare a constitution for the Government of India acceptable to all sections of the people. Representatives of free India and representatives of Great Britain will confer together for the adjustment of future relations and for the co-operation of the two countries as allies in the common task of meeting aggression.

It is the earnest desire of the Congress to enable India to resist aggression effectively with the peoples' united will and strength behind it. In making the proposal for the withdrawal of the British rule from India, the Congress has no desire whatsoever to embarrass Great Britain or the Allied Powers in their prosecution of the war, or in any way to encourage aggression on India or increase pressure on China by the Japanese or any other Power associated with the Axis group. Nor does the Congress intend to jeopardise the defensive capacity of the Allied powers.

The Congress is, therefore, agreeable to the stationing of the armed forces of the Allies in India, should they so desire, in order to ward off and resist Japanese or other aggression and to protect and help China. The proposal of withdrawal of the British power from India was never intended to mean the physical withdrawal of all Britishers from India, and certainly not of those who would make India their home and live there as citizens and as equals with the others. If such a withdrawal takes place with goodwill it would result in the establishing of a stable provisional government in India and co-operation between this government and the united nations in resisting aggression and helping China. The Congress realises that there may be risks involved in such a course. Such risks, however, have to be faced by any country in order to achieve freedom, and more especially at the present critical juncture in order to save the country and the larger cause of freedom the world over from far greater risks and perils. While, therefore, the Congress is impatient to achieve the national purpose it wishes to take no hasty steps and would like to avoid, in so far as is possible, any course of action that might embarrass the United Nations. The Congress would be pleased with the British power if it accepts the very reasonable and just proposal herein made not only in the interest of India but also that of Britain and of the cause of freedom to which the United Nations proclaim their adherence. Should, however, this appeal fail the Congress cannot view without the gravest apprehension the continuation of the present state of affairs involving a progressive deterioration in the situation and the weakening of India's will and power to resist aggression. The Congress will then be reluctantly compelled to utilise all the non-violent strength it might have gathered since 1920 when, it adopted non-violence as part of its policy for the vindication of the political rights and liberty. Such a widespread struggle would inevitably be under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. As issues raised are of the most vital and far-reaching importance to the people of India as well as to the peoples of the United Nations the Working Committee refer them to the All-India Congress Committee for final decision. For this purpose the A. I. C. C. will meet in Bombay on the 7th of August, 1942.

APPENDIX III (2)

Text of the resolution adopted by the All-India Congress Committee on 8th August 1942

" The All-India Congress Committee has given the most careful consideration to the reference made to it by the Working Committee in their resolution dated July 14, 1942, and to subsequent events, including the development of the war situation, the utterances of responsible spokesmen of the British Government, and the comments and criticisms made in India and abroad. The Committee approves of and endorses that resolution, and is of opinion that events subsequent to it have given it further justification, and have made it clear that the immediate ending of British rule in

India is an urgent necessity, both for the sake of India and for the success of the cause of the United Nations. The continuation of that rule is degrading and enfeebling India and making her progressively less capable of defending herself and of contributing to the cause of world freedom.

"The Committee has viewed with dismay the deterioration of the situation on the Russian and Chinese peoples its high appreciation of their heroism in defence of their freedom. This increasing peril makes it incumbent on all those who strive for freedom and who sympathise with the victims of aggression, to examine the foundations of the policy so far pursued by the Allied Nations, which have led to repeated and disastrous failure. It is not by adhering to such aims and policies and methods that failure can be converted into success, for past experience has shown that failure is inherent in them. These policies have been based not on freedom so much as on the domination of subject and Colonial countries, and the continuation of the Imperialist tradition and method. The possession of Empire, instead of adding to the strength of the ruling power, has become a burden and a curse. India, the classic land of modern Imperialism, has become the crux of the question, for by the freedom of India will Britain and the United Nations be judged, and the peoples of Asia and Africa be filled with hope and enthusiasm.

"The ending of British rule in this country is thus a vital and immediate issue on which depend the future of the war and the success of freedom and democracy. A free India will assure this success by throwing all her great resources in the struggle for freedom and against the aggression of Nazism, Fascism and Imperialism. This will not only affect materially the fortunes of the war, but will bring all subject and oppressed humanity on the side of the United Nations, and give these nations, whose ally India would be the moral and spiritual leadership of the world. India in bondage will continue to be the symbol of British Imperialism and the taint of that imperialism will affect the fortunes of all the United Nations.

"The peril of today, therefore, necessitates the independence of India and the ending of British domination. No future promises or guarantees can affect the present situation or meet that peril. They cannot produce the needed psychological effect on the mind of the masses. Only the glow of freedom now can release that energy and enthusiasm of millions of people which will immediately transform the nature of the war.

"The A. I. C. C., therefore, repeats with all emphasis the demand for the withdrawal of the British power from India. On the declaration of India's independence, a provisional Government will be formed and free India will become an ally of the United Nations, sharing with them in the trials and tribulations of the joint enterprise of the struggle for freedom. The provisional Government can only be formed by the co-operation of the principal parties and groups in the country. It will thus be a composite Government, representative of all important sections of the people of India. Its primary functions must be to defend India and resist aggression with all the armed as well as the non-violent forces at its command, together with its Allied Powers, and to promote the wellbeing and progress of the workers in the fields and factories and elsewhere to whom essentially all power and authority must belong. The provisional Government will evolve a scheme for a constituent assembly which will prepare a constitution for the Government of India acceptable to all sections of the people. This constitution, according to the Congress view, should be a federal one. With the largest measure of autonomy for the federating units, and with the residuary powers vesting in these units. The future relations between India and the Allied Nations will be adjusted by representatives of all these free countries conferring together for their mutual advantage and for their co-operation in the common task of resisting aggression. Freedom will enable India to resist aggression effectively with the people's united will and strength behind it.

"The freedom of India must be the symbol of and prelude to this freedom of all other Asiatic nations under foreign domination. Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, the Dutch Indies, Iran and Iraq must also attain their complete freedom.

It must be clearly understood that such of these countries as are under Japanese control now must not subsequently be placed under the rule or control of any other Colonial Power.

" While the A. I. C. C. must primarily be concerned with the independence and defence of India in this hour of danger, the Committee is of opinion that the future peace, security and ordered progress of the world demand a world federation of free nations, and on no other basis can the problems of the modern world be solved. Such a world federation would ensure the freedom of its constituent nations, the prevention of aggression and exploitation by one nation over another the protection of national minorities, the advancement of all backward areas and peoples, and the pooling of the world's resources for the common good of all. On the establishment of such a world federation, disarmament would be practicable in all countries, national armies, navies and air forces would no longer be necessary, and a world federal defence force would keep the world peace and prevent aggression.'

" An independent India would gladly join such a world federation and co-operate on an equal basis with other countries in the solution of international problems.

" Such a federation should be open to all nations who agree with its fundamental principles. In view of the war, however, the federation must inevitably, to begin with, be confined to the United Nations, such a step taken now will have a most powerful effect on the war, on the peoples of the Axis countries, and on the peace to come.

" The Committee regretfully realizes, however, that despite the tragic and overwhelming lessons of the war and the perils that overhang the world, the Governments of few countries are yet prepared to take this inevitable step towards world federation. The reactions of the British Government and the misguided criticism of the foreign Press also make it clear that even the obvious demand for India's independence is resisted, though this has been made essentially to meet the present peril and to enable India to defend herself and help China and Russia in their hour of need. The Committee is anxious not to embarrass in any way the defence of China or Russia, whose freedom is precious and must be preserved, or to jeopardise the defensive capacity of the United Nations. But the peril grows both to India and these nations, and in action and submission to a foreign administration at this stage is not only degrading India and reducing her capacity to defend herself and resist aggression but is no answer to that growing peril and is no service to the peoples of the United Nations. The earnest appeal of the Working Committee to Great Britain and the United Nations has so far met with no response and the criticisms made in many foreign quarters have shown an ignorance of India's and the world's need, and sometimes even hostility to India's freedom, which is significant of a mentality of domination and racial superiority which cannot be tolerated by a proud people conscious of their strength and of the justice of their cause.

" The A. I. C. C. would yet again, at this last moment, in the interest of world freedom, renew this appeal to Britain and the United Nations. But the Committee feels that it is no longer justified in holding the nation back from endeavouring to assert its will against an imperialist and authoritarian Government which dominates over it and prevents it from functioning in its own interest and in the interest of humanity. The Committee resolves, therefore to sanction, for the vindication of India's inalienable right to freedom and independence, the starting of a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale, so that the country might utilize all the non-violent strength it has gathered during the last 22 years of peaceful struggle. Such a struggle must inevitably be under the leadership of Gandhiji and the Committee requests him to take the lead and guide the nation in the steps to be taken.

" The Committee appeals to the people of India to face the dangers and hardships that will fall to their lot with courage and endurance, and to hold together under the leadership of Gandhiji and carry out his instructions as disciplined

soldiers of Indian freedom. They must remember that non-violence is the basis of this movement. A time may come when it may not be possible to issue instructions or for instructions to reach our people, and when no Congress Committees can function. When this happens every man and woman who is participating in this movement must function for himself or herself within the four corners of the general instructions issued. Every Indian who desires freedom and strives for it must be his own guide urging him on along the hard road where there is no resting place and which leads ultimately to the independence and deliverance of India.

" Lastly, whilst the A. I. C. C. has stated its own view of the future governance under free India, the A. I. C. C. wishes to make it quite clear to all concerned that by embarking on a mass struggle, it has no intention of gaining power for the Congress. The power, when it comes, will belong to the whole people of India ".

APPENDIX IV

Confidential. Andhra Provincial Congress Committee

Bezwada, 29th July 1942.

The following instructions are issued to all D. C. Cs. The Presidents and the Secretaries are requested to undertake organisation work immediately on the lines suggested hereunder. But it is open to the D. C. Cs. to supplement the items or alter the lines of organisation subject to the conditions in para. 1 below. The D. C. Cs. are requested to send their first report by 8th August 1942 and a report every week thereafter without fail.

The success of the movement when it starts will very much depend on the tempo we can give it at a swift pace from the time it begins. For this the organisation should not only be effective but also should be entrusted to capable hands and arranged in succession wherever possible.

The President and the Secretary of the P. C. C. will tour the districts and will be in active touch with the developments as long as they happen to be free.

The D. C. Cs. are also requested to pool together immediately all the amounts due from primary members. The quota due to the P. C. C. must be sent by about the 4th August, 1942.

If donations are collected anywhere for Congress work 25 per cent should be sent at once to the P. C. C. Even when the P. C. C. partakes in the collections work the same proportion will be claimed.

(1) The whole movement is based on non-violence. No act which contravenes this instructions should ever be undertaken.

All acts of disobedience committed should be overt and never covert (open but not under cover).

(2) *Organisation.*—The District may be divided into convenient groups based on Revenue divisions or Taluks and should be placed under an organiser. The organiser should be given the assistance of select Congress workers who will actively arrange the details—place, date and the persons. Consolidated lists of these organisations with available details should be sent to the P. C. C. office immediately.

The following suggestions can be followed immediately—

I. Collect information as regards items of programme—porambokes with toddy yielding trees and natural salt depots, liquor shops, railway stations, Telegraph and Telephone lines, troop locations, recruiting centres, etc.

II. Names of persons put in charge of various items of organisation work should be listed.

III. Organise public meetings and intensive propaganda in villages at once

IV. Congress resolutions and replies to counter-propaganda must be widely circulated. Printing work may not be possible. Duplicators may be used. Material can be gathered but will also be supplemented from time to time from the P. C. C.

(3) The form of disobedience may be individual, generalised individual, or mass.

(4) Items of the programme :—

Group I.—First Stage—

(*a*) Breaking of prohibitory orders.

(*b*) Picking salt.

(*c*) Continuing openly to be members of unlawful associations.

Group II.—Second Stage—

(*a*) Items of non-cooperation—

Lawyers to leave practice.

Students to leave colleges.

Jurors and Assessors not to respond summons.

(*b*) Government officers including village officers to resign their jobs.

Group III.—Third Stage—

Arranging labour strikes.

Group IV.—Fourth Stage—

(*a*) Picketting of foreign cloth shops.

(*b*) Liquor shops.

(*c*) Foreign concerns in trade and industry.

Group V.—Fifth Stage—

The following items are not prohibited but not encouraged and to be considered at this stage only :—

(1) Stopping trains by pulling chains only.

(2) Travel without tickets.

(3) Cutting toddy yielding trees.

(4) Cutting telegraph and telephone wires.

N.B.—Rails should not be removed or permanent way obstructed. No danger to life, should be a great caution. (sic).

Group VI.—Practically the last stage—

(*a*) Non-payment of taxes excluding Municipal taxes. Especially Zamindari rent should not be paid if the Zamindar will not join the movement.

(*b*) Picketting of troops.

Convictions.—When people are sent to jail, they need not keep quiet as usual. But they should continue disobedience here also through work and lock out strikes (sic.) Hunger strikes also should be undertaken, but voluntarily, on personal risk of the individual as it may lead to the glory of self immolation.

Warning.—99 out of 100 chances are for the inauguration of this movement by Mahatmaji at an early date, possibly a few hours after the next All-India Congress Committee meeting at Bombay. The D. C. Cs. should be alert and begin to act immediately. But please also take note that no movement should be launched or any overt act done till Mahatmaji decides. After all he may decide otherwise and you will be responsible for a great unwarranted mistake. Be ready, organise at once, be alert but by no means act.

APPENDIX V

A comparison of the "A. I. C. C. twelve-point programme" with Mr. Gandhi's pre-arrest writings and statements

"12-Point" Programme.	*Extracts from Mr. Gandhi's writings or statements.*
Instruction (1).—There shall be a hartal throughout the country, in all the cities and villages of India. The hartal will be peaceful. The hartal will be country's protest against the arrest of Gandhiji, the Congress President and members of the Working Committee. It will also be symbol of our determination to carry on the struggle, which started with the arrest of Gandhiji, to its successful conclusion. If participation in a hartal carries with it any penalties, they should be cheerfully borne. There will be a meeting in the evening in villages and cities where we shall deliver the Congress message "Quit-India". If there are bans on the meetings, they should be resisted.	
Instruction (2).—Salt is a prime necessity of our life. Our countrymen should consider themselves free to manufacture it wherever they can do so whether in coastal or inland areas. Laws prohibiting the manufacture should be resisted and all consequences taken.	"As to salt famine, the law is not quite on the people's side, but the right is wholly on their side..... I would advise them to manufacture salt even at the risk of prosecution. Necessity knows no law."—*Harijan* (28-6-42). "The programme covers every activity of a strictly non-violent character included in a mass movement. Therefore undoubtedly the things you have mentioned (*viz.*, breach of salt laws, calling out Government servants and labour) are included."—*Harijan* (26-7-42).
Instruction (3).—Our struggle is "non-violent non-cooperation" on the widest possible scale. The teeming millions that inhabit the 700,000 villages form the backbone of our struggle. They have the biggest and most vital part to play. Let them withhold all co-operation from the alien administration that reduced them to servitude and abject poverty. Let them when the time comes withhold payment of all revenue to the Government. Where there is zamindari system, the zamindar may be given his share of the revenue provided he throws in his lot with the people and refuses all co-operation with the Government.	"*Non-violent non-cooperation* is the most effective substitute for every kind of violent warfare. If the whole nation takes to non-violent action, it can be wholly successful."—*Harijan* (26-4-42). "What I am hoping and striving for is an irresistable mass urge on the part of the people and an intelligent response on the part of all privileged classes to the popular demand."—*Harijan* (14-6-42). "If the (British) withdrawal is to take place, it won't be due merely to the non-violent pressure..... Thus we can disown the authority of the British rulers by refusing taxes and in a variety of ways."—*Harijan* (5-7-42).
Instruction (4).—The students are the vanguard of our struggle. It is their solemn and sacred task to rouse and awaken and vitalise the dumb millions from one end of the country to the other. It is unthinkable that they can be passive spectators of the grand fight for freedom that is going on about them. Let students above 16 leave their colleges and universities and conduct the non-violent struggle to its victorious conclusion. They are the intelligentsia of the country and know full well how our leader wants them to act. Our leaders have been arrested. The few that remain will soon be clapped, if worse does not befall them. Students alone can fittingly supply the gap. There is no doubt they will prove worthy of the great call that has come to them.	"As regards students, I have not formulated my plans as yet and I do not want them to join this struggle for the moment, but I wish that the students and professors should imbibe the spirit of freedom. They should stand by the Congress and should have the courage to say they are for the Congress. When they get the call, they should cheerfully abandon their studies and their careers and support the movement whole-heartedly."—A. I. C. C. meeting, Bombay (8-8-42).

"12-Point" Programme.	*Extracts from Mr. Gandhi's writings or statements.*
Instruction (5).—The members of the Government services are faced with a choice. In this titanic clash between the people and the alien Government, what is their place? Must they earn their livelihood by betraying their country at a time when it is engaged in a mortal and deadly struggle? Is it part of their duty to suppress, to betray the people? Do they like to have the blessings of the present and future generations or their curses? The days of the administration which is giving them their bread and butter are now numbered. Why lean on a broken reed? If those who do not have the strength to resign their jobs have at least the courage to say 'no' to all orders that are designed to suppress and crush our people. If the saying of 'no' involves dismissal, let it be cheerfully courted. Every such dismissal will be a nail in the coffin of the Empire that *is* throttling us.	"The programme covers every activity of a strictly non-violent character included in a mass movement. Therefore undoubtedly the things you have mentioned (*viz.*, breach of salt laws, *calling out Government servants* and Labour) are included."—*Harijan* (26-7-42). "There is no need for the Government servants to resign, but they should write to Government to say that they are with the Congress."—A. I. C. C. meeting, Bombay (8-8-42).
Instruction (6).—As Gandhiji said let every soldier in the army consider himself a Congressman. If his officer issues an order which hurts his conscience as Congressman let him disobey them and take the consequences cheerfully. It can be no part of their duty to lathi charge, tear gas or shoot non-violent crowds, peaceful processions or meetings. India hopefully looks to them to play worthy part in the great struggle. The fellow soldiers in other lands fraternised with the people when they rose in revolt against misrule and oppression whether indigenous or foreign. Let the Indian soldiers follow their glorious example.	"The sepoys should also declare that they belonged to the Congress, but that they were working for their livelihood, and, if they were asked to shoot Indians, they should refuse to do so saying that they are prepared to fight the Japanese."—A. I. C. C. meeting, Bombay (8-8-42).
Instruction (7).—The Indian States are a part and parcel of India. The struggle today is as much theirs as of the so called British India. Gandhiji at the A. I. C. C. issued an appeal to the Princes to make common cause with the Indian people and throw off the common yoke. Whatever the response of the Princes to Gandhiji's appeal let our brothers in Indian States make the struggle their own. Their fight today is not with the Princes but with the alien master who is keeping them and the people in subjection. If the Princes side with the alien masters it will be the painful duty of the people to wage a struggle against a combination of the Princes and the alien master.	"Will the Princes march with the times or must they remain tied to the Imperial chariot-wheel? If they take their courage with both their hands and make common cause with the nation, they can run the risk of dispossession..... Will the Princes and princely landholders and merchants take the lead? It is for them to take the lead, not for the 'have-nots'..... If the 'haves', who are in fact the pillars on which the mighty British Power rests, can realise their obvious duty, the British Power must yield. It was because I had despaired of response from the pillars, that I have thought of moving the masses on whom the pillars rest."—*Harijan* (2-8-42). "Princes are the creation of the British Power. Their number may be 600 or more. They are created by the ruling power, as you know, to create differences between Indian India and British India.....The Congress claims to represent them as well..... Whatever the Princes may say their people will acclaim that we have been asking for the very thing that they want. If we carry on this struggle in the way I want it, the Princes will get more through it than they can ever expect. I have met some Princes and they have stated their helplessness by saying that we are more free than they are because they can be removed by the Paramount Power."—A. I. C. C. meeting, Bombay (7-8-42).

"12-Point" Programme.	*Extracts from Mr. Gandhi's writings or statements.*
	"Let the Princes know that I am their well-wisher from the bottom of my heart..... The Princes should rise to the occasion. They must part with responsibility of administration to their subjects. Let them read the sign of the times. If they fail to do this, they will have no quarter in a Free India..... Let the Princes shear themselves of their autocracy.... Their only chance of survival depends on the goodwill of their people. I would venture to ask the Princes whether they are not equally anxious to see India free. If the answer is in the affirmative, let them come forward. If the answer is in the negative, then I do not hesitate to say that even the Paramount Power will not be able to come to their rescue because the Power itself will not be there. Responsible Government should immediately be conferred on their subjects."—A. I. C. C. meeting, Bombay (8-8-42).
Instruction (8).—Gandhiji has time and again stressed the vital and decisive part that our womenfolk can play in the non-violent struggle. It is for them to justify Gandhiji's faith in them. If they bring to the struggle the non-violent sacrifice and suffering of which they are capable our struggle will inevitably be short and swift. Let it fall to them to infuse and energise the people of India at the fateful period in her history.	
Instruction (9).—Let every man and woman in the country carry on his person a badge bearing the motto "Do or Die". This will proclaim our determination to be free or perish in the attempt to be free.	"If they (the Allies) don't (do the initial act of justice and put their case on unassailable basis), they must face the opposition of those who cannot tolerate their rule and are prepared to die in order to get rid of it."—*Harijan* (2-8-42). "If I could turn India, Great Britain, America and the rest of the world including the Axis Powers in the direction of non-violence I should do so. But that feat mere human effort cannot accomplish. That is in God's hands. For me 'I can but do or die'."—*Harijan* (9-8-42). "You have to forsake wife, friends, forsake everything in the world.... Even if all the United Nations opposed me, even if the whole of India tried to persuade me that I am wrong, I will go ahead, not for India's sake alone, but for the sake of the world..... I have pledged the Congress and the Congress will *do or die*".—A. I. C. C. meeting, Bombay (8-8-42).
Instruction (10).—This is a struggle in which all Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Parsis and Christians have to participate. Freedom's struggle knows no communal or racial distinctions. If there must be competition between Communities let it be one in sacrifice and suffering for the great cause.	"I wish all conflicting elements and interests will make a combined effort to rid India of foreign domination."—*Harijan* (24-5-42). "The fight has been conceived in the interest of the whole of India..... They will fight not to seize power, but to end the foreign domination, cost what it may..... The movement has only one aim—that is displacing British power..... Why should not Muslims, who believe in Pakistan but also believe in Independent India, join such a struggle?"—*Harijan* (12-7-42).

"12-Point" Programme.

Preamble and instruction (*11*).—With the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi every man and woman in India is his successor. Victory or death should be the motto of every son and daughter of India. If we live we live as free men, if we die, we die as free men. There can be no rest for us so long as Gandhiji is in jail.

This is our final struggle. If all do their duty, the struggle should finish in two months time. All classes of men are called upon to join the fight. Millions have to move and break the chains that bind India. The struggle will include all activities that a non-violent mass struggle can include. Let our struggle gather momentum from day to day till it becomes an irresistible force and we regain our previous heritage. Let us be true to the message which Gandhiji has left us: "Do or Die."

Ending of foreign rule is our objective. Whatever helps in the attainment of that objective, subject to inexorable condition of non-violence, is permissible and legitimate. People in the Provinces have to devise and adopt all non-violent ways of paralysing the administration. Every man is his own guide and leader. All Provinces have full Provincial autonomy in the matter of carrying on the struggle. Let them remain true to non-violence and all will be well with the struggle. There is no place for fear in the struggle: it should be banished from our minds and hearts. Each one of us should feel and assert that he is a free man. Suffering that comes our way as a consequence of this assertion and our action on it shall be cheerfully borne. Our leaders have done their part, it is for those who are left out to do theirs. The burden of carrying on the struggle falls on them. Let them carry their burden worthily.

Extracts from Mr. Gandhi's writings or statements.

"I ask for a bloodless end of an unnatural domination and for a new era."—*Harijan* (17-5-42).

"British rule in India in any shape or form must end. Hitherto the rulers have said, 'We would gladly retire if we know to whom we should hand over the reins'. My answer is, 'Leave India to God. If that is too much, leave her to anarchy'."—*Harijan* (24-5-42).

"Nor is waiting possible till hatred abates. Withdrawal of the hated power is the only way to rid the land of the debasing hatred. The cause gone, hatred must cease..... In this struggle every risk has to be run in order to cure ourselves of the biggest disease—a disease which has sapped our manhood and almost made us feel as if we must for ever be slaves. It is an insufferable thing. The cost of the cure, I know, is heavy. No price is too heavy to pay for the deliverence."—*Harijan* (31-5-42).

"We want the (British) rule to end altogether, for that is the poison that corrupts all it touches, that is the obstacle that stops all progress. And what is needed for this are two things—the knowledge that the domination is a greater evil than any other evil that we can think of, and that we have to get rid of it no matter what it may cost..... Next is the will to throw off the chains..... That (the resultant anarchy) is the consideration that has weighed with me all these 22 years. I waited and waited, until the country should develop the non-violent strength necessary to throw off the foreign yoke. But my attitude has now undergone a change. I feel that I cannot afford to wait. If I continue to wait, I will have to wait till doomsday. For the preparation I have prayed for and worked for may never come, and in the meantime I may be enveloped and overwhelmed by the flames that threaten all of us. That is why I have decided that even at certain risks which are obviously involved I must ask the people to resist the slavery..... The people have not my Ahimsa, but mine should help them. There is ordered anarchy around and about us. I am sure that the anarchy that may result because of the British withdrawal or their refusal to listen to us and our decision to defy their authority will in no way be worse than the present anarchy. After all, those who are unarmed cannot produce a frightful amount of violence or anarchy..... But to be passive witness of the terrible violence that is going on in the name of resisting a possible foreign aggression is a thing, I cannot stand..... I am also sure that those who cannot, or will not, understand me will do so in the light of experience, *i.e.*, if they survive the present catastrophe."—M. D.'s report of Gandhi's address to the Rashtriya Yuvak Sangh.—*Harijan* (7-6-42).

"Our arrests would work up the movement, they would stir everyone in India to do his little bit..... My invitation to the British to withdraw is not an idle one. It has to be made good by the sacrifice of the inviters...."

"12-Point" Programme.

Extracts from Mr. Gandhi's writings or statements.

"Strikes can be and have been non-violent. If railways are worked only to strengthen the British hold on India, they need not be assisted..... What I am hoping and striving for is an irresistable mass urge on the part of the people and an intelligent response on the part of the privileged classes to the popular demand. But because I know that this picture is for the time being imaginary, I am quite prepared for the worst. Hence my statement that I would end the present state of things even at the risk of anarchy reigning supreme in the land."—*Harijan* (14-6-42).

"I have been working for it (the end of the British rule in India) for years. But now it has taken definite shape and I say that the British power in India should go today for the world peace..... (The next move) will be a move which will be felt by the whole world. It may not interfere with the movement of the British troops, but it is sure to engage British attention..... I do not know (if what is wanted is a relaxation of civil grip) I want unadulterated independence. If the military activity serves but to strengthen the strangle-hold, I must resist that too..... I have waited long and I can wait no longer."—*Harijan* (21-6-42).

"If the withdrawal is to take place, it won't be due merely to the non-violent pressure.... Thus we can disown the authority of the British rulers by refusing taxes and in a variety of ways."—*Harijan* (5-7-42).

"I am not going to make a call on the Khadi workers. But if there is a general conflagration, Khadi workers cannot escape it..... You must also understand that I am not thinking of civil disobedience or non-cooperation of old..... No hard and fast rules can be laid down this time."—*Harijan* (5-7-42).

"My proposal presupposes shedding of all fear and distrust..... All this may not come to pass. I do not mind. It is worth fighting for, it is worth staking all that the nation has."—*Harijan* (5-7-42).

"Why should you shove all the blame on to me for all that may happen by reason of my taking action for the discharge of an overdue debt and that too just when the discharge has become the necessary condition of my life?"—*Harijan* (12-7-42).

"It will be a mass movement of a strictly non-violent character.....It will include all that a mass movement can include..... I am not going to court imprisonment..... It is too soft a thing. We had no doubt made it a business to court imprisonment up to now, but there will be no such thing this time. My intention is to make the thing as short and swift as possible."—*Harijan* (19-7-42).

"12-Point" Programme.

Extracts from Mr. Gandhi's writings or statements.

"The programme covers every activity of a strictly non-violent character included in a mass movement. I shall handle the movement gently, but I would not hesitate to go to the extremist limit, if I find that no impression is produced over the British Government or the Allied Powers..... (It will be) my biggest movement..... (With the arrests of leaders) it should gain strength, if it has any vitality."—*Harijan* (26-7-42).

"For a swift ending a general strike is necessary. It is not outside my contemplation, but seeing that I shall take every step in terms of my oft-repeated declaration that a mass struggle is not conceived in any INIMICAL spirit, I shall move with utmost caution. And if a general strike becomes a dire necessity, I shall not flinch."—Press interview, Bombay (6-8-42).

"This is the last struggle of my life. Delay is injurious and waiting any further would be humiliation for all of us. Our struggle is about to start. But before launching the movement I will address a letter to the Viceroy and wait for his reply. It will take a week, a fortnight or three weeks. In the meantime we will have, apart from carrying out the thirteen points of the Congress Constructive Programme, to observe the following code :—

> Let every Indian consider himself to be a free man. He must be ready for the actual attainment of freedom or perish in the attempt. His attitude towards life should be that he is a free man..... There is no compromise on the demand for freedom. Freedom first and then only the rest. Do not be cowards, because cowards have no right to live. Freedom should be your 'mantra' and you should chant it."—A. I. C. C. meeting, Bombay (8-8-42).

Instruction (12).—Last but not the least let us not forget spinning so dear to Gandhiji. If millions spin it will administer a powerful stimulus to the struggle.

"DO or DIE".

APPENDIX VI

The "A. I. C. C." instructions for a no-tax, no-rent, no-grain campaign

During the last three months the Indian people have risen to new heights of resistance of the usurper authority. While the towns were the first to flare up into flames, it was inevitable that they should be overpowered with superior military force. But the most heartening feature of our revolution is the spontaneous extension of our field of action from the towns into the countryside. It is not easy to paralyse the civil administration in the towns for any considerable length of time, mainly because civil administration can stand on the support of bayonets and machine guns. Besides industrial general strike is the core of urban resistance. If it is not possible to maintain such a general strike urban resistance is bound to collapse. The spirit of revolt can, however, be kept alive by a continuous programme of specific defiance

2. In the rural areas civil administration is not backed by the same overpowering superiority of military and police force. Therefore in the first month or two rural India brought the apparatus of civil administration to a standstill. The war on communications (railroads, telegraph and motor roads) prevented the enemy from concentrating his military might and distances because the strongest weapon of the revolution. This phase of the struggle lasted for over two months and even to-day resistance is spreading to newer areas where civil administration has been rendered ineffective. This situation is, however, not as extensive as it should be. Bihar and Eastern U. P. were the first to lead the way. It is only now that gradually the spirit and technique of this revolt are spreading all over India. But it has brought the full fury of police and military violence on those areas which had completely overthrown the usurper authority. A period of military reconquest ushered in the worst excesses to history. Looting and burning of villages, rape and rapine on a mass scale, machine-gunning and even aerial attacks with such weapons the gangster requires tried to strike terror and to break the spirit of revolt. There is no doubt that these indiscriminate and ruthless atrocities are a sign of weakness. It is the last resort of a collapsing authority.

Unfortunately the primary impulse of revolt could not be extended continuously from one district to another, or from one province to the next. The rural areas were thrown on the defensive. Repression could not break the iron will of our leading cadres. But the spontaneous up-surge of entire village was suppressed for the time being.

On the other hand the inhuman barbarity of British authority has widened the gulf between the people and the agents of this regime. Today there is a conscious hatred of the foreign rulers where before there was a vague groping for a way out of existing hardships. But all the same over wide areas it is not immediately practicable to launch another offensive against this regime, based on a spontaneous mass action of the people as a whole. The core of resistance is still unbroken but a reorganisation of our forces has become necessary ; such a reorganisation is the essential preliminary to a renewed assault which would bring civil administration to an end and render the tax collecting agency ineffective reffete. This task devolves upon :— (*a*) Those active congress workers who have spread the fire of revolt in the countryside and have still remained free, (*b*) those students who have left their colleges and schools and who have taken up the leadership of rural revolt, (*c*) those newer elements from among the rural and urban workers who have been fired into activity by the events of the last three months, (*d*) and those adventurous elements who have found a new worth-whileness in this struggle ; all these forces must combine to tackle the tasks of reorganisation for a fresh offensive.

Our ranks have been depleted ; our resources, in the form of local assistance in rural areas, and active enthusiastic support from village young men have been reduced by repression. With such resources as we have we can yet set ourselves the task of rekindling this fire on a more extensive scale. The time for tax collection is approaching and the business of administration will be extended on a scale which cannot be supported by threats of military and police action at all points.

March and round about months of 1943 will almost decide the fate of the Indian Revolution. It is during this period that the usurper Government will collect its land tax throughout the country. If this can be made an occasion for mass-defiance, by a general programme of non-payment we will have solved the problem of coordination and simultaneous action in all the Provinces and districts of the country.

Land-tax is important to the usurpers not only for the income that it yields but much more so for its administrative value. On land-tax alone hinges the rural administration of the British in India with its revenue officers and law courts and police stations. In resisting the land-tax we must therefore be clear about its revolutionary value. We must plan to go beyond our former no-tax campaigns. In former campaigns, the peasantry merely refused to pay the tax willingly, but permitted the revenue officers and the police to attach lands and other property. This

must not happen. It must be a total resistance. The peasantry must obstruct the revenue and police officers to collect the tax, in fact to enter the village unless in the form of a military invasion. Even this can be temporarily rendered ineffective by flight into the jungles until the invaders are forced to retire. They can be harassed in the meantime by cutting their communications and supplies. This can be done and instructions will tell you how.

(1) We must start with a campaign for the non-sale of food-crops and cattle. It is in the interest of the people themselves that they should ensure an year's stocks of food, when communications are so undependable and when the food-prices are so unsteady due to the worthlessness of the paper currency.

(2) Convert all cash into goods. Paper money is a fraud; it will starve the peasant as well as other classes. Put no faith in the illusion of well-being created by the currency notes.

(3) In Ryatwari areas there is a straight tie between the Government and the peasantry. In the Zamindari areas however the question of the landlord does crop up.

The landlord should be paid by mutual agreement a small part of the rent which will enable him to maintain his family. An informal understanding with his tenants will be able to secure for the landlord his reasonable requirements.

It must however be made clear that the Zamindar must give a preliminary undertaking not to pay tax to the government before the tenants can agree to accept the responsibility of maintaining his family. Any attempt on the part of the landlord to bend before the British power will be sufficient cause for the tenants to withhold all payment by way of rent.

The A. I. C. C. has declared a moratorium on agricultural debts and interests. Arrangements should however be made between creditors and debtors for such payments as will enable the creditor and his family to meet their reasonable requirements of food, etc.

Communications should be continuously cut, young men of the village should cut wires from now on as a preliminary training. All the time tax-collecting is actually attempted communications should be so thoroughly put out of action that movements of police and military are rendered very slow and difficult.

Who would form the Swaraj Panchayats, who would cut the communications, who would bring about and maintain the unity among villagers ? The most satisfactory answer would be, the villagers themselves without outside assistance. Just give them the idea. But even to do this, we need a fairly large number of active propagandists and organizers. These should in the first instance be recruited from :—

(*a*) Such Congress and other political workers as are still out and active.

(*b*) Students and teachers.

(*c*) Strikers and dismissed workers from factories.

(*d*) Workers of social welfare institutions.

(*e*) The better type Sadhus and Fakirs.

The directorate of each Congress province should immediately appoint a man in charge of the campaigns to resist land-tax and for the non-sale of food-crops. His task should be to meet at once, through a deputy if necessary, the active elements of the five groups mentioned in each district and to enthuse them with the basic idea of these instructions and to coach them upon the general line of propagandist and organisational activity.

Propaganda.—The main lines of propaganda in the villages should be :—

(*a*) *Political.*—Since the 9th of August and the arrest of Gandhiji and other leaders, the British are declared usurpers. To pay land-tax to them is sin. Mother India, Gandhiji, the Congress religion and all that one prizes forbid the peasantry to pay land-tax.

(*b*) *Currency—Collapse.*—Sale of crops or cattle for paper notes is a big gamble. Already paper notes are unable to buy even one-third of what they formerly used to and they may soon become almost valueless. The British Government is to-day existing on the printing of paper-notes without gold or silver or other valuables. Therefore convert your savings into goods instead of cash.

(*c*) *Danger of Food and Cloth Famines.*—The British Military in and out of India is using up our crops and cattle and railways and cloth. War and aerial bombing of cities has come on our eastern frontier. All this will lead to food and cloth famine. Therefore, to sell crops or cattle to-day is to prepare for suicide to-morrow.

(*d*) *Organisation.*—Form Swaraj Panchayat, arrange for barter inside the village and between one village and another. Develop handicrafts, particularly spinning and weaving. Have no dealings with anti-national revenue or police officers. Create unity in the village itself and among groups of villages.

(*e*) *Break-up of communications.*—If roads and telegraphs and railways are put out of action or destroyed throughout the country, the British military will be defeated and India will be free and the peasantry will prosper.

Emphasise these five points in your propaganda. Tell the peasantry that to sell crops or cattle or to pay land-tax is sin, gamble and suicide.

NOTE.—Attempt should be made to reach the appended appeals of the A. I. C. C. to (1) The Peasants of India (2) The Landlords (3) The Money Lenders (4) Revenue and Police Officers in the villages. These appeals should be spread as they are for the sake of uniformity of propaganda and because of the weight that the name of the A. I. C. C. would carry. Further appeals must be drafted on the general lines indicated by the Provinces and the Districts themselves.

APPENDIX VII

"THE FREEDOM STRUGGLE FRONT"

1. *The Struggle of Revolt.*—India is stirring as she has never stirred before. Robbed of organisation and leadership, denied of guidance and planning, the people of our country have started their revolutionary march to freedom. There is a tenseness in the air—every section every man and woman is deeply moved and feels impelled to action. Established authority is reeling under its impact, and is striving to beat down the upheaval with desperate repression. There are faint hearts which are appalled, muddled heads that screech their condemnation, servile bodies that bend to crush this upsurge of spirit. But the fact of this outburst is here. It is the profoundest fact of recent history.

2. *The Nature of the upheaval.*—Undirected, uncontrolled and leaderless, the masses are surging, heaving, swaying in their struggle for release. Every individual every group is acting on its own, impelled by diverse motives, diverse ideals. In this lies at once the strength and the weakness of the movement. This strength Gandhiji invoked where he called out to each Indian to feel free. That feeling stirring in his breast makes him rise. The appeal is to the individual direct; the response is of the individual direct. The medium of a party or organisational machine becomes redundant. The active units in this battle are individual, not mass formation dependent for every move on extraneous command. This feature invests the movement with a spontaniety, flexibility and deathlessness, an elemental and all-embracing quality which is thrillingly unique in its national and international possibilities. Gandhiji has given us a new technique in revolution. It is ethically superior to all other methods in that it eschews collective massacre and entails the minimum of bloodshed. It is a weapon of self-defence, self-expression and liberation of a people, not of territorial aggression or exploitation of another. It is economical in resources in that the enemy is fought, not with a colossal array of costly armour, but by paralysis of its organisation by individual resistance. It is a process

of mass education on the most extensive scale, offering an inherent guarantee of the permanence of its achievement, in that it strengthens each individual participant by bringing to him a consciousness of his latent power and a realisation of his unity of interest with his fellow fighters. Unity is not to be looked for in a static formula of percentage, but is realisable only through this dynamic struggle, while pursuing an obvious political objective, it simultaneously solves the problems of fear, ignorance and disunity. In laying stress on the common man and awakening him to power, it makes sure that he will be the centre round which the structure of the new state will be raised.

3. *The need for plan.*—There can be no doubt about the essential soundness of this technique. Whatever the opinion about its universal applicability for all militant action, there can be no gainsaying that it is the only feasible method in the present circumstances of this country. But the stress it lays on the individual, which is the secret of its unique efficacy, is also the source of weakness one must most carefully guard. The individual is thrown on his own resources of thought and action. How small these resources are in a suppressed people we know. There are some who would eternally postpone the struggle on that account, forgetting that it is only through struggle that they may enlarge these resources. But this limiting factor dictates the form which the struggle must take. The objective must be immediately appealing to the common man, because immediately satisfying vital lack, (Sic) clearly defined, so as to be easily grasped by the meanest intelligence. The ultimate issue, the final goal is perceived and maintained aloft only by a sustained process of reasoning and must be allowed to emerge before the fighting ranks only in careful stages, through a progressive series of secondary and immediate aims. The action demanded to cover each stage must be of the most direct and simplest kind. Else there will be perplexity and false manoeuvrings and despair. The final goal of the struggle must be kept steadily in view of (by ?) some ; the stages to its attainment must be carefully set by some. That is the task of planning.

4. *The scope of planning.*—This movement is decentralised, individualistic, anarchical. Yet because it is a movement and not an involuntary explosion of pent-up energy, it has a direction, and its anarchy is deliberate and purposeful. The object of planning is to set the direction, inform and animate the participants with the purpose. But the scope of central direction and control in a movement of this atomistic character is strictly limited. The function of planning in this movement is threefold : It must furnish the ideological perspective at each stage ; it must indicate the broad principles which will guide action ; and it must provide a general co-ordination of the efforts of groups and individuals, by arranging contacts, dissemination of intelligence, suggesting avoidance of overlapping or mutually cancelling actions. Central direction cannot attempt much more without destroying the elasticity and decentralised initiative which constitute the essential quality of this movement. The detailed application of the general principles in concrete acts and manoeuvres must be left to the primary fighting units. The movement will not conform to a uniform pattern in all areas for this reason. Its outward manifestation will exhibit as great a variety as local problems and circumstances will vary. This infinite diversity of expression should be welcome. It is bewildering to the enemy and should be encouraged by working up and bringing to a head the particular local grievance which is most acute in any area. It may be a shortage of foodgrains in one place, the exaction of rent-collector in another, the refusal of permission to irrigate the fields in some other, the realisation of collective fines is still another. Each such problem is the focal point for the initiation of the movement in that area. The general plan will direct the search for such force ; point out why our festering economic sores will be the most suitable starting points for local agitation, being the most deeply felt and the quickest, most natural and the most unifying inciting agents for the local people ; explain how these issues can never be solved within the framework of the existing system; and as this understanding spreads and the agitation has reached a sufficient pitch, suggest the precipitation of the next wider issues, taking the people forward to the next higher phase of the struggle.

5. *The machinery for planning.*—The machinery set up to undertake this planning must be suited to its special and limited purpose. That purpose is, as indicated already, to outline the general policy and direction and to provide a loose and flexible co-ordination of the work of already established parties, groups and individuals to whom the widest discretion is to be left in carrying out the day to day programme of the struggle. These are old organisations claiming the membership of disciplined bodies of men and women, who have been already working for the subversion of the present order of things for a long time. They may have varying methods and varying creeds but as long as they do not plan counter to the general direction of this movement, they will be welcome and will find a place. The invitation must be open even to individuals in their own right as children of this country. This struggle is a total struggle in its present phase, the upsurge of a whole people. It is not sectional, partisan, exclusive, but total and inclusive at this stage. The class war may have to come, but that is not yet, not till after the riddance of foreign exploitation. It is arguable that in the course of this struggle the shift of forces will get power to the proletariat even in the process of overthrowing the foreign hod (? hold), the two vital phases being simultaneous, not successive. Be that as it may, this must be clear now that the organisation required for central guidance of the movement in its present stage is not the rigid organisation of an exclusive party professing a dogmatic creed and enforcing an iron discipline. We do not want to set up a new party which must immediately come into conflict with existing parties and can only prevail by fighting and destroying them. What we need to set up is a meeting place for parties and groups, a forum for discussion, a clearing house of ideas where the greatest common measure of agreement on policy can be worked out. What we need is a coming together of parties not their supersession by a new body. What we need is a combination, a joint enterprise, a common stand. What we need is the Freedom Struggle Front, where every group, every party, every class and section and every individual can find a place to fill without (? losing) their separate identities. There are many revolutionary parties in the field. They differ in their methods, their traditions, their special experience of particular lines of work ; but there is little difference in the ultimate goal of their endeavours. Their organisation, discipline, resources, special talents and aptitudes for special tasks must be all utilized. They can be all roped in on the common platform of the Freedom Struggle Front, and this can be done in the present phase of the struggle without calling upon them to renounce their immediate loyalties. To a much more, limited extent, yet in some measure, the same is true of social groupings also. There is no class or section, no social or functional unit, which is not disaffected against the present State. Let that discontent and frustration in each layer of society be exploited and nursed into a disruptive force. If the rich mill owner or banker is willing to finance the revolution, let his help be eagerly seized. He may be acting from calculated self-interest, desiring a freer field for his capital investments ; or as happens more often than the text book communist will think, he may be moved inspite of himself by the partriotic change in the air. In any case, the course of development of the struggle which can only succeed through the people awakening to power, he must either identify his interest with that of the masses, or be submerged in the rising tide of their power. Let not a virginly horror of outraging the class issues stand in the way of seeking and taking his help. Let him be roped in too.

6. *The Programme of Action.*—There are as many battle fronts in this war as there are classes and sections and individuals waging it, and action on all fronts is simultaneous. But the most extensive and significant field of work lies in the country-side, where our peasantry offers the biggest reserve of man-power and where village economy is threatened with imminent break down. Let peasant representative in the villages be approached by our central agents. The agents themselves must be selected from tried workers of existing organisations and parties, some now disbanded by law, such as the Spinners' Association, some still countenanced openly, such as the Krishak-Projas, who have already established connections in the interior. Let them select the initial targets for assault in each village or group of

villages. Let the rising and simmering discontent against these immediate grievances be churned up into an angry ferment; first, through informal discussions then through open meetings, all the while attempting to relate the immediate problems to wider and bigger issues in simple, understandable terms. Open conflict with authority should be avoided at this stage by representing the agitation as a lawful demand for economic concessions. As soon as the discontent has crystallized to some extent, orderly but confident processions should be organised, for its collective representation before the local authorities. On their failure to redress, which is inevitable, the more extreme and militant spokesmen of the peasants should be helped to take the lead and prepare the man for direct action; by organised and orderly seizure of stocks of essential goods; by refraining payment of rents and debts; by refusing to part with crops; by ignoring court processes for distraint and refusing to attend or bid at sales; by taking possession of the machinery of local administration, such as Union Boards, Chowkies, Thanas, and running it themselves; by setting up new machinery where necessary. If the developments can be fairly synchronised in a number of areas from the centre,—and to a great extent this will be helped by the natural infectiousness of the precess,—the forces of the State will be helpless to check this progress, the disturbances will be too widespread and scattered. The police and military may advance on one village and reduce it to ashes. But their flanks and rear and front will be constantly harassed, their communications will be constantly cut off, their food supplies will be precarious. The tactical plan of defence for the villagers will be to isolate their area, organize scouts to give warning of the enemy's approach, retire and disperse before its advance and return like the tide when the enemy must presently withdraw, having nothing to do and little to subsist on. The suffering of the villagers will be great. But the stakes are also high. If they have been made to realise these at the outset, if they know that the alternative is inaction and suffering no less, if they have been trained what to expect and do, then this suffering will not break them, then each time they will return to their razed villages with a grimmer determination of spirit, an increased bitterness of heart. And the news of happenings in other villages, other districts must filter through to fortify their resolve.

7. *Other Fronts.*—We have a better organisation and greater experience of work among industrial labour. Here also unrest must be brought to a head on immediate economic issues. The situation will be directly helped by the campaign in the villages which will dry up the sources of food supply and raw materials to the urban and industrial areas. Dearness allowances can never keep pace with prices, which will soar higher and higher with a progressive inflation of the currency. Price control will show up as the senseless deception it is. Strikes should be easy to organise in this contest. Propaganda should be meanwhile pressed home on the capitalist front, appealing to this class on emotional patriotic grounds to view the strike programme with favour. The bourgeoisie must be exhorted to keep up political discontent at high pressure, 'declasse' members of the petit bourgeois sections must be recruited to lead militant demonstration of students and labourers. The Indian officialdom should be approached for secret contributions in money and information and sabotage of vital processes of the administration. The precise points and methods of attack must be left to their own decision in this as in other cases, but countless illustrations can be cited and innumerable opportunities discovered once the general lines of our movement are clearly grasped. That general analysis of the struggle should be made known in every suitable case.

8. *Administrative Tasks.*—The training of workers; the issue of leaflets, news sheets, slogans; the organisation of contacts; the raising of funds; frequent reviews of progress; issue of directions to the fighting line. These are the urgent administrative problems of the Freedom Struggle Front. Help is pouring in from all sides. The tasks will be done. But in administration, as in programme, the greatest decentralisation should be provided for. In that, rather than in secrecy for which the scope is strictly limited in a movement of this character, lies the biggest safeguard against its suppression.

APPENDIX VIII

AN APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE

Independence Day, 26th January 1943

To-day is the 26th January. Twelve years ago on this day we took the vow of freedom, and since then every year we have renewed that solemn pledge. These twelve years have been years of travail and suffering, and every Independence Day has brought us nearer our goal. This day, however, on which we are privileged to live—January 26th, 1943—is different from all such dates that have gone before. The battle of freedom which began twelve years ago has now reached its climax and shall soon reach its end. Beginning with Satyagrah and disobedience of specific laws we are now in the midst of total revolution. It is not this or that law of the foreign power that we defy but that power as a whole. It is not this or that Constitution that we demand, but total withdrawal of the Imperialist aggressor.

Therefore, the pledge that we take to-day must be different from that pledges we have taken before. Our only pledge to-day can be to make 1943 the last year of our national slavery. On August 8, last year we declared ourselves as free people but the enemy is still in our midst and is trying by fascist terror to crush our will to freedom. We must, therefore, vow to-day that before January 26 come round again we shall be a free people, and on the Government House in Delhi all Government Houses and all our houses in the country shall fly not the arrogant British flag but the proud flag of the republic of India. Every section of the people must therefore pledge to-day to discharge its duty to the Nation and pay its appropriate part in the National Revolution.

Therefore, in the name of the Indian National Congress and the Republic of India, which is being born to-day, we appeal :—

To the Peasants.

To pay no Taxes or revenues to the British usurpers.
To pay no rents to the landlords who pay revenues to the British Government.
To establish Swaraj Panchayats in their villages.
To boycott Law Courts and to settle their disputes in panchayats.
To sell no crop or cattle.
To keep no paper money and to deal through barter.
To form Guerilla Bands.

To the Workers.—In factories, Railways, in mines and elsewhere

To strike work.
To slacken production.
To sabotage.
To organise and fight for wages and cheap Food.
Cloth and the right to strike.
To form Guerilla Bands.

To Students.

To leave schools and colleges.
To enrol as soldiers of revolution.
To form Guerilla Bands.
To form vacation brigades.

To Businessmen.

To cease business with englishmen.
To withdraw deposits from Imperial and other British banks.
To subscribe to "Swaraj Karaz".

To the armed Forces.

To take prescribed oath of allegiance to the republic.

To refuse to be used against their own countrymen.

To vow to rise against the British usurpers on the command of the congress.

To the Police and other Government servants to refuse to be used against the national revolution.

To everybody.

To help in every big and small way to destroy the usurper authority and to Establish the Republic of India.

To Raise the slogans of " Inqilab zindabad ".

" Karange Ya Marenge " and " Angrezon ko nikalo ".

At 8 A.M. and 9 P.M. everyday.

Central Directorate
All India Congress Committee.

APPENDIX IX

" To all Fighters for Freedom "

Revolutionary greetings

Comrades,

Let me first of all offer you and those comrades who have been made prisoners of war my heartiest congratulation on the magnificent battle already given to the enemy. Nothing like it ever happened or was expected to happen in this our long suffering and suppressed country. It truly was the " Open Rebellion " envisaged by our incomparable leader Mahatma Gandhi.

The Rebellion, no doubt, seems to have been suppressed for the moment. But I hope you will agree with me that it has been suppressed only for the moment. This should cause us no surprise. As a matter of fact, had the very first assault been successful and had it completely crushed imperialism, that in reality would have been a matter for surprise. The very fact that the enemy himself has admitted that the Rebellion came pretty near destroying his power, shows how successful was the first phase of our National Revolution.

And how was the first phase suppressed ? Was it the Military power of the enemy, his unmitigated reign of goondaism, looting, arson and murder that did the Job ? No. It is wrong to consider the " Revolt " as having been " suppressed ". The history of all Revolutions shows that a Revolution is not an event. It is a phase, a social process. And during the Evolution of a Revolution, tides and ebbs are normal. Our Revolution is at present going through the period of low water, so soon rather than rise to higher heights and go from Victory to Victory, not because the superior physical force of the Imperialist aggressors intervened, but because of two important reasons.

Firstly *there was no efficient organisation* (of) the national Revolutionary forces that could function (and) give effective lead to the mighty forces that were released. The Congress, though a great organisation, was not tuned to the pitch to which the Revolution was to rise. The lack of organisation was so considerable that even important Congressmen were not aware of the progress of the Revolt, and till late in course of the rising it remained a matter of debate in many Congress quarters whether what the people were doing was really in accordance with the Congress programme. In the same connection should be mentioned the regretable fact that quite a considerable number of influential Congressmen failed to attune their mental attitude to spirit of this " last fight for Freedom ". The earnestness, the urgency,

the determination that marked the attitude of leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Dr. Rajendra Prasad or Sardar Patel failed to reflect in the minds and hearts of all congress leaders.

Secondly, *after the first phase* of the Rising was over *there was no further programme* placed before the people. After they had completely destroyed the British Raj in their areas, the people considered their task fulfilled, and went back to their homes not knowing what more to do. Nor was it their fault. The failure was ours : we should have supplied them with a programme for the next phase. When this was not done, the Revolt came to a standstill and the phase of the ebb began. This situation was created many days before the British soldiers arrived in sufficient numbers to push back yet further the receding works of the revolt. What programme should have been placed before the people in the second phase ? The answer is suggested by the nature of Revolutions. A Revolution is not only a destructive process, it is at the same time a great constructive force. No Revolution could succeed if it only destroyed. If it should survive, it must create an authority to replace the one it has destroyed. Our Revolution too having accomplished over large territories of the country the negative task of destruction, called for a positive programme. The people who destroyed the objects and means of administration of the foreign power and drove away its agents should have set up in their areas their own units of Revolutionary Government and created their own police and militia. Had this been done, it would have released such an unprecedented volume of energy and opened up such a vast field for constructive work that the waves of the Revolution would have mounted higher and higher till—if the rising was countrywide—the imperialist power had been broken and the people had seized supreme authority throughout the land.

The lack of efficient organisation and of a complete programme of National Revolution : these were two causes of the downward course of the first phase of the present Revolution.

The question now is what are our present tasks ? First, to banish all depression from our minds and those of the people, and create an atmosphere of joy instead at the success achieved and of hope for success in the future.

Second, we must keep steadfastly before our minds and of the people the nature of this Revolution. It is our last fight for freedom. Our objective can, therefore, be nothing but victory. There can be no half way houses. The efforts that men like Rajagopalachari are making for the establishment of National government are not only fruitless but positively harmful in as much as they distract public attention from the real issues. There is no compromise, between the slogans of " Quit India " and of a " national government ". Those who are running after the slogan of Congress-League unity are merely serving the ends of imperialist propaganda. It is not the lack of unity that is obstructing the formation of a national government, but the natural unwillingness of imperialism to liquidate itself. Mr. Churchill left no manner of doubt about it, when he declared recently that he had not assumed the office of the King's first minister to preside over the liquidation of the Empire. He would be a foolish student of society indeed who expected empires to wither away of their own accord. Those erstwhile " revolutionaries " who are attempting today to wish away the Indian Empire by the cataclysmic force of humble memorials are making of themselves the most pitiable fools of history.

It is not the unity of all the important elements in Indian life, to quote the imperialist jargon, that is the need of the hour but the unity of all the national revolutionary forces. And these are already united under the flag of the Congress. Unity between the League and the Congress does not foreshadow the growth of these forces, but their absolute relation, for the League cannot conceivably tread the path of revolution and freedom.

The complete overthrow of imperialism, then, is our objective and we must keep this steadfastly in view. There can be no compromise on this issue. Either we win or we lose. And lose we shall not. Not only because we are determined ceaselessly

to work for victory, but also because powerful world forces are drawing the doom of imperialism and fascism ever nearer and nearer. Do not believe that the formal results of this war settled laboriously at the Peace Conference would settle the fate of the post-war world. War is a strange alchemist, and in its hidden chambers are such forces and powers brewed and distilled that they tear down the plans of the victorious and vanquished alike. No peace conference at the end of the last war decided that four mighty empires of Europe and Asia should fall into dust—the Russian, the German, the Austrian and Ottoman. Nor, was the Russian, the German, the Turkish Revolution decreed by Lloyd George, Clemenceau or Wilson.

Throughout the world where men are fighting, dying and suffering today, the alchemist is at work, just as he is in India, where he has already let loose a mighty social upheaval. Neither Churchill nor Roosevelt, neither Hitler nor Tojo will determine the fate of the world at the end of this war. It is force such as we represent that will fulfil that historic task. Can we doubt that revolutionary forces are stirring everywhere ? Can we believe that millions of people are undergoing unutterable suffering without a thought for the future ? Can we believe that millions are satisfied with the lies that their rulers daily feed them with. No, it cannot be so.

Having therefore definitely fixed our vision on the goal of total victory, we have to march ahead. What concretely must we do ? What does a general do when he loses or wins a battle ? He consolidates and prepares for the next battle ? Rommel stopped at El Alamein after his great victory to consolidate and prepare. Alexander too prepared and he turned his serious defeat into a resounding victory. Ours was not even a defeat. We really won the first round of the fight in as much as our large territories of the country the civil rule of the British aggressor was completely uprooted. The masses have now learnt from experience that the imposing edifice of the police and magistracy and law courts and prisons which goes by the name of British Raj is but a house of cards when they hurl against either collective power. This lesson is not likely to be forgotten and it constitutes the starting point for the next offensive.

Our third and most important task then at the present moment is to prepare for the next major offensive. Perhaps organisation, discipline ourselves—these are our present watch-words.

The next offensive ? When do we expect to launch the next offensive ? Some people think that the masses will not rise again for the next five or six years. This estimate might be true of peace time but it does not hold good for a stormy war-torn world of fast moving events. The savage tyrannies of the British fascists—the Linlithgows, the Hallets, the Stewarts and the myriads of others and theirs base Indian Lackeys—may have compelled the people to lie low for the present, but they have nowhere converted them into friends of the oppressors. The whole country side, where this British type of Nazi Hell was let loose, is seething with the most intense discontent, anger and thirst for revenge. The people have merely to understand that *powerful preparations are afoot* to take courage again and to enter the plans and schemes of the next offensive, with active, co-ordinated and disciplined work ; it would be wholly favourable for the next assault. International events may come to our aid. Then there is Gandhiji's ever impending fast unto death, a constant reminder to us and to the people not the slacken, not to waver, not to rest on the oars.

The question of the next offensive is linked up with the question of the positive task of the Revolution—*i.e.*, the establishment of the units of the Revolutionary governments. With the latter question is bound up the question of violence and maintain(ed) armed forces. I wish, therefore, to place before you my view on this question, as to my mind it affects vitally the future of our Revolution.

First of all, I feel I must say a few words about the noise the British authorities have made about the violence committed in the course of this revolution. There was some violence indeed under extreme provocation, but it was remarkably little as compared with the magnitude of the Rising and the staggering manifestation of

individual and collective non-violence. It is not realised, perhaps, that thousands of British and Indian employees of the foreign power were for some days literally at the mercy of the masses, who took compassion on their foes and spared them their lives and property. And what of the cool, sublime courage of those thousands of young and old who received the enemy's bullets on their chests with the flag revolution in their hands and " Inqlab Zindabad " on their lips ? Have the British a word of praise for this godly courage ?

In any case is it not remarkable that the British power which is soaked in violence, which is based on violence, which daily commits the most pitiless forms of violence, which grinds down millions of people and sucks their life-blood should make so much noise about the violence that others commit ? How are the British concerned with what weapons we choose to fight them with ? Have they pledged non-violence if the rebels adhere to it ? Have they not already shot down thousands of our non-violent soldiers ? Whatever weapons we use the British have only bullets for us and looting and rape and arson. So let them keep quiet as to how we fight them, it is our business entirely to decide that.

Coming to the question as it affects us, I would first remind you of the difference between Gandhiji's views on non-violence and those of the Working Committee and the A. I. C. C. Gandhiji is in no event prepared to depart from non-violence. With him it is a question of faith and life-principle. Not so with the Congress. Then Congress has stated repeatedly during this war that if India became free, or even if a national government were set up, it would be prepared to resist aggression with arms. But, if we are prepared to fight Japan and Germany with arms, why must we refuse to fight Britain in the same manner ? The only possible answer can be that the Congress in power could have an army, whereas the Congress in wilderness has none. But *supposing a revolutionary army were created or if the present Indian army or a part of it rebel*, would it not be inconsistent for us first to ask the army to rebel and then ask the rebels to lay down arms and face British bullets with bared chest ?

My own interpretation of the Congress position—not Gandhiji's—is clear and definite. Congress is prepared to fight aggression violently if the country became independent. Well, we have declared ourselves independent, and also named Britain as an aggressive power ; we are, therefore, justified within the terms of the Bombay resolution itself to fight Britain with arms. If this does not accord with Gandhij's principles, that is not my fault. The Working Committee and the A. I. C. C. themselves have chosen to differ from Gandhiji and to reject his conception of non-violence as applied to the war. Nor was Gandhiji allowed by the British power to lead and shape this resolution ; so, in following interpretation we should in no manner be false to him. We should only be discharging our duties in the light of our own reason. As far as I am concerned, I feel that I should be completely justified as an honest Congressman, without in any manner intruding my socialism upon the question, in repelling the British aggression with arms.

I should add that I have no hesitation in admitting that non-violence of the brave, if practised on a sufficiently large scale, would make violence unnecessary, but where such non-violence is absent, I should not allow cowardice, clothed in Shastric subtleties, to block the development of this revolution and lead to its failure.

With the implication of the last phase of the revolution clear in our minds, *we have to prepare, organise, train and discipline our forces.* In everything we do, we have constantly to bear in mind that ours is not to be merely a conspiratorial action. It is total revolt of the masses that is the our objective. So, along with our immense technical work, we must do intensive work among the masses—peasants in the villages and the workers in the factories, mines, railways and elsewhere. We must do ceaseless propaganda among them and help them in their present difficulties, organise them to fight for their present demands, recruit from them selected soldiers for our various activities and train them technically and politically. With training a few may succeed where thousands failed before. In every fiska and taluka and

thana, in every considerable factory and workshop or other industrial centres, we must have a band of militants, mentally and materially equipped for the next rising.

Then there is our work *in the Indian Army and the services.* There is agitational and demonstrative work. There is work in the schools and colleges and in the market place. There is the work in the Native States and on the frontiers of India. It is not possible for me here to describe our preparations more concretely. Let it suffice to say that there is tremendous work to be done and work for every one. Much is being done at present, but vastly more remains to be done.

Who but youth can accomplish all this ? Is it too much to hope that our students who have set such a brilliant record already will follow up their achievements and vindicate the promise they have given ? It is for the students themselves to answer.

I should make it clear that preparation does not mean that fighting entirely ceases for the moment. No " Skirmishes ", " frontier activities ", " minor clashes ", " sniping ", " patrolling "—all this must go on. These are in themselves a preparation for the offensive.

With full confidence in the people and devotion to the cause, let us, then, march ahead. Let our steps be firm, our hearts resolute and our vision undimmed. The sun of the Indian freedom has already risen above the horizon. Let not the clouds of our own doubts and disputes, inaction and faithlessness, obscure that sun and drown us in our self-created darkness.

In the end, comrades, I should like to say that it has made me inexpressibly happy and proud to be able once again to place my services at your disposal. In serving you, the last words of our leader, " do or die " shall be my guiding star, your co-operation my strength and your command my pleasure.

Somewhere in India.

B. JAI PRAKASH.

APPENDIX X

Mr. Gandhi's last message

Every man is free to go to the fullest length under *Ahimsa* by complete deadlock, strikes and all other non-violent means. *Satyagrahis* should go out to die and not to live. It is only when individuals go out to seek and face death that the Nation will survive. *Karenge Ya Marenge.* (We shall do or die).

APPENDIX XI

I. Instructions from the ALL INDIA CONGRESS COMMITTEE to the Provincial Congress Committees and others

Our chief task is to keep up the enthusiasm witnessed in urban India on the day of the arrest of Gandhiji and other leaders and to organise it along positive lines and, at the same time, to work up rural India to a similar pitch of activity with a view to make the culminating point of our struggle simultaneous in all the country. The essential consideration is time. Not only that we have to show what we are worth within two or four weeks, for else, Gandhiji might resort to a fast but that our rural and urban movements should be so coordinated and timed together that the Government may not already have crushed the one before the other is ready to meet with the same fate.

Rural India.—The village population should be encouraged to declare at public meetings and elsewhere that they are free and that the laws, taxation and police and other arrangements of a foreign government no longer bind them. The beginning of such meetings may be made in the smallest units, say a village, but the activity must soon develop into freedom and fraternity processions marching from one village

to another. All this is intended to lead to the bigger meeting of any ten and twenty villages, where the declaration of freedom and unity is reiterated. Nevertheless this propagandist and agitational activity must be given a positive programme and definite direction, or else it will fizzle out. Such a positive direction cannot be one of no-rent or no-tax campaign except as agitation, for the month for rent collection is yet far off. Nor can it be merely of educative agitation in respect of food-shortage, currency inflation, price control and the like. All this must be done, together with the declaration of freedom, in order to rouse the people. Once the people are roused, and even while they are roused, their energies must be given a definite task. In the present circumstances, this can be nothing else than the non-violent raids of thousands of people on the symbols and centres of British authority, the Thanas and the Tehsils. These must be put out of action. The police and other government servants should be invited, in the first instance, to accept the authority of the people or, in their refusal to do so, should be dispossessed both of their weapons and their governmental positions. It is essential to remember (1) that such raids should take place in the best awakened and organised two or three Tehsils or any one district and care should be taken not to select such areas in which there is friction of any kind, (2) that not only must these raids be timed together in the same district but thoughout the province, or, at least in the majority of the districts where the Congress message has reached best. The culminating point of these raids will be reached when the spontaneously awakened but organised energies of the people in their thousands raid the district headquarters. The government machinery will then not only be paralysed but shattered. Either at this moment, or in the process while this is taking place, a parallel authority of the people will be formed. This will be the beginning of the Free Indian States. It is also necessary to remember that efforts should be made to time together, as far as possible, the paralysis of the existing government machinery in all provinces. The climax of this paralysis should be designed to reach in four weeks from now; or a little earlier or a little later. There can of course be no rigidity.

It is needless to say that between their declaration of freedom and their attempt to put the existing administrative machinery out of action, the people must have completed their disobedience of all political and general laws of the government, with which we are in disagreement. They must, for instance, start manufacturing salt at their will, disobeying evacuation and other orders, refusal to appear in law courts.

Certain problems of (1) cadres to organise this work, (2) dislocation of government communications arise. This will be treated separately. Moreover all attempts at violence must be seriously discountenanced and this problem will be treated more thoroughly in an examination of our relations with government servants.

The instructions in succession, therefore, are:—

(1) Get everyone of our seven lakhs villages to organise meetings of declaration of freedom.

(2) Organise freedom and fraternity marches from one village to another.

(3) Disobey government authority and laws specially D. I. R. and engage in positive activity such as formation of people's executive and manufacture of salt and cessation of recruitment and war-contributions.

(4) Put Thanas and Tehsils and, later, district headquarters out of action through non-violence.

(5) Arrange completion of this programme in four weeks or thereabout. We must, however, be alert and careful that we do not fall behind the tamper of the people.

Urban India.—From reports obtained of happenings in Bombay, Ahmedabad, Allahabad, Calcutta and elsewhere on the day of Gandhiji's arrest, and even later, it is obvious that the people are highly excited. The enormous crowd in Shivaji Park where Gandhiji was to have spoken stood over dozen repeated attemps to

tear-gas it. There have been hundreds of lathi charges and quite frequent firings. The people appear to stand all this well but extreme care should be taken (1) to maintain the spirit of resistance, (2) to further strengthen it so that, even in the event of firings, a determined band of men and women at any rate should not run away.

The instructions are as follows:—

(1) To canalise the spontaneous outbursts of the people, an organised form should be given to it. An authoritative call for a general strike till Gandhiji and other leaders are back among us throughout the country is hereby given and in the first twenty cities of India effect should be to make it complete.

(*a*) Colleges and Universities must close indefinitely till freedom is won and Gandhiji is back among us. The striking students will (1) lead the demonstrative action in the towns or (2) go into the villages to further our four-week's programme.

(*b*) All general offices, such as whole-sale trade, banks and other establishments must close and their clerical personnel brought out. Retail shops with the exception of foods and similar provisions must also be persuaded to close.

(*c*) Stoppage of work in manufacturing industries such as textile and engineering should be completed in the course of the indefinite general strike and the workers brought out.

(2) Efforts should be made to reach the workers and clerical staff in the transport industry such as railways and docks and in the government agencies such as posts and telephones and radio and in the electricity producing and distributing plants, while the general strike in other sphere is maturing. When the culminating point of the general strike is reached, say three or four weeks from now, the call to strike should be given to this other category of workers, and clerks.

(3) Care should be taken to see that the climax of the movement both in rural and urban India is reached in four weeks from now.

(4) Appropriate appeals should be made to every class of our population, workers in the manufacturing industries, workers in the transport and government concerns, clerical staff all round, students, retail dealers through leaflets issued daily, differing in tone and directions in consonance with our needs and the differing situation, and through meetings and processions. In spite of the serious repressions, there must be daily small meetings and processions in hundreds and thousands all over the town and bigger demonstrations wherever possible, reiterating the declaration of freedom.

There is pre-eminently the problem of cadres, determined bands of men and women, who will lead our revolution, through its various stages of success. Apparently this is an enormous problem and we may flinch at the great task we have set before us and the inadequacy of our organisation. But nowhere was it more true than today that a revolution provides its own leadership. Moreover, the cadres are already there, if only we make use of them. In addition to the thousands of trained Congress workers who cannot all be clapped up in a day, nor even in a fortnight if they choose to work rather than to court arrest, there will be the hundreds of thousands of striking students, workers and clerks, particularly students. Upon these we can draw for our rural and urban work according to their talents and taste.

There is also the problem of the technical work of our revolution. Two things must be borne in mind. (1) These activities should never be looked upon as independent. They must in every event be subordinate to a mass action. (2) None of our activities should be such as to endanger human life, whether Indian or British and warnings should always be issud.

Again, how shall we infuse in our people the determination to face firings and yet not to retaliate in kind. In the earlier stages, hundreds will have to be ready to die, but when that is done, the end will not be far off when considerable sections

of the military and the police refuse to shoot or when, after the necessary non-violent strength is acquired, the people start disarming the government forces without killing the personnel. The organisation of non-violence is pre-eminently the question of a thousand or so self-chosen martyrs in all the country.

In this connection appeals should be made to the military and the police through leaflets and personal approaches and brave encounters in the midst of an awkward situation. Indians among government forces should, in the first instance, be asked to regard themselves as free men and to refuse to admit to foreign authority and to come over to the Indian revolution. If they cannot do this, they should in the second instance be asked not to shoot their own defenceless people fighting for their freedom as much as their own. Appeals not to shoot may also be addressed to British and American soldiers, although the emphasis here will not be a national freedom but on human freedom and peace all over the world.

DO OR DIE

We will die, Great Leader, but
We will also do,
We will free Gandhiji before he fasts.
LONG LIVE THE FREE STATE OF INDIA.

Duplicate and Distribute.

II.—All India Congress Committee: To Students

At the A. I. C. C. meeting in Bombay Gandhiji in his parting message to the nation issued an appeal to the students to take their rightful share in the struggle. The appeal was heard by the students of Bombay and we have no doubt it has also somehow reached the ears of students in other parts of the country. The struggle has started. The response of the nation on the very first day has been splendid. All classes of people threw themselves into the fight, but none perhaps took a braver and more glorious part than our student community. Most of the Congress leaders everywhere having been picked up, the students stepped into the gaps and assumed the leadership of the campaign. Our students are the rightful successors to our leaders behind the prison bars. We need intelligence, skill, judgment, earnestness and capacity for suffering among those whose privilege it will be to conduct the struggle and all these qualities our students possess. It is the task of the students to keep the fires burning, to carry on and intensify the struggle, to reach the Congress message to all our countrymen whether in urban and rural areas. Here is a bare outline of what they can do.

(1) All students above sixteen should leave their schools, colleges and Universities. They cannot carry on the studies and the Great Revolution simultaneously. Colleges and Universities must close down by the students voluntarily withdrawing from them. Let them remember that the fight we are in is not a long drawn out agony. We are resolved to make it a short and swift revolution. We have therefore to bring to it utter desperation born of the unconquerable will to DO OR DIE. If the students are possessed of this spirit they will infect the whole nation with it. They cannot have this revolutionary spirit unless they burn their boats, leave the colleges and fling themselves wholeheartedly into the fight.

(2) Our fight will be waged on two fronts—Rural and Urban. The students have a decisive part to play on both the fronts. Complete paralysis of the administrative machinery in all its branches is the objective of the struggle. The forces of law and order which are being used to lathi charge and tear-gas people into submission to be paralysed by all non-violent means, the courts of law set up to administer laws made by the Imperialist Government to suppress our people to be rendered functionless, stoppage of work in manufacturing industries till our goal is reached. Communications, which to-day instead of being public utility services

are used to throttle us to be put out of use without causing hurt to life, to give a few instances of what we need to do if our struggle is to succeed in the contemplated period of time. It will be the task of students, as leaders of this struggle, to canalise the energy and enthusiasm of the people and divert it into fruitful channels. The revolutionary spirit must be kept up by all non-violent ways open to them.

Ours is a vast country. The message of the Congress has to reach each village and each hamlet. The rural India has to be roused into a spirit of open rebellion and who will do this if not the students. Such among them as are suited for this work should singly or in parties visit the rural areas and deliver the message. Only the message has to be delivered and explained and the people will do the rest. They have to be told that the British Raj is no more and they have to take steps to establish the Raj of the people. Let the people combine and take steps to establish the Raj of the people. Let the people combine and take the administration of the villages into their hands. This must inevitably involve disobedience of orders received from officials high or low. There shall be complete non-co-operation with the alien administration. There must be utmost harmony and unity among the people if our revolution is to succeed in the minimum time. The disappearance of the existing apparatus of administration should synchronise with the establishment of our own Raj in each village and Tehsil. The Raj will have behind it the united will and strength of the people.

(3) We must remember that non-violence is the basis of our struggle. Activities which tend in the direction of violence should be discouraged. Disciplined non-violence on a mass scale will generate in us ever growing strength and power. For purely practical considerations non-violence should be adhered to even under circumstances of the gravest provocation. At all events care should be taken to avoid all danger to life. Violence is self-destructive. Nothing will be more conducive to the success of the struggle than that our people remain non-violent while violence rages round them. Acts of non-violence, bravery, readiness to face death without retaliation disarm our opponents and win popular sympathy for our cause. The struggle is hardly two days old and yet we have reports of many soldiers and military officers resigning from the service. This is largely the outcome of the appeal that our voluntary suffering without retaliation makes to them. It is heartening to note that our people have remained predominantly non-violent even in the face of indecent and indiscriminate violence. They have endured the lathi charges and firings as non-violent soldiers are expected to do.

(4) The Government has suppressed all existing channels of publicity. It is for the students to explore fresh avenues. They have skill and resourcefulness enough to reach all relevant news about the movement to the people. Let them organise an information bureau. The instructions that reach them from the A. I. C. C. and other authoritative quarters should be broadcast to the people. They may print bulletins and leaflets of their own and distribute them in thousands among the people in the language or languages of the province as also in English. A group of students should be especially appointed for the publicity work.

(5) While the work of preparing bulletins and leaflets is to be entrusted to one group of students, another group, a much larger one, should be charged with the work of distributing them among all classes of people.

(6) We have to approach all classes of people, the labourers, mill-owners, the clerical personnel in the various services, the merchants, the petty traders, the police, the military and so on. Students have to maintain close and constant contacts with them. Their contacts with the police and the military can be especially useful. There is a large and growing element in the police and military services which is friendly and sympathetic to the Congress. We have to plead with them, wherever we find them to play the part worthy of them in the Great Fight. A soldier's duty is to protect the people and fight and if need be lay down his life for a good cause. It cannot be the duty of an Indian soldier to help in putting down his own people struggling for their birth-right of freedom. Our earnest pleadings

coupled with the events that are happening from day to day, cannot but have a salutary effect on the minds of our countrymen in the military and the police services. The American and other soldiers should also be approached. More about them separately.

(7) Processions and meetings should form a daily feature of our struggle. In big towns meetings may be held in different localities on different days. Besides speeches there should be a liberal distribution of printed literature among the audience. Initiative in organising meetings etc. should be taken by students.

(8) Paper or metallic badges bearing suitable mottos such as "DO OR DIE" should be distributed in thousands among the people.

(9) It is our firm hope and belief that the present struggle will bring us communal harmony. The three days of struggle have brought us abundant evidence of growing fraternisation among Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and others. Nowhere is this fraternisation more in evidence than among students. We see this in strikes, processions, meetings and other activities. Common suffering, common devotion to the cause of Liberty have abolished all communal distinctions. Let it be the proud privilege of a student to be the agent of communal harmony. Students, Hindu, Muslim, Christian and others, should lay their heads together and find out ways and means of cementing the unity that is emerging out of the crucible of common suffering for a common cause. The message of unity should reach the man in the street through leaflets, slogans and appropriate cries.

(10) Our struggle is thickening with each passing day. There can be no slackening, no relaxation of our work. There is going to be no going back on the decision the Congress has taken. If we live we live as free men in a free country else we die in the attempt. Gandhiji need not fast, need not make the supreme sacrifice if we all stand by him, and in one united mass assert the will to be free. A miracle will happen. What appears to be a formidable structure will collapse like a pack of cards in an incredibly short space of time. Let our students be the agents of this miracle.

DO OR DIE

WE WILL DIE, GREAT LEADER, BUT
WE WILL ALSO DO
WE WILL FREE GANDHIJI BEFORE HE FASTS
LONG LIVE THE FREE STATE OF INDIA.

APPENDIX XII

Survey of the first five months of "Our Revolution"

EXTRACT FROM BOMBAY CONGRESS BULLETIN No. 132, DATED 9TH JANUARY 1943

Looking Back: Our Revolution has now completed five months of its giant sweep, and is now in the sixth month. Five months of hard struggle, of toil, tears and blood, on a scale unparallelled in the history of our country. Five months of mass-up-risings, of acts of individual bravery and fearlessness, of heinous acts of inhuman brutalities and atrocities on the part of the alien Imperialist agents, and five months sustained and cheerfully braved sufferings on the part of the large masses of our people. To-day on the memorable 9th, let us, for a while, pause and ponder over these months of our freedom-march, and analyse our failures and our ahievements.

Let us, at the very outset, admit that the Revolution has not been able to attain that pitch, that momentum, which we all expected it would. The march has been slower than expected. Thousands of our dear and valued comrades have laid down their lives, and many more thousands have suffered and are suffering imprisonments and untold hardships. The gigantic and sweeping mass up-risings and mass

demonstrations and mass-attacks that we witnessed in the beginning of our struggle have slowed down and subsided. The defiant temper that showed itself on the faces and in the activities of our people in the earlier stages of our struggle is today, after a strenuous march, rather seasoned down to solid bitterness. We confess that while numerous centres of usurper administration have been attacked, and in many cases, destroyed, and the war on communications has been carried on with more or less sustained tempo, we have not been, as yet, able to paralyse the administration completely. The factories are still working and producing war materials, and other factories which have been producing intellectual slaves are still active: The students have again lapsed into inactivity and drifted into the old rut.

That is our debit side. These can be put as our failures. But what about the credit side? What about our achievements?

The dynamics of our struggle do not allow us now to expect any swift results. Ours is going to be a sustained, even if long-drawn-out, struggle. Our achievements during these five months, however, give us a certain hope of ultimate success. If mass-demonstrations have ceased, we have gained immeasurably in individual bravery and resourcefulness. The movement has gone underground, and is slowly atomising into strong and virile pockets. The earlier tempo may not have been maintained. Yet the spirit of defiance and determination has spread and developed widely and intensely. In place of disorganised and scattered mass demonstrations, we have now strongly formed groups of brave and courageous and resourceful cadres, working day and night, planning and executing numerous and varied raids on the enemy.

Together with this, the social and economic discontent upon which revolutions like ours are based and are being fostered, is coming into its own. The untold poverty, hunger, and daily increasing food scarcity are rapidly rising to a pitch when all the revolting elements will join hand and crash with a bang upon the usurper authority and, through chaos and confusion and through violent upheavals, lead the Revolution to a success and create a new and better world to live in.

APPENDIX XIII

" Six Commanders of Gandhi Baba "

[Bapu's (Mahatma Gandhi's) message to the nation at the time of going to jail.]

1. Look upon yourself as free.
2. We are free to do anything so long as we remain within the limits of non-violence.
3. Paralyse the administration of Government by means of complete hartals and other non-violent means.
4. A satyagrahi should join the struggle for dying and not in the hope of remaining alive.
5. Keep the nation alive even at the risk of death.
6. Do or die.

(How should you put into execution this message?)

1. Do not acknowledge any power other than the public.
2. Keep closed all factories, mills, colleges, schools and markets so long as full independence is not achieved.
3. Maintain complete non-cooperation with Government.
4. Destroy the administration of Government.
5. Do picketting in Government offices and dislocate Government administration by every means.

6. Destroy tram, railway and motor services.
7. Destroy telegraph and telephone wires.
8. Persuade policemen not to carry out Government's orders.
9. Let the people take possession of college and school buildings and Government administration and keep them closed and in suspension if the British Government does not leave India.
10. Violate all prohibitory orders of Government.
11. Disseminate by every possible means and in every corner the news of this open rebellion against Government (for example give publicity to this by writing on walls, by leaflets, by writing on the ground, by word of mouth or by distributing leaflets etc.).

For the sake of God and your country make and distribute ten copies of this.

"LONG LIVE FREE INDIA".

APPENDIX XIV

EXTRACT FROM THE "HARIJAN" DATED AUGUST 23, 1942.

Question Box.

Permissible Items.

Q.—What may be permitted for disorganising Government within the limit of non-violence ?

A.—I can give my personal opinion only. In my opinion looting or burning of offices, banks, granaries etc. is not permissible. Dislocation of traffic communications is permissible in a non-violent manner without endangering life. The organisation of strikes is the best and if that can be accomplished it in itself will be effective and sufficient. It will be non-violence without blemish. Cutting wires, removing rails, destroying small bridges cannot be objected to in a struggle like this, provided ample precautions are taken to safeguard life. If the Japanese were invading us, there can be no doubt that even no principle of non-violent self-defence, these would have to be carried out. The non-violent revolutionaries have to regard the British power in the same way as they (*i.e.* revolutionaries) would the Axis powers and carry out the same measures.

APPENDIX XV

Miscellaneous Congress pamphlets.

Inquilab Bulletin No. 1.

Friends ! We put before you the following few instructions :—

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(4) To make complete deadlock possible all factories, mills, colleges, markets, etc. must remain closed till freedom is achieved. *Instead of idling away their time, students* should form their own groups in their localities to prevent their people from attending business offices.

(5) Persuade Government officers and officials to disobey Government orders and give up their slavish jobs.

(6) Completely paralyse communications and transport, dislocate tram and bus service, uproot telegraphic and telephonic posts, dig up roads, cut railways, tear out motor and bus tyres and dislocate the Government machinery in every possible way.

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Congress Bulletin No. 5

Britishers' ordered Anarchy

The real fighters for India's freedom and independence will never fight shy of the word " chaos " ; rather they should invite it. That is going to overpower the present ordered anarchy carried on by the Britishers in the ugliest form for the last five days in all the cities and towns of India. Remember what Mahatmaji said on the 25th May last :—" I am convinced that we are living to-day in a state of ordered anarchy. This ordered disciplined anarchy should go and if, as a result, there is a complete lawlessness in India, I would risk it and people will evolve real popular order out of chaos ".

Every freedom-loving man and woman must follow this instruction of Gandhiji to complete the task that he left unfinished.

Anglo-American Third Front in India

The most virulent form of violence is being used by the combined Anglo-American forces and this must be met by all available means including violence wherever necessary.

Mass murder all over India

The India Office in London says that our movement has not affected the masses. Since the first phase of demonstration against the British offensive in cities is now over, it is incumbent on the townsmen, villagers, factory and land-workers to organise wholesale strikes, stop payment of taxes and revenue, withdraw money from Postal Savings Banks, take possession of post offices, tahsil headquarters, thanas and chowkies, picket recruiting centres, persuade military and policemen not to use lathies, guns and bayonets against their Indian brothers and sisters and if and when such command comes from the top they should use the same weapons against their masters for unjust and inhuman order. Thus this task should be carried on relentlessly for some time and open the road for the Indian armies, who had gone out of India to fight for British but now allies of other powers, to come back to India and join your struggle.

Remember that as a protest against the British firing on Indians since 9th August the arrest of nationalist leaders and patriotic workers here, one Indian Army in Egypt and another in North Africa have refused to fight for the British and their officers and ranks have been mercilessly shot as rebels. Another Regiment of Indian Army in North Africa has revolted and as a result, 20 per cent. have been shot dead and the rest made prisoners.

International Affairs

Look to the battle of Solomon Island. Japan has had the upper hand there as elsewhere ; yet false news is given that Japan is being defeated. On the other hand, the whole of the Pacific is controlled by the superior Jap Naval Force. America is provoking Great Britain to launch offensive everywhere, so that it gets crushed as Britain provoked all the countries only to be crushed.

Marshal Timoshenko has now given up the hopes of saving the Caucasus ; he is concentrating all energies and forces towards the Stalingrad front which is in a very precarious position. It is only a matter of a few weeks for the German drive towards the borders of Iran.

The British Premier Mr. Churchill is away from London—but where and why ?

The treacherous role played by Mr. Harris, British Vice-Counsul at Ishpahan has been avenged by the Persian Patriots. They believe in slogan of " Asia for Asiatics " and therefore they greet each other with the abbreviated expression " Afa ". Similarly, those Indians who think and act in terms of " India for Indians " propose their greeting terms as " Ifi ".

The United National profess to fight for freedom and democracy but yet none of them has yet condemned the British atrocity and brutal massacre of Indians in the last few days, while all the countries forming the Axis Power and other neutral countries have been sending every day their sympathies with us and condemning gangsterism of Britishers.

Japan has consistently and persistently pronounced that she has no interest nor lust for conquest of India except that the Britishers are driven out and India becomes free at once.

The Indian soldiers including those of the Mysore, Baroda, Kapurthala, Nizam States who are now free in Japan and German occupied countries or even in Free States of Burma, Malaya, Singapore, Batavia, etc. are sending their greetings to their Indian brothers with assurances that they would come back soon to liberate India. Once the struggle has begun it must be carried on vigorously simultaneously all over India till Gandhiji's Birthday—2nd October next.

Bombay Congress Bulletin dated 17th August 1942

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TO SOLDIERS. Let us appeal to the soldiers and the police in our country to refuse to act as the repressive arm of the law. For this organisation and continued effort is necessary. The will of the people is with us. Let us get down to our workers and tell them that they must refuse to supply with their labours the requirements of an unjust government. Actual organisation of their relief is another heavy task. Determination to strike work cannot succeed without adequate food for those who come out. Let us collect food and aid for the workers so that a general strike of a long enough duration may succeed.

It is the legitimate duty of a people to end tyranny and thwart its opponents by the organised strength of its will. Let us exercise our will and—

1. Refuse all co-operation to the Government.
2. Deny the use of communication to troop movements or troop supplies.
3. Refuse to obey their unjust laws.
4. Refuse to work in war factories.
5. Refuse to help the government in represessing our own people.

Remember that our five hundred people have been shot dead and five times as many wounded all over India during the week after Gandhiji's arrest. Nearly thirty thousand men and women have been thrown into prisons during the first week of the struggle for freedom but the spirit of the people is undaunted. Government is congratulating itself already but he laughs best who laughs last. The fire within and underneath will express itself in some days. Each one of you help in this expression. Non-cooperate with the industrial economic and legal machine of the Government. Stay away from your jobs.

The finger of our brave martyr is pointed at you. Shall it be one of accusation or praise ?

Leaflet entitled " Workers of India " issued in the name of the A. I. C. C. Office

Gandhiji has called upon every Indian to declare himself or herself as a citizen of free India. This declaration implies that we refuse to obey British laws or accept British authority. The process of smashing British authority has already begun with the beginning of Indian Revolution.

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Workers have always been in the forefront of Revolutions and you must lead the Indian Revolution. You have already shown your determination by walking out of your factories which were today mostly doing jobs for the British Government you have begun to overthrow. Keep out of these factories till British power is smashed and becomes a thing of the past. Bring out your comrades who are still inside the few factories. You will not have to keep out long and the factories you go back to will not be the monuments of exploitation that they are for with British rule must end.

The resolution of the Working Committee dated 14th July which was subsequently reiterated by the Bombay A. I. C. C. states " Only after the end of British authority will the realisation come home that princes, jagirdars, zamindars and propertied and monied classes drive their wealth and property from workers in the fields and factories and elsewhere to whom essentially power and authority must belong ". It is in your hands to make this possible by sweeping away British authority and exploitation of one stroke.

You have all over the country faced lathies and bullets and you are facing them today as brave men and women. Nothing worth while is achieved without the necessary sacrifice.

In addition to the stoppage of work you have to see that communications in any shape or form must stop, the foreign army must be immobilised so that it can have no power to strike you and your countrymen.

Every article which this army and the British authority needs must also be cut off. We did not invite them here. Let them feed and clothe themselves as best they can.

Start organising yourselves in your street and moholla committee so that you protect yourselves against the attempt by the police and the military to re-establish British authority.

You know that Gandhiji asked you to rebel because Japanese are knocking at your doors and perhaps Germans might be doing so in the near future. The British Government has proved itself incapable in Malaya, and Burma to protect those people. They are no more capable of protecting you. The people want the power to organise themselves for defence for the British and other foreign armies if defeated will run with their tails between their legs. You will have to live in this country and you do not want to exchange masters but be masters in your own country. The right and ability to defend our country can only be effective after we have the power to do so, a power the British have withheld from us because in spite of their tall talk of democracy they want to hold India in bondage.

Bulletin No. 6—War of Independence

Devilish Slaughter

The devilish slaughtering by the British Army and Police is going on still more ruthlessly. In addition to the places mentioned in our previous bulletin, the firing was resorted to on the unarmed people at Madura, Sangli, Benares, Gorakhpur and several other places. Further brutal attacks with tear gas, batons, lathies, guns, bayonets and bombs etc., are made freely while the defensive weapons of our soldiers are only stones and soda water bottles. The casualties so far being 700 killed and about 7,000 wounded ; about 4,500 people have already been made prisoners of war by the British while the number of such prisoners in Bombay alone is in the neighbourhood of 1,000.

No Negotiation—Fight on

Those who talk of negotiation and compromise even at this stage, are doing greater harm than good to the cause of the country. The Government has first started the offensive, and ours is only defensive. This fight we must carry on to victorious conclusion. " Victory or Death " is our determination.

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War Programme

This programme has already been given to the country and we dealt with items in our previous bulletins. While reiterating the same we now ask you to include the following items as well and they should be worked out according to the suitability of different places and capacity of the soldiers of freedom—

1. Boycott of all English goods.
2. Boycott all British firms and shops.
3. Social boycott of persons who help the British in any shape or manner.
4. Formation of Guerilla Bands to give surprise attacks on the Tommies.
5. Prevention of personal harm or physical injury of the public.
6. Symbols of slavery like the British monuments, statues are to be demolished and destroyed.
7. Slow and inefficient work by clerks and ministerial staff in the offices of Government and British and American Firms.
8. Wholesale strike in mills and factories concerning textile and engineering.
9. Britishers' cooks are to be organised to cook bad food for their masters.
10. Formation of barricades in streets to prevent police and military attacks.
11. Defiance of all laws.
12. Prevention of all courts functioning.
13. Non-payment of all kinds of taxes whenever possible.
14. Stopping of all trains carrying troops and war materials.

Bulletin No. 7—War of Independence.

....., the soldiers of our National Militia have been so far successful in dislocating all the railway traffic, telephone and telegraphic communications almost all over India. The notable success in this direction is in Bengal which even the Government had admitted.

Workers Task

This movement has opened up the greatest opportunity for the industrial workers to fight for their salvation. So long as they were fighting only on economic grounds and had their piecemeal settlement. But now let them secure the political Freedom and take rein in their hands. For this they must strive every nerve to sabotage the supply of war materials to the British. This they can and should do by stopping work in all mills and factories specially of textile and engineering. They should leave their work immediately, leave the cities and go to their native places and take up the whole programme to work out in the interior. Those who remain in and around the cities should picket vigorously all the places including transport services, create all kinds of harassment to the civil, police and military of the Britishers.

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The self-respecting citizens, youths and students would retaliate the insulting and most humiliating expressions of the Britishers when they call our soldiers of the National Militia as "mobs", "hooligans", "rowdy elements" etc.

Regular hands of youths and students should be organised to approach the mothers, sisters, and wives of those Indians who are now working in the Police and Military and make them persuade their relatives to revolt against their masters and win freedom for their own motherland. As a matter of fact, within these ten days

our own Indian brothren have shot our brilliant brothers and molested our sisters. If they do not stop this behaviour, they will be suitably dealt with for which the mothers and sisters of such police and military men should be warned before hand.

Bonfire of English Goods

There should be organised raids on shops dealing with English goods and asked to stop selling such goods. If they refuse to do so, there should be bon-fires of such goods in front of those shops.

Picketing of English and American Banks

The Bank clerks of such banks should ask all depositors to withdraw their money; destroy such records as are useful to the English Directors and the Bank itself. Students and workers should raid such banks as well, but before it is done the depositors should be asked to withdraw their money from all English and American banks.

"Victory or Death"—Must be our Answer

Do or Die—Mahatma's Command.

INQUILAB ZINDABAD. AZAD HIND ZINDABAD.

Leaflet entitled "Free State of India Gazette", dated 18th August 1942.

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In order to shorten the struggle against the foreign authority it is very necessary among other things to starve it of vital supplies. Your Association is concerned with one such vital supply and it gladdened our hearts to see that there was practically a complete stoppage of work in Textile Mills. It helped us in two ways, stopping supplies to the British and releasing large man-power to assist in the task of smashing British authority.

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